## Liberal International Order Bad

### Notes

#### Notes and file complied by Will Kochel

#### Impact scenarios---

**Global Governance:** Chinese backlash to the LIO causes global governance collapse. Only inclusion into global norms allows for a) a wider variety of problem solving and b) prevents total collapse from said backlash. The US lead is specifically bad because it excludes those perspectives

**China Backlash:** China is not revisionist, but if they are forced out of the international order (not LIO) or the US keeps its leadership their only option is to violently react rather than cooperate which is more escalatory

**Relations:** LIO promotion causes China to not trust us (also causes war) which collapses bilateral relations---those are key to a

**Peacekeeping:** expanded Chinese leadership in the UN is key to successful peacekeeping operations which prevents hotspots from escalating

**African Instability:** Allowing China to have expanded power in Africa deescalates conflicts in the region promoting over all stability which is good for a la

**For unsustainability**, distinguishing the “ myth of the liberal order” is helpful – the neg should note that the aff insulates and maintains a globalizing coercive American led LIO not the idealistic ev their normative impact ev describes

### 1nc – Global Governance

#### Trying to maintain the US LED order fails and ensures extinction. China can be integrated into the world order BUT only if the US takes a step back

Zelikow 22 — Philip Zelikow Professor of History at the University of Virginia. A former U.S. diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations., “The Hollow Order,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 22 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system, accessed 7-1-2022, WMK

It may be easy, and perhaps natural, for the would-be architects of the new system to organize it around Washington. But that would be a mistake. The enemies of this new order, united by their resentment of the United States, will seek to discredit it as just another effort to dominate global affairs. For this new order to be viable, it must be conceived in such a way that the charge is false.

The new order must also be decentralized to be effective; the resources and wisdom needed to solve many vexing problems are not concentrated in the United States. For instance, on the enormous issue of defining rules for a digitized world, Washington has been confused and passive, despite—or perhaps because of—its dominance in such commerce. It is the European Union that has led the way. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, its Digital Services Act, and its Digital Markets Act created the standards that influence most of the world, including the Americas. Decentralized leadership has also proved critical to responding to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. The nucleus of the emerging pro-Ukraine coalition, for instance, is not just the United States but the entire G-7, including the European Commission. South Korea and Australia should be invited to join this coalition as well.

Yet a revised system of world order shouldn’t be limited to the United States and its traditional allies. It must be open to any countries that can and will help attain its common objectives. India should have a place at any symbolic high table, for example, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. But India’s leaders are still making their choices about their will and capacity to work on common problems. Even China should be welcome at the table. After much internal debate in the early 1990s, China’s leaders chose to play a major and often constructive role in the global commonwealth system that emerged after the end of the Cold War. In 2005, Zoellick famously urged Beijing to become a “responsible stakeholder.” As late as 2017, Kurt Campbell, who now leads Asia policy for the Biden White House, thought this invitation was a wise move.

But Zoellick’s words were a challenge, one that Beijing is failing to meet. China’s partnership with Putin—whom Xi described to the Russian press as “my best and bosom friend”—is the opposite of responsible. Instead, it shows that China and Russia lead a primarily Eurasian grouping of dangerous states, including the likes of Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. Their loose confederation has its cross-purposes and is united mainly by hostility toward the United States. But it is building tighter links, better divisions of labor, and more effective coordination than existed among the Axis powers before or during World War II.

For these and other reasons, pessimists believe China is irredeemably hostile. They argue that China has written off the United States as a country determined to resist China’s rise and that Chinese leaders may feel they have little to lose by embracing confrontation. In this pessimistic view, China is trying to shift from the post–Cold War era’s emphasis on global interdependence toward a Chinese grand strategy of Eurasian dominance and growing national self-sufficiency. China’s leaders are now using the pandemic to keep a chokehold on international travel and strengthen domestic surveillance.

That does seem to be China’s current plan. But it is unclear whether this plan will work. It rests on unproven social, political, and economic premises that are starting to deeply disturb parts of Chinese society essential to its past and future success—such as the many residents of Shanghai who have been trapped during the city’s draconian recent lockdown.

Chinese leaders may also have noticed that, in backing the Putin regime, they have tethered themselves to an adventurist Russian government that, for 30 years, has treated its neighbors much as Japan treated China between 1915 and 1945. For instance, Putin insists that Russia is not invading Ukraine. There is no war, he declared; there is only a “special military operation.” Many Chinese people will recall that, from 1937 to 1941, Japan insisted that it, too, was not invading China. There was no war, the Japanese said; there was merely a “China incident.”

Throughout the years of Japanese aggression, the United States defended China’s territorial integrity. Even amid times of misjudgment and weakness, Washington maintained that stance, refusing in November 1941 to make a deal with Japan at China’s expense. Ten days later, Japan went to war against the United States. As they watch what is happening in 2022, Chinese leaders can still reflect on this past and consider what decisions to make.

If Beijing charts a new course, it would not be the first time it has chosen to change. But if China does rejoin a system of world order, it should be a new one. The old system has fractured and must be remade. Facing tragic realities, the citizens of the free world must rebuild a global order that is practical enough to address the most vital common problems, even if it cannot and does not promise progress on all the values and concerns people face. This system will be far more effective if the world’s most populous country joins it, and China faces another time of choosing. Regardless of China’s participation, responsible actors must begin the hard, substantive work of protecting the planet from war, climate, economic, and health risks. The time for rhetoric and posturing is over.

#### Chinese led order is key to prevent great power war---transition is possible and peaceful ONLY if there is not US backlash

Manning 22 — Robert A. Manning, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and its New American Engagement Initiative. “Locking China Out of the Global Order Could Backfire” Foreign Policy. May 9th, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/09/china-global-order-decoupling-xi-beijing-reforms/> WMK

Both Russia’s scorched-earth invasion of Ukraine and the swift fury of the U.S. and European Union-led global response seem to have come as a shock to Beijing. China’s ambiguous stance—clearly anti-American but not explicitly pro-Russian or anti-Ukrainian—in part comes because the West’s surprisingly strong response has frustrated Chinese ambitions.

It may not have fully sunk in yet in Beijing, but the resurgence of an economic and strategically unified West, and the risk of the financial and political liability of protecting a dependent, wrecked petrostate, should lead Chinese President Xi Jinping to see the wisdom of cooperating with the global economic order, albeit with a larger Chinese voice and modest distancing from its partner in Moscow. Despite its echoing of Russian disinformation, Beijing has cautiously cut off Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank loans and trade financing to Moscow, and China’s state-run Sinopec halted gas and petrochemical projects in Russia. With $3 trillion in mostly dollar and euro assets and watching the United States disappear Russian Central Bank assets overnight, Beijing’s caution is understandable.

But would the United States accept inclusion of a more cooperative China if Beijing changed course and used it leverage to help resolve the Ukraine question? Given relentless U.S. indictment of Chinese behavior on Ukraine, even before China has taken any actual moves to aid Moscow, Xi could be forgiven for thinking that the answer is: probably not.

I’ve never quite understood the endgame of the many efforts to forge common cause solely with democracies on global trade, technology, and all things digital. I thought the point was to position the United States to shape global rules and standards—which means accepting major authoritarian economies in that order, lest a dangerous race to the bottom from a fragmented order of competing rules and standards ensues.

The unified public and private sector sanctions placed on Russia underscore the imperative of reaching consensus on rules and standards with allies and like-minded partners to the degree possible. It’s a smart U.S. starting point, a force multiplier for U.S. leverage. And in strategic areas of supply chain security and technology like 5G, it can be a viable end goal. But what jumped out at me watching U.S. President Joe Biden’s Summit for Democracy last December was the question of whether this is viewed as an end in itself across the board. If the United States can, for example, reach a consensus with the EU and Japan on World Trade Organization (WTO) reform or standards for artificial intelligence, shouldn’t this provide leverage to negotiate with China, Russia, and others to shape global norms?

Instead, the opposite appears more the conventional wisdom. In February, when asked about consulting with the region on the recently released U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Kritenbrink said emphatically, “There is currently no intention to engage the People’s Republic of China on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.”

This is not a one-off aberration but tracks with the responses I get when I ask senior administration officials, “Won’t this lead to a more dangerous, divided world? So why not test China’s intentions at the negotiating table?” The response, as one official put it, was, “Yeah, we assume China won’t change.” Richard Fontaine, the CEO of the Center for a New American Security, seemed to embrace this assumption in a recent essay in Foreign Affairs, writing, “The aim of U.S. policy toward China should be to ensure that Beijing is either unwilling or unable to overturn the regional and global order.” That assumes China seeks not just to tilt rules in its direction but overturn the order on which its economy depends.

Yet China is hardly impervious to change. Aside from 12 major (and dozens of minor) dynasties over the past 4,000 years, since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949, there have been no shortages of major shifts. There was Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, a catastrophic collectivization campaign launched in 1958 that led to some 30 million Chinese starving to death. That was preceded by Mao’s “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom” campaign to encourage diverse, new thinking—but then Mao cut the flowers with an anti-rightist campaign against those who spoke out.

In 1966, to reassert control over what he feared was a bureaucratizing CCP government, Mao started the disastrous Cultural Revolution, empowering Chinese youth (so-called Red Guards) to attack the CCP bureaucracy, institutions, and intellectuals. Nearly 2 million people were killed and millions imprisoned or tortured, disrupting a generation and setting China back. The led to the reform period. After Mao had a stroke in 1972, Deng Xiaoping gradually took the reins of power, following internal CCP struggles against Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and the “Gang of Four.” Market-oriented reforms took off, first with incremental experiments and then writ large, with Deng proclaiming, “To get rich is glorious.” Collective leadership followed, implementing change, until Xi’s rise and his “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” undoing some market reforms and Deng’s restrained foreign policy. The reactionary trend of policy under Xi is, in fact, a sign that China is capable of change—in both directions.

But even a post-Xi leadership is unlikely to see any incentive to change if it believes the United States has no interest in seeing it or in reaching accommodations with China in a viable international order. Despite the wild political roller coaster of CCP rule, much of the deluge of commentary by the post-engagement commentariat seems to view the party as a monolithic, relentless force. There may be some truth in Xi’s own inflexibility. Though he has eliminated many rivals, Xi has his share of enemies and, as noted above, a CCP history of course changes. There are hints of discontent: Recent extraordinary articles by a Central Committee member and a leading party school official, respectively, praising Deng’s reforms and not mentioning Xi were widely discussed in China.

If the United States wants an international order, rather than, as Princeton University’s Aaron Friedberg recently proposed, a “partial liberal order,” it has to offer states such as China some stake in that order. The logic of “democracies only” could lead to a bifurcated or maybe trifurcated world (the EU has a different philosophy on regulation) with dueling trade rules and tech standards.

#### Global governance prevents extinction---pandemics, climate change, emerging tech, and global peace

Bailey 18 — Robert Bailey, "Why do we need global governance?," Vision of Earth | Shaping a happy, healthy, and prosperous future, 9-5-2018, https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-governance/, accessed 7-6-2022, WMK

Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen.1

The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3

We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day. The progress of technological research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier.

There are other problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4

Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways – we refer the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves.

Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination.

Effective global governance is global governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance can be achieved.

### I/L LIO Collapse🡪 GG

#### The LIO is a myth and fails---its try or die to transition away for successful global governance

Barnett 19 — Michael N. Barnett Professor of International Affairs and Political Science Elliott School of International Affairs George Washington University “The End of a Liberal International Order That Never Existed • The Global,” 4-16-2019, https://theglobal.blog/2019/04/16/the-end-of-a-liberal-international-order-that-never-existed/, accessed 7-4-2022, WMK

More “order” than “liberal”?

This is the basic origin story of the liberal international order. But it might be more order than liberal. Sovereignty and the principle of non-interference was a cornerstone of that order, and while it was routinely violated, almost all states accepted that a world of sovereignty was necessary for stability. To help matters along, the United Nations (UN) established the norm of the use of force only in self-defense; and while it, too, was repeatedly violated, it did cause many states to pause before attacking and to look for nonviolent ways to accomplish their goals. States and the UN also created institutions and rules to help create a path for peaceful change, but they were hardly liberal. The UN helped the world make the transition from a world of empires to a world of sovereign states, but liberal (imperial) states can hardly be given credit for hurrying along the decolonization process. There was broad attachment to multilateralism, which meant more than simply three or more states involved in creating cooperative arrangements. It meant eschewing unilateralism in favor of mutual accommodation. It meant steering away from narrow self-interest in recognition of the value of diffuse reciprocity and collective welfare. It meant operating according to generalized principles of conduct that extended to all. It meant accepting principles of nondiscrimination. This form of multilateralism would help maintain international order. According to some, liberal states were especially critical for creating this multilateral worldview, but multilateralism had principles that were hardly owned and operated by liberalism.

There was a postwar order, but was it liberal? Like most political orders, it looked much better on paper than it did in practice and to the core members of the order than those on the margins. Scholars of liberalism disagree about the core attributes of liberalism and how they combine to produce a stable order, but, for the sake of argument, it contains the following. There is a fundamental belief that all humans are equal and are of equal worth. Liberty is central to liberalism, with an emphasis on individual autonomy and freedom. These principles translate into the rule of law, private property, and human rights. Rule-based restraints on the arbitrary exercise of power are critical because they give the weak more protections than they otherwise would have and limit the ability of the powerful to maximize their ability to exploit the system for their individual benefit. The powerful accept such an arrangement for various reasons, including because it injects the order with legitimacy. Thus, a liberal order is not only a rule-based system but also a consent-based system, and the existence of consent means that order can be maintained without the continued threat and use of force. Additionally, how we see the world, diagnose problems, and render solutions became a product of reason and not superstition, religion, or folk wisdoms. Because reason is the basis of acting, we are capable of learning from our mistakes and improving the human condition. Such is the basis for progress.

These liberal values were only remotely attached to the postwar institutions. Sovereign equality did not translate into a liberal world order. The postwar institutions were run by the most powerful countries, with middle and lesser powers either shunted to the back of the room or locked out altogether. The most “liberal” institutions were committed to the protection and spread of unfettered markets and global trade. The Washington Consensus fully embraced liberalism, but it was a neoliberal model. The United States and the Soviet Union made many of the most important order-making decisions, and while each presented themselves as representing universal values, they did their best to not let ideology complicate the more pragmatic search for stability. The Third World now comprised most of the world’s states, but it was on the outside looking in. Western states enjoyed democracy and the rule of law, but the U.S. and the former colonial masters undermined rather than supported democracy and human rights elsewhere. Some Western states and analysts presumed that the global order must have some legitimacy because there were no great (or at least successful) revolts by the Third World, but they mistook coercion and the lack of alternative for consent.

When scholars and policymakers attempt to locate the liberal, they tend to narrow their gaze to arrangements established among Western states. But even here it is worth asking: what made them liberal? One view is that liberal states adopted liberal foreign policy practices. There has been a slew of work along these lines, and the democratic peace claim is the most researched. But this is an argument about how democratic states get along with each other, with a recognition that their pacific-leaning practices do not extend to illiberal states. As previously noted, when faced to choose between security and human rights, the U.S. and other Western states almost always choose the former. Another view is that liberal states formed their own exclusive associations. Many of the most important economic and security institutions either are a club of or are controlled by liberal states. This is not a liberal world order; instead, it is a world order created by and for liberal states. A third view is that institutions are run according to liberal principles. A standard argument is that forward-thinking postwar U.S. leaders created institutional rules that led the U.S. to self-bind, that is, to adopt rules to restrain its power and create more opportunities for the weak to voice their views. Which view comes closest to the historical mark? A combination of the second and third view, with the recognition that these principles were limited to those states that recognized each other as having a liberal identity.

Toward history’s end, or coming back full circle?

Only a few scholars and practitioners referred to the postwar international order as liberal prior to the end of the Cold War. Instead, the designation seems to have taken off beginning in the 1990s, and mainly among those in the West. Does the name fit after the end of the Cold War any better than before? Yes, for several reasons. Now that the Cold War was over, there was a growing self-consciousness among Western states that they were joined by shared liberal principles – and these principles clearly distinguished them from other kinds of states. Second, there was an increasingly accepted claim that liberal states were fundamentally superior to illiberal states in all kinds of ways: this is the moment when the democratic peace thesis takes off and advanced democracies are lauded for having qualities that make them more legitimate, peaceful, and prosperous. Third, many Western states began adopting policies to export the liberal model to non-Western states, especially evident in their post-conflict reconstruction policies, as they attempted to transform war-torn states into liberal states. Fourth, there were various states in former Eastern bloc and the global South that are expressing an interest in adopting liberal principles. And, finally, many of the grand proposals for the post-Cold War order are crafted around liberal principles: democracy, markets, and the rule of law. Human rights became one of the defining anthems at this moment. Liberal states might not represent the end of history, but the arc of history certainly bends in their direction. Western, liberal states were feeling pretty good about themselves and fairy confident that they showed the rest of the world its future.

But because more states were envisioning a liberal international order and using liberal principles to define its content and legitimacy, did this mean that a liberal international existed? Not necessarily. Wanting a liberal international order and having an international order governed by liberal principles are two different things. There was clear evidence that many global institutions were under pressure to adopt more liberal principles, especially as they increasingly accepted norms of accountability, transparency, participation, and inclusion. Multilateralism and the view that only states count began to yield to multistakeholderism and the view that all those who are affected should have a voice; but the evidence suggests that the latter has become something of a fig leaf for the former. There were more states holding elections, but in many cases they were hardly free and fair, making U.S. elections look fairly good by comparison. Western states attempted to use their aid packages to promote liberal reforms, but these were quite piecemeal and patchy, with relatively little evidence that the aid created the conditions for a more inclusive polity and economy. Some might consider the 1990s as a highwater mark of the liberal international order, but my view is that the international order got closer to having a liberal quality but never quite passed the threshold.

It would give too much credit to al-Qaeda and the Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks to claim that the beginning of the end came on September 11th 2001. But this clearly was a turning point, an event that made liberalism seem like a luxury compared to the dirty business of fighting a global war on terror. But there were many other contributing factors. China’s meteoric rise required accommodation, and most of the energy went into turning it into a status quo power and not a liberal polity. The 2007 financial collapse, coupled with the growing disquiet with globalization, fueled a renewed debate over the virtues of an open economy. With good reason, scholars began pointing to the interwar period and digging out their copies of Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation. The frailer liberal states became, the more insistent they became on the virtue of a liberal international order, suggesting the presence of a romantic nostalgia. And then came Brexit, the election of U.S. President Trump, and unapologetic authoritarianism. Whether or not one is a card-carrying liberal, it is quite difficult to hear leaders and followers no longer holding basic norms of decency and dignity for others, subjecting immigrants and others to tremendous cruelty, and boasting of their willingness to use violence to get their way. The domestic wheels have been coming off the liberal states that were supposed to pull forward the liberal international order. The recent turn of events has caused some scholars to become wistful about liberal international order. But I am suggesting that the liberal international order was never all that liberal is reinforced by recent scholarship that attempts to identify its core principles for the sake of better measuring what might be lost with its demise. Many discussions emphasize the possible weakening of sovereignty, self-determination, legal equality, and free trade. John Ikenberry, who has done more work on the liberal international order than any other scholar, recently identified the following attributes: openness; loosely rule-based relations to generate cooperation; the possibility of reform; a progressive direction toward liberal democracy; self-restraint; and consent and a rule-based order. Liberal attributes are included, but arguably they take a backseat to cooperation. And, importantly, most of the other attributes, and especially those that are an anchor, are not exclusively liberal. Specifically, illiberal states have organized their relations around sovereignty and accepted many of the fundamental institutions of international society. They have shown the capacity to cooperate when it suits their interests. Importantly, they also will play by the rules, they just want rules that are to their liking as all states do. Indeed, at this moment it is liberal United States that is shaking some of the international rules and illiberal China that is coming to the defense of a rule-based order. But always beware those who want to play by (their) rules.

The suggestion, then, is that if the international order is having greater difficulty creating rule-based governance, it might have less to do with the weakening of liberalism and more to do with the fact that the rules that have been in place for decades were overdue for an overhaul, and especially given a shift in power from the West to the East. But there is little evidence that there will be an abandonment of the fundamental institutions of international society. Sovereignty, as an organizing principle of world order, appears to be here to stay. Indeed, to the extent that liberalism often provided a push toward foreign intervention, the decline of liberalism could help reinforce sovereignty. Global debates are less likely to reference liberal values, but their impact has been greatly exaggerated. And because liberalism is so closely associated with a hegemonic West, and thus poisons debate, perhaps fewer explicit references to liberalism might help create a more level-headed negotiating environment. Will the retreat of liberal states cripple the ability of states to solve big problems in the world, such as climate change? Perhaps. But most analyses do not seem to think that liberalism is the answer. Global governance might be more difficult, but it has been difficult for a while and the rumored demise of the liberal international order is incidental to its problems. Indeed, many believe that global governance is quite alive and well because there is more experimentation, more kinds of actors, including corporations and nongovernmental organizations, and more willingness to develop alternative architectures. Global governance might not depend wholly on either sovereign states or liberal values.

#### China leadership is key to global governance, peace keeping, and development---this ensures more equitable south-south cooperation

Schwoob 18 — Marie-Helene Schwoob is Advisor to the Executive Secretary of the UNCCD. Marie-Hélène Schwoob, et al. THE UNITED NATIONS OF CHINA: A VISION OF THE WORLD ORDER. “Chinese views on the global agenda for development “ European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018. JSTOR, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21647. Accessed 5 Jul. 2022](http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21647.%20Accessed%205%20Jul.%202022). WMK

Over the past few years, the position of China on the international stage has gradually evolved, following its rise as an economic power, visible in its rapidly increasing trade and investment flows. China’s evolving role has also had implications for its place in global governance, through a greater involvement in activities ranging from United Nations peacekeeping operations (China is by far the biggest contributor of personnel, with more than 3,000 troops and police committed) to contributions to development funds (Xi Jinping pledged $2 billion in support for the development of poor countries at the Sustainable Development Summit in 2015). Numerous Chinese scholars have started to rethink China’s role and consider new strategies that would help the country offer alternative models for international cooperation and governance for development. Cui Wenxing, a post-doctoral fellow at Fudan University, writes that there have been three main stages of evolution in China’s development policy. Firstly, under Mao, when the country’s south-south cooperation was essentially based on political considerations (such as providing assistance to socialist countries).[20] Secondly, after the reform and opening up, when China shifted its focus essentially to economic cooperation with other countries (in all directions), and, finally, the acceleration of the “going out” movement (走出去 zouchuqu) in the 21st century, when south-south cooperation became a way for China to encourage its enterprises to go abroad and to take part in global development.[21] Cui believes that both the “going out” movement and China’s development agenda provided opportunities for Chinese enterprises for more economic cooperation (for instance, via low interest loans provided to Chinese enterprises in developing countries). For Xu Qiyuan, associate research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Sun Jingying, postdoctoral fellow at Beijing University, even if “it is clear that China is still a developing country”, its role has evolved from that of recipient country to one of donor country, and China has become an important partner of international development agencies.[22] China’s role in the development of south-south cooperation has been increasing tremendously. The time has come, say these authors, for China to build a “new global partnership for development” (建新型全球发展伙伴关系 jian xinxing quanqiu fazhan huoban guanxi), arguing that this new approach should put aside political issues but focus partnerships on pragmatic interests.[23] Chinese criticism of the UN development agenda Chinese scholars point to the imperfections of the development framework that the United Nations has promoted since its foundation in 1945. Some Chinese scholars, such as Xu and Sun, recognise that the UN’s development framework managed to gradually mobilise the international community, that it has achieved some level of agreement on key concepts relating to development (such as environmental issues, climate change, or sustainable development goals), and that it has contributed to the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, several problems remain in the view of these authors. Among other issues, they note that the MDGs have had mixed results, such as uneven progress geographically, and areas of development lagging behind, such as universal access to primary education, maternal healthcare, and environmental sustainability. In addition, they believe that the development framework has sometimes focused too much on political issues – for instance, the controversial conditions attached to aid, which relate to governance, transparency, and human rights. In their view these issues should be separated from a country’s development goals. In particular, Xu and Sun argue that donor countries often link environmental aspects of sustainable development to political aspects that oppose the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, a phrase which is important to developing countries. Developed countries (“traditional aid countries”) indeed usually put emphasis on a “universal” principle of environmental responsibility, resulting in environmental sustainability goals being placed at the forefront of priorities.[24] In addition, for Cui, the “shock therapy” of the World Bank has had significant downsides, by forcing countries to adopt austerity policies and to engage in market liberalisation over short periods of time, instead of progressively changing policies based on long-term research and experimentation.[25] China’s development agenda and the UN In the view of Xu, Sun, and Cui, China has implemented a successful economic development model and it has performed well in its progress towards the MDGs, all of which (in their view) relate to Deng Xiaoping’s development paradigm “crossing the river by feeling the stones” (摸着石头过河 mozhe shitou guohe), which provided a smoother alternative to the shock therapy of the World Bank.[26] However, the author/authors believes that there is a role for China to play in redefining a more balanced global partnership for development, that would better reflect the rise of south-south cooperation and the growing role of emerging economies.[27] Xu, Sun, and Cao Jiahan (assistant research fellow at the Research Institute of Comparative Politics and Public Policy) recognise that the new role that China could play at the global level should take into account organisations which already exist, such as the development agencies of traditional aid countries or the UN agencies in charge of implementing the 2030 Development Agenda. For them, connecting Chinese development initiatives to the agenda of these organisations could indeed help increase trust in these initiatives. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in particular, has recently raised some concerns in the international community, in Western countries in particular. For Cao, connecting the BRI agenda to the United Nations’ 2030 Development Agenda could be a way to “increase trust and dispel doubts” ( 增信释疑 zengxin shiyi) and to exert greater international influence, as the BRI represents “an attempt by China to explore a new model of international cooperation for development and global governance”. [28]

### I/L China k/t GG

#### Chinese leadership solves extinction.

Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced. The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous state in such key areas as global economic governance and climate change. Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics. The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily. All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other civilizations. So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced. China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.

### ! GG Solves Nuke War

#### Global governance solves nuke war

Bailey 19 — Robert Bailey, "A Very Long Peace: Potential solutions to armed conflict found in global governance?," Vision of Earth | Shaping a happy, healthy, and prosperous future, 2-12-2019, https://www.visionofearth.org/politics/long-peace-potential-solutions-armed-conflict-global-governance/, accessed 7-6-2022, WMK

In our work on the cooperation possibility frontier, we have demonstrated that as the framework for coordination and trust between nations increases, so too does our threshold for solving problems of a global nature. It is in humanity’s best interest to expand this frontier – thus improving global cooperation and coordination. But there is only reason to do so if the underlying assumption, that there are challenges of a global scale facing humanity, is valid. If that assumption is valid, then global governance in the form of a solid framework for the aforementioned coordination should be a major goal.

In a previous post, we talked about the need for global governance in order to effectively tackle said global challenges. In the next few posts, we’ll look at some of these challenges in detail, beginning with armed conflict.

Over the last few generations, we have experienced such a prolonged era of peace between great powers that it is tempting to dismiss armed conflict as a global issue worth further consideration. Why invest resources in solving this issue when it appears to have already been solved?

It’s important to understand how recent this peace is and why it is so unprecedented. Throughout the ages, humans have had the tendency to murder, maim, and torture one another. In fact, it’s really only in relatively recent history that violence and sadism has become the exception rather than the norm in the human experience.1

Over the past few centuries, violence has declined dramatically in various ways – two of which are particularly worth noting. First, there has been a decline in interpersonal violence within societies that began millenia ago and has continued up until the present day. Second, over recent decades there has been an enormous reduction in interstate conflicts, particularly between great powers.1]

The reduction of interpersonal violence came in several waves, beginning millennia ago with the creation of the first states. Throughout history there have been several additional factors in the decline of violence, including the spread of civilizing norms like table manners, the invention of the printing press, and the Enlightenment, which began in Europe in the 18th century and spread to the rest of the world from there.2 The further implementation of strong centralized governments throughout much of the world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries continued the reduction in overall lawlessness.

The decline in interstate conflicts is much more recent. Crucial factors for this decline include norms against war, the spread of democracy, and the shattering destruction of the two world wars. The Long Peace following the conclusion of the world wars has been the most peaceful time in human history.3 Thus, it’s worth exploring why this peace came about in the wake of World War II.

The world wars were unprecedented in terms of their material destructiveness and ended with the unleashing of the most terrible weapon yet seen by humanity. As such, they serve as a profound cautionary tale for all great powers that no one is keen on repeating. It should be no surprise then, that at the conclusion of those wars, a body of incentives and political structures was assembled that could create significant and lasting peace – or at least peace that has at least lasted until the present. This peace has been maintained not only through Mutually Assured Destruction between nuclear superpowers, but also by other factors, such as the fact that democracies do not typically go to war with each other. This peace is significant in that no great powers have warred directly with each other in more than half a century.

Conflict, however, still exists – in the form of civil wars, proxy conflicts, genocides, and terrorism. External factors now play a major role in shaping hostilities around the world – often leading to their perpetuation or escalation.4 Major powers, unable to set aside their conflicting interests, are often unwilling to work together in order to prevent or end conflict. Even if they do so on the surface, they cannot agree about the strategy best taken. One only need look at the most recent and prominent international proxy conflict – the Syrian Civil War – for a potent example of this issue.5

There is also the issue of emerging technologies making conflict a greater threat to humanity. Ballistic missile defense and combat drones may weaken global military restraint – a false sense of security being granted by the idea that ICBMs could be shot down and that real soldiers do not have to be put in harm’s way in order to attack the enemy. Cyber-attacks on an unprecedented scale may be capable of radically destabilizing the world’s governments, infrastructures, communities, and markets. Biological and nanotechnological weapons could change the face of warfare and reshape the level of coordinated countermeasures that need to be rallied in order to protect the peace, which is ultimately more fragile than it might seem. As long as nations continue to be divided – as long as they call each other “rivals” or “enemies” – war will always be possible.

Government worldwide being consolidated into an agreed-upon structure, would of course not solve all of these problems right away. It would, however, allow for improved coordination between major powers to help deal with conflicts and resolve them instead of escalating them. The post-war settlement, which created the United Nations and its associated institutions, was profoundly important in setting the stage for the peacefulness and prosperity of the decades since.6 A renewed effort to invest in global governance institutions and norms could likewise steer humanity toward peace. Governance institutions provide a forum for constructive dialog, centralized action, and an embodiment of norms as they evolve.7

### ! Chinese Exclusion 🡪 GPW

#### Exclusion of China causes backlash which escalates to great power war and turns every benefit from the LIO---Ikenberry is wrong

Shidore 21 — Sarang Shidore is Director of Studies at the Quincy Institute. His areas of research and analysis are geopolitical risk, grand strategy, and energy/climate security, with a special emphasis on Asia Sarang Shidore, "Calling 'liberal internationalism' what it is: American primacy," Responsible Statecraft, August 4, 2021, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/08/04/calling-liberal-internationalism-what-it-is-american-primacy/, accessed 7-7-2022, WMK

The authors argue instead for “liberal internationalism,” better characterized as primacy, or armed global dominance, of the liberal variety. However, liberal primacy, a major influence in Washington for decades, is itself partly responsible for the crises of the current world order and is now enhancing risks of great power conflict. Moreover, liberal primacy marginalizes alternative and quite different versions of internationalism, including those well within the American tradition, which have much to contribute to achieve a world of security and prosperity.

Deudney and Ikenberry’s main arguments are as follows: The restraint camp remains hostage to its critique of the American “blunder” in Iraq. It is moreover incoherent due to its dissimilar factions of libertarians, balance-of-power realists, and progressives, and thereby offers only a negative agenda for shaping the future world order. Restrainers purportedly provide no solutions to problems generated due to industrialization and high interdependence, such as inequality and climate change. Moreover, they resist defending and promoting democracy in a world threatened by a rising and authoritarian China. “Liberal internationalism” with its focus on democracy promotion, institutions, and regulated capitalism is the only model that can solve the world’s problems.

Let us put aside for a moment the authors’ misrepresentation of positions of restrainers more generally, and those of the Quincy Institute specifically. Let us also acknowledge the positive aspects of the broader liberal project, which do not contradict a grand strategy of restraint (and which the Quincy Institute supports.) Individualism and democracy are welcome antidotes to social and political repression, diversity mostly enriches societies, institutions help solve problems, and versions of capitalism have proven superior to communism. Liberal primacists’ prioritization of collective action problems such as climate change is also on the mark. But a closer examination reveals that some of these supposed achievements are more rhetorical than real.

Liberal primacy’s stress on democracy would be credible — if only its deeds matched the claims. Washington is tough, even militant, on violations of rights by its geopolitical adversaries, with sanctions and harsh rhetoric routinely employed as a tool. Liberal primacists indeed seem to be concerned with the fate of democracy in what they call the “core” — a reference to European allies. But when it comes to U.S. allies and partners in the Global South, they rarely go beyond nudges and occasional slaps on the wrist.

Objective observers can conclude that, outside of the Atlantic area, democracy and human rights are only of marginal importance in the liberal primacy project, except when they can act as force-multipliers in the great power competition framework. Restrainers on the other hand genuinely support democracy by directing the United States to perfect its own model at home so that it can lead by example. Restrainers also have a well-founded suspicion of the true motives of Washington’s actions (or any power that claims to be acting out of altruism) and, in general, hold a pessimistic view of achieving changes in the domestic politics of other societies through coercive measures.

Deudney and Ikenberry greatly stress liberal primacy to achieve global economic equity and avert environmental catastrophe. However, under liberal primacy’s long innings in Washington, these challenges have only multiplied at home and abroad. The United States, under the major influence of primacists of all shades, did not by itself create all these problems. But its disproportionate power and wealth means that it is more responsible than any other single actor. Moreover, when liberal and other primacists make extraordinary claims of global leadership and explicitly seek to preserve unipolarity, they should also accept a corresponding level of responsibility for all that has gone wrong under their watch.

Liberalism is also by no means necessarily tied to U.S. primacy. The work of scholars such as Stephen Wertheim (a co-founder of the Quincy Institute) and Michael Kazin has cogently highlighted a very different American internationalism in the pre-WW II era that opposed primacy in the long national tradition (notwithstanding a few exceptions) of staying away from foreign wars and advocating diplomacy to resolve disputes in extra-hemispheric conflicts. Nowhere do Deudney and Ikenberry seriously engage the core argument of restrainers of armed dominance detracting from domestic priorities and raising risks of regional and global conflict.

Liberal primacists have belatedly come around to reducing (though not eliminating) the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East. But, as Quincy Institute president Andrew Bacevich has laid out, few lessons appear to have been learned from the Iraq war, which was not so much a “blunder” as a flagrant violation of international law and American values. Nearly two decades after that fateful step, primacists (liberal and otherwise) show little desire for accountability from actors who supported and executed this war ridden with illegal actions, a reluctance that severely undermines their justifications for prosecuting violations of other states.

It is on China, however, that liberal primacists flirt with the greatest danger to the international order. A rising China is framed as a threat, predominantly due to its authoritarian system as also its recent actions in the region. Domestic and foreign policies of most states are indeed linked, but they may manifest in apparently inconsistent ways. For example, powerful, authoritarian states may not necessarily seek global conquest or even dominance (for example, China in the 15th century) just as major democratic states may disavow global hegemony (the United States itself from the late 19th century until World War II). Democratic powers may also empower tyranny, as was seen with Israel’s export of the cyber-weapon Pegasus to several authoritarian governments recently. Liberal primacy has a deterministic, inflated view of Chinese power and threat and little space for the major uncertainty in Chinese capabilities and intentions two or three decades in the future.

Whereas Washington is stepping up on framing China in stark cold war-type language, much of the world, including many U.S. partners, has a much more nuanced viewpoint of the competition. The reluctance of Southeast Asia or treaty ally South Korea to join the U.S.-led Quad and the general lack of support across much of the world for the monochromatic view of China’s Belt and Road Initiative as an exploitative debt trap are two examples. Prominent Southeast Asian voices in particular are increasingly worried at the turn liberal primacists’ China strategy is taking.

Whittling away at the time-tested One-China policy, over-militarization of relations with the Quad states, and aggressive, publicly announced military FONOPs close to the Chinese coast are only some of the ways in which liberal and other primacists are helping raise risks of great power conflict. China is not an existential threat to the United States. This is not to say that China’s excessive claims in the South China Sea, coercive pressure on U.S. partners including Taiwan and India, exploitative deep-sea fishing, cyber-attacks on the homeland, and certain trade practices should not be of major concern. But it takes two hands to clap. When it comes to China, liberal primacy’s reign in Washington feels as escalatory as the Trump era.

Liberal primacy is also less than international, with its continuing Euro- and Global North-centric tendencies. Alternative internationalisms include those from the Global South, where most of humanity lives. Southern internationalism matters to the U.S. national interest because, in an increasingly multipolar world, regional and middle powers have enhanced autonomy and capability to exercise veto power if their views of the world order are not taken into account.

As seen from the South, spreading democracy, managing interdependence, and containing the rise of China — Deudney and Ikenberry’s principal problematiques — is a part-erroneous, part-limited list. A view from Johannesburg, Dhaka, or Jakarta might argue that achieving domestic stability, economic “catch-up” with the wealthy world, and avoiding another militarized great power competition are more pressing concerns (along with those of climate change and pandemics, correctly identified by Deudney and Ikenberry). Moreover, U.S. interventionism and coercive strategies of extraterritorial sanctions (often backed by liberal primacists) might be seen as equally or more threatening than the rise of China. In general, Southern internationalism stresses sovereignty, solidarity, and a search for compromise rather than coercion in great power disputes.

Southern internationalism has led to many initiatives of varying success – from decolonization itself, to Afro-Asian frameworks such as Bandung, the push for a New International Economic Order, Tricontinentalism, and the Nonaligned Movement. More recent examples include the Like-Minded Developing Countries coalition in global climate negotiations. While some practitioners of Southern internationalism were domestic autocrats, paradoxically, their banding together also enabled a somewhat more democratic world order by placing limits on the extent of bipolarity or unipolarity. Liberal primacists, either largely ignore or oppose other internationalisms, domestic and foreign, thereby revealing their own paradox – while democracy is backed at home, a diversity of ideologies across states is distinctly unwelcome.

Deudney and Ikenberry are correct in that there are differences among restrainers. But coming from advocates of the “Roosevelt School” this is downright bizarre if not a sign of amnesia. FDR’s multi-decade imprint owed largely to his phenomenal success at crafting a diverse coalition at home to address the central challenges of his time. Building – and sustaining – such coalitions signifies maturity, not incoherence.

Restraint is a grand strategy comprised of first and foremost disavowing armed global primacy and stressing diplomacy for conflict reduction and management. This, by itself, is an enormous task that, if achieved, would be a major accomplishment and greatly diminish risk of a great power war. But beyond this common agenda, the young coalition will naturally engage deeply with itself over time as it grows. Indeed, primacists of the liberal and non-liberal variety who have been at this for much longer than restrainers, are themselves characterized by differences. The Quincy Institute, for its part, has laid out positive agendas for achieving peaceful co-existence in East Asia (including its maritime domain), South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. These involve reversing armed global dominance, stressing diplomacy and institutions, letting regional players lead in solving their problems, abandoning coercive attempts to spread American political values, and energetically constructing confidence-building measures with major powers China and Russia.

In sum, liberal primacy, at best, is mostly a status-quoist ideology that is likely to only compound emerging global challenges. At worst, it is a thin veneer over a deeper intent of perpetuating unipolarity for its own sake. Either way, it is an outmoded approach to our time of uncertainty, increasing multipolarity, and a planetary crisis. Restraint may be, as Deudney and Ikenberry state, a “radical challenge to the main course of American foreign policy.” But it is exactly the corrective we need to American grand strategy that can pave the way for a more secure and prosperous world order.

#### Even if they’re revisionist, they’re ‘reformist’ not ‘revolutionary’---attempting to contain them causes revolutionary backlash to the LIO which turns the ADV

#### \*\*Should we copy paste China-Russia Alliance bad here?

Kim and Kim 22 — Sung-han Kim a Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea & Sanghoon Kim b Center for Maritime Security, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Seoul, Republic of Korea (2022) China’s contestation of the liberal international order, The Pacific Review, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2022.2063367 WMK

Despite conventional wisdom that the AIIB represents a challenge to the liberal international order and Chinese ambitions to establish a Sinocentric international order, the AIIB is an example of contested multilateralism. Specifically, it is a strategy of competitive regime creation to better reflect the interests of China in the multilateral development sector without challenging the constitutional structure and the fundamental institutions of the liberal international order. In fact, the AIIB has been working collaboratively with parallel institutions within the regime complex such as the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the ADB. In assessing whether the AIIB signifies deconcentration and delegitimation of the U.S.-led liberal order, it is too early to tell whether the AIIB will evolve into a multilateral development bank that serves as an instrument to export a Chinese model of economic statecraft such as state capitalism. Moreover, this paper examines only the AIIB as an example of Chinese contestation of the liberal international order and future research can test the contestation-challenge distinction of revisionist state behavior with other case studies in different issue-areas to corroborate the argument laid out in this paper. Moreover, the task remains on sophisticated ways to distinguish contestations from challenges in the security domain.

Certainly, the developmental model, emphasizing export promotion with a high degree of state intervention, is touted as an alternative pathway to achieve economic growth, especially after the experiences of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. However, it is hard to disregard the possibility of China using these infrastructure projects as ways to promote Chinese interests, by exporting excess capacity in domestic industries while paving the way for increased connectivity along the lines of land and sea communications. After all, even if China had the intention to construct a regional sphere of influence and an exclusive China-led international order, the success of such endeavor would rely on China’s ability to continue its material rise and to buy voluntary compliance of secondary powers, earning legitimacy of a renewed Chinese leadership in the region by presenting an alternative order. An early assessment of Chinese efforts at order-building in the multilateral development domain, reveals that secondary powers are, gradually, finding the shortcomings of China-led initiatives, ranging from the lack of transparency to the incurrence of exorbitant national debts. At the same time, the introduction of the ‘Build Back Better World (B3W)’ partnership, by the Biden administration, may restore U.S. leadership in the global infrastructure development sector with emphasis on liberal values such as transparency, good governance, and environmental safeguards (The White House, 2021).

If China is contesting, not challenging the liberal international order, the countermeasures of the United States, as the guardian of the liberal international order, become equally dependent upon the question of whether China will transform into a ‘revolutionary’ revisionist power from today’s ‘reformist’ revisionist power. A strategy of ‘hard’ containment and the use of coercive measures to suppress Chinese influence in the region will further aggravate Chinese dissatisfaction towards the liberal international order. This will motivate China to actively seek counter-hegemonic military coalitions with strategic partners, such as Russia, to challenge the United States at all levels. Therefore, it is important for the United States to accommodate China’s legitimate demands within established institutions that reflect the changes in the distribution of capabilities.

#### [MOVED] The LIO is terminally unsustainable---clinging to it causes outside powers to backlash escalating conflicts

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Considering the liberal international order in its idealized form, it seems to be trapped in a deepening crisis. The first sign of crisis is evident in the decline of the United States and its gradual disengagement from international affairs, especially after Trump took office. During his first term, Trump withdrew from the Paris Accord; the Trans-Pacific Partnership; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Moreover, he has generated tensions with long-term allies in Europe and tarnished the image of the liberal order. As expressed by Trump in his speech at the UN General Assembly, “America will always choose independence and cooperation over global governance, control, and domination” [20]. It seems that the United States is stepping back from its role as a world leader. Some scholars lament that, without a broader vision as defender of the free world, and with a new focus on pursuing narrow national interest, Trump’s America is abandoning its “global leadership” as the “long-time champion” of the liberal international order [21]. Even worse, Trump has launched a direct attack on this order—the system of multilateral trade and alliances that the United States built to serve its interests and attract others to its “way of life” [22]. Cooley and Nexon’s assessment further demonstrates that the unravelling of American hegemony was already underway before Trump’s presidency. Trump only sped up America’s retreat in the liberal international order [23]. Moreover, the doubt cast on America’s leadership by its allies in Europe, the loss of “a vision of how the world is supposed to work”, and the challenge from internal fragmentation all contributed to “the eclipse of the West” [24].

The second sign of crisis is the rise of China and Russia in the international arena. Scholars had already sounded alarms before Trump took office. Besides their military power, challengers like China and Russia threaten the existing liberal order by disrupting it with their own political systems, interests, and ideologies [25]. According to Stephens, the rise of revisionist powers, including China, Russia, and Iran, have posed serious challenges to America’s claims on “both the goodness and the success of the liberal-democratic model”. As these powers become increasingly assertive and ambitious, the U.S.-led order is in deep trouble [26]. Moreover, a larger group of challengers—the emerging economies in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)—are increasingly undermining the Western dominance, especially after the financial crisis in 2008 [5, 6]. In particular, in recent years, China has moved from a reformist of the liberal international order to a revisionist that seeks to establish “new systems of governance and international cooperation” [27: 14]. The factors behind this change include China’s renewed self-confidence and awareness of a greater role in global arena, the reluctance of the West to reform, the weakening of the United States after the 2008 financial crisis, and the dominant powers’ alienation of developing countries [27]. Although scholars disagree on the extent of disruption that China may bring to the liberal international order, there are evident concerns that the U.S.-led order may be replaced by a new one dominated by China [26–28].

To many Western scholars, these two trends—the retreat of the United States and the rise of powerful challengers—are indeed worrisome, as reflected in their warnings of a “new global disorder” [25] or “a descent into the chaos of a world without effective institutions that encourage and organize cooperation.”2 In Stephens’s words, the only alternative to Pax Americana would be global disorder [26]. And it is likely to bring about “a highly competitive international environment” that may result in “unprecedented global calamity” [29]. The main problem with this line of argument is that, the liberal international order discussed by these scholars tends to mix its normative aspect with the observed reality. Their emphasis on the normative or idealized aspect of the liberal international order often leads to the assumption that this order is a unitary and cohesive whole that needs to be preserved in its original form, including perpetuating the American dominance. As such, any existing alternatives or emerging experiments are considered as disruptive to the order or sowing the seeds of disorder. In particular, an illiberal order would be considered as the opposite of all the good things brought together in the liberal order. It will be “politically and economically divided and closed, authoritarian, uncooperative, coercive, and disrespectful of rules and norms” [30: 5].

However, to understand the depth of the crisis of liberal international order, it is necessary to examine the differences between the normative order and the empirically observed order. As Rosenau notes, to be insensitive to their distinctions will “run the risk of either clouding sound analysis with preferred outcomes or confounding preferred outcomes with empirically faulty recommendations” [31: 10]. Scholars need to distinguish observations of the reality of the international order from judgments and visions of such order. In Buzan’s words, adopting the normative aspect of such a concept could be seen as an effort to consider what is possible and advocate what is desirable [32: 300]. However, it is necessary to acknowledge that the reality on the ground may not approximate the desired ideal. Regarding the current liberal international order, its advocates often offer a narrow and highly selective view of history. They tend to ignore aspects of coercion, violence, and instability in the post-war era, while emphasizing the order’s unwavering support for democracy, freedom, and human rights [1]. This tendency has led to what Allison calls the “myth of the liberal order”. In his words, the liberal international order is essentially “an imagined past in which the United States molded the world in its image” [33]. Moreover, the nostalgic view of the liberal order is ahistorical as it ignores the process of ordering that was marked by episodes of violence, coercion, and resistance, as well as the imperial prerogatives of the United States that had often disregarded rules and accommodated illiberal forces [30].

Beneath the surface of “stability” and “peace”, the liberal international order is rife with tensions, the first of which comes from the competition between different political-economic models. That is, the liberal model, supported by dominant Western powers, is challenged by the so-called illiberal models promoted by major challengers like China. These models are by no means pure in their forms and practices. There are evident contradictions within each model. Just as the liberal model has elements of coercion and violence, the illiberal model also contains elements of cooperation and rule. The second tension arises between states seeking to assert their agency against the seemingly inexorable and homogenizing forces of globalization promoted by the liberal order. States refuse to be hollowed out by the globalizing forces and seek to assert their authority and legitimacy both within their territorial boundaries and in transnational processes. In the context of external shock and rising nationalism, states would prioritize their national interests and make choices that are most aligned with their material and ideological preferences. Finally, the third tension lies between the defenders and challengers of the existing order. Countries with increasing military and economic power may seek to transform the current international order to better reflect their own ideologies and serve their interests. The competition between major powers could be intensified by triggers like financial crisis or pandemic crisis.

The Challengers’ Perspectives

If the existing order rests upon widening economic discrepancies among actors, there will be growing pressure for change. If the material conditions, including the distribution of resources among actors, undergo substantial change, the current arrangement could potentially reconfigure, leading to a breakdown or restructuring of prevailing order [31]. Moreover, the image presented by the liberal world has been and will continue to be questioned by the emerging powers, further deepening the ideological divisions between them. The rising powers could also promote their images and profiles globally, provide political, economic and military goods to their clients and partners around the world, and rally support for their alternative political-economic models in the global arena. In other words, they compete with each other to sell their models in the global market of economic resources, security, aid, and ideology.

By highlighting the influence of ideas on the international arena, the constructivists’ account of international relations has filled in the gap left by the liberals and realists and it offers important tools for scholars to analyze the changing dynamic of the international order. According to the constructivists, ideas can generate identities and interests, help states and other actors find common solutions to problems, and shape their understandings of threats and expectations of the others’ behavior [34]. The influence of ideas can work through at least three pathways: Beliefs can serve as roadmaps for decision-making; shared ideas can serve as focal points in facilitating cooperation; and ideas, enhanced by the international norms and rules and embodied in the institutional frameworks, can constrain the actors’ choices [14]. Being embedded in the dense networks of international social relations, states could be “socialized to want certain things” [35: 2].

In other words, states and other actors can choose to play the game in the current order, respond to the changing environments, or develop their own rules of the game to suit their purposes. The circulation of different beliefs and ideas about how the world should be organized has turned the international arena into a contested field. Instead of conforming to the expectations by dominant Western countries, powerful challengers may push for more space for multiple models of governance in the international order. The convergence of beliefs and ideas can reinforce the popular appeal of certain models and could serve as focal points for different actors to coordinate their actions and reshape the international norms. Moreover, the creation and extension of international social networks by new institutional platforms or linkages can facilitate socialization between states and encourage state leaders to “want certain things”, which could include access to alternative sources of economic power, security, aid or ideology.

The rising challengers have benefited from the Western-dominated order. But they also challenge the mythologized liberal international order and expose the contradictions in the dominant Western model which often needs to reconcile its proclaimed liberal values with illiberal behaviors. The idealized image of liberal international order does not always align with reality, especially in the case of the order’s most powerful leader. As Strange [36: 573] observed, there was a clear gap between America’s rhetoric in preaching liberalism, internationalism, and multilateral decision-making, and its “inconsistent, fickle, and unpredictable” conduct of foreign policy. Other scholars have noted that, there were plenty of illiberal behaviors by the countries that proclaimed liberal values. For instance, the United States supported authoritarian rulers throughout the Cold War, and afterwards; it also dismantled the Bretton Woods, and invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, etc. [1, 37]. Some scholars suggest that the so-called liberal international order has “never existed”. Even after the end of the Cold War when liberal principles were promulgated to more countries, the liberal international order only “got closer to having a liberal quality but never quite passed the threshold” [38].

By treating the potential change in the current international order as a crisis, many prominent scholars reveal their Western-centric, and especially the U.S.-centric, views of IR. As Hobson points out, many IR scholars continue to reproduce the discourse of power through their own works. For instance, one prominent scholar who signed the public statement has argued on another occasion that, humanitarian interventionism and structural adjustment programs are essential for keeping the non-Western world on track toward Western-style liberal capitalism and democracy. Without interventions by the West, these countries are denied the opportunities and “privileges” to imitate the advanced Western model [39: 17–18]. This argument echoes the tone in the public statement, which emphasizes how the existing order has served the United States and its allies well for more than seven decades and brought unprecedented levels of prosperity and peace to the world.3 In the meantime, there is no mention of what kind of reform and change is needed.

In the challengers’ eyes, such reform has been delayed for too long. The pressure on the current international order began building during the financial crisis in 2008. Before that, advanced countries in the Group of Seven (G7) promised to give more voices to emerging economies in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But they failed to deliver on promised reforms. Instead of embracing “the dawn of a new era of multilateralism”, the world is witnessing “the last gasp of an old-fashioned concert of great powers” [5: 51]. Another example is the World Bank, which Weaver [4: 3] illustrates as mired in “bureaucratic ‘pathologies’, dysfunctions, and legitimacy crises”, unable to make substantive changes in its structures, policies, ideologies, and behaviors. As a result, a new order less reliant on these traditional international institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, may be emerging.

Similarly, Stephen argues that existing international institutions are often too “sticky” to adapt to the new distribution of power and the preferences brought by the diverse group of emerging powers. The challenges from the BRICS countries may bring about an order that is “strongly contested, less universal, less liberal, and more fragmented” [6: 484]. Ikenberry notes that the old U.S.-led order may be in the “crisis of transition” whereby “a new configuration of global power, new coalitions of states, new governance institutions” will emerge [10: 8]. As Acharya observes, a key driving factor to this fragmentation is “the outdated system of privilege enjoyed by the Western countries and their abuse of existing rules and norms and resistance to the lack of reform of multilateral institutions” [3: 457]. In a post-hegemonic multiplex world, the United States must relinquish certain privileges and share its power and authority with emerging powers [40]. However, the United States has already shown its reluctance to share its power and privileges, despite its gradual retreat from global leadership.

In a white paper that focuses on the relation between China and the world, China criticizes the theory that assumes China will seek hegemony as it gets stronger and pose serious threat to the world. The report points out that this interpretation is driven by “cognitive misunderstanding, deep-rooted prejudice, a psychological imbalance brought about by the prospect of falling power, and deliberate distortions by vested interests” [41]. One the one hand, the report emphasizes China’s contribution to the world economy as “a stabilizing force and power source” and “an important promoter of global openness and a dynamic market”. It further states that, China has benefited from the international community and in return provides it with more and better public goods. On the other hand, the report points out the dangers of blindly copying or being forced to adopt the Western model, which had led to “social unrest, economic crisis, governance paralysis, and even endless civil war”. The report proposes to build “a global community of shared future” that opposes “the law of the jungle, power politics and hegemonism” [41].

As stated in the report, in a new model of international relations, there should be 1) mutual respect based on equality among all countries and respect of other’s political systems and developmental paths; 2) equal right and equal access to opportunities and proper balancing of national interests and contribution to international community; and 3) mutually beneficial cooperation. More importantly, the world should uphold the international order or global governance system with the United Nations as its core, rather than the United States. According to the report, China has no intention of replacing the United States. But the United States also needs to “abandon the Cold War mentality, and develop a proper understanding of itself, China, and the world”, adapting to the development and prosperity of other countries and living in harmony with them [41]. If it fails to do so and tries to maintain its strength by suppressing other countries, any serious strategic miscalculation may lead to conflict and confrontation between major countries.

### ! GG – Unregulated AI/TC

#### Only inclusion of China into the world order solves every global threat---its cooperate or die

Tiberghien 22 — Yves Tiberghien, Danielle Luo, Panthea Pourmalek, "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity," Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2-14-2022, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/, accessed 7-7-2022 WMK

We are facing an ever-growing gap between the phenomenal acceleration of technology and of connectivity, and the human capacity to manage these trends. The gap is well-documented in the fields of finance, climate change, pandemics and nuclear risks. But the contrast between the exponential growth of disruptive technology and the lacklustre supply of governance mechanisms is starkest in the fields of digital governance and artificial intelligence (AI).

That gap becomes existential when we consider the likely future development of artificial general intelligence (AGI) (Ord 2020) or superintelligence (Bostrom 2015) that can be misaligned with human values or even the goal of ensuring the continuity of human existence. This question of the governance of life with AI may be the most essential question of our time (Tegmark 2017), but you would not know it from the current output of global governance in this field. Summarizing the judgement of many scientists in the field, Toby Ord argues that unaligned AGI is actually the number-one global existential risk for humanity, with a 10 percent chance of human extinction within 100 years. The prophesized existential threats posed by extreme and accelerated technological advancement and expansion have never been as close to reality as they are now. As noted by Yuval Noah Harari and Daniel Kahneman (2021) in a recent conversation, the task of taming and governing the digital/AI revolution is daunting. Humanity may have no slack for a mistake this time around, given the existential consequences of such a mistake.

Today, we already benefit from tremendous digital or AI innovations in e-commerce, social media and communication, home management, work, health care, education, transportation, and entertainment (West and Allen 2020). We can foresee that AI-driven algorithms may soon be able to correct human judgement flaws (or noise) caused by fatigue, irregularity, emotions and other weaknesses, afflictions that can generate variation in decisions by up to 50 percent (Kahneman, Sibony and Sunstein 2021). Within two decades, we can envisage a world with generalized deep learning and virtual reality, computer vision, contactless love, fully autonomous vehicles in most advanced and emerging economies, autonomous weapons in militaries and a dream of plenitude (Lee and Chen 2021).

Yet, today, we witness tremendous havoc created by the explosion of social anger, exacerbated by sophisticated social media algorithms, deep polarization, the return of tribal politics, the loss of agreed truths and the spread of misinformation and dangerous conspiracies, the loss of privacy, the rise of massive and uber-powerful tech companies, and massive job displacement and inequality (Bartlett 2018). Influence operations by foreign states have also amplified such social anger and polarization in many democracies, adding a degree of external threat and urgency. We also live with a world of security-driven digital decoupling between the United States and China (Ma 2021). In other words, the digital revolution is moving faster than the human capacity to cope with it, embed it within a public good-oriented framework and steer its disruptive power toward a non-destructive direction.

The problem is visible at the national level but particularly salient at the global level. Digital/data governance is fragmenting among at least four poles: a US model with maximum innovation and limited regulation; an EU model with a strong regulatory balance; an India model with an emphasis on digital sovereignty and infant industry protection (applicable to other developing countries); and a Chinese model with both rapid innovation, strong state control and surveillance. Our global governance capacity is affected by multiple splits: a US-EU split over privacy, tax and anti-monopoly regulations; an India-West split over data ownership and first-mover advantage; and, worst of all, a potential digital cold war between the United States (and its allies) and China. In response to this dire need for governance, Rohinton P. Medhora and Taylor Owen (2020) have proposed a need for a new fundamental effort at coordinated governance — or a “digital Bretton Woods.” While fundamental international conditions and global distribution of power today differ drastically from the Bretton Woods era, a high-stake and fragmented digital world is in dire need of such renewed cooperative spirit.

Recognizing the gap in digital governance, we ask the following questions: What is the scale of the gap in governance relative to requirements needed to keep the digital economy afloat? And what could be a pathway forward in the context of the growing securitization and increasing divides?

It is urgent to raise a sense of awareness, mobilize all social and public actors around this urgent dilemma and catalyze a multi-level effort to address this conundrum. We argue that no global, regional or national institution alone will be able to deliver the right governance capacity. Instead, we recommend a highly reactive, innovative and competitive model of networked governance that operates at multiple levels with key nodes and catalysts.

Governance innovation must keep pace with technological innovation. Given how far the digital cold war has already proceeded and the currently low capacity to cooperate between the United States and China, part of the solution will need to involve clubs and alliances of countries and non-state actors. At the same time, some level of global coordination and basic rules for global co-existence are crucial for success in managing this existential threat. The Group of Twenty (G20) is one critical venue for such work, even though it has not delivered so far.

### 1nc – China War and Relations

#### LIO causes miscalc – most likely scenario for war and collapses US-China relations

Glaser, PhD, 19

(Charles, PublicPolicy@Harvard, ProfPoliSci@GeorgeWashington, A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided, International Security, 43:4, 51-87)

To improve analysis and debate of U.S. foreign policy, scholars, policy analysts, and policymakers should discontinue use of the term “liberal international order” and its variants, including “hegemonic liberal order.” First, for reasons discussed above, the LIO concept provides little analytic leverage; it is inward looking, and certain of its arguments are theoretically weak. Second, the LIO discourse is a source of significant confusion about both the evolution of global politics and U.S. policy. As I argued at the outset, scholars and commentators do not have an agreed understanding about what the LIO includes. More important, the LIO terminology clouds analysis of international policy by obscuring what is actually occurring. Consider, for example, the common observation that the LIO faces growing threats as a result of China's rise and Russia's assertive foreign policies. These dangers, however, have actually strengthened U.S. alliances and, in turn, the LIO. At least until the Trump administration, China's rise was increasing the depth and cohesion of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia. Similarly, Russia's increasingly aggressive behavior in Ukraine and elsewhere was helping reinvigorate NATO. In short, the United States is facing growing threats to its security, not to the LIO. Although perhaps counterintuitive, it was the early post–Cold War decades that posed the greatest threat to the security elements of the LIO—the lack of major power threats to U.S. security weakened U.S. alliances. It should also be noted that China is much more integrated into the international economy, including importantly via the WTO, than the Soviet Union ever was. Whether China's economic inclusion is a net positive for the United States remains an open question, but it certainly strengthens the economic pillar of the LIO. Third, framing analysis of U.S. policy in terms of the LIO builds in a significant status quo bias. Much of the discussion of the LIO starts from the premise that it is desirable and needs to be preserved.95 During periods of significant change in the distribution of power, however, the United States should be reconsidering whether to preserve its international commitments and exploring how best to achieve its fundamental interests in the decades ahead.96 Fourth, by viewing the LIO as an unalloyed good, U.S. leaders risk failing to appreciate fully that adversaries of the United States view central pillars of the LIO—its alliances, in particular—as a source of competition and threat. For example, the LIO perspective contributed to U.S. enthusiasm for expanding NATO eastward to spread democracy, while giving too little weight to Russia's understanding of expansion's negative implications. Similarly, it likely contributes to U.S. underappreciation of the threat that the U.S.-Japan alliance, especially the broadening of Japan's responsibilities in the alliance, poses to China. These U.S. misperceptions increase the probability that the United States will misinterpret adversaries’ policies by failing to understand them as reactions to threatening U.S. policies. The LIO's status quo bias and its contribution to these U.S. misperceptions are potentially dangerous, because they encourage the United States to exaggerate the threats it faces and to pursue unduly competitive policies. Framing China as a threat to the LIO reflects and combines both of these dangers, and thereby unnecessarily aggravates U.S.-China relations.97 For all of these reasons, scholars and policymakers should use LIO terminology, at most, for descriptive purposes. The LIO would simply refer to the international situation, including the key international institutions, the rules that support them, and the regime types of its members. It would not imply desirability or the ability to generate, even contribute to, specific international outcomes, beyond those generated by its individual elements. Even this usage has disadvantages, among others that there is no agreement on which elements the LIO includes. ADVANTAGES OF A GRAND-STRATEGIC LENS To generate greater clarity about the international challenges facing the United States and its options for confronting them, analysts should employ a grand-strategic lens. By grand strategy, I mean the broad policies—military, diplomatic, and economic—that a state pursues to achieve its vital interests.98 The LIO is simultaneously a product of U.S. grand strategy and a part of U.S. grand strategy. The U.S. Cold War grand strategy of containment called for protecting Western Europe from the Soviet Union; NATO was created for this purpose and is a key component of the LIO. The economic dimension of U.S. grand strategy is the liberal international economic system, which is a second key component of the LIO; it reflects long-held U.S. beliefs in both the economic benefits of openness and the potential of openness to support peace. Adoption of a grand-strategic lens would improve the analysis of issues raised by the LIO discourse by placing them in the wider context of U.S. options for dealing with current geopolitical challenges. It would have three specific advantages. First, it would improve analysis of U.S. interests and threats to those interests. The initial step in any analysis of grand strategy is to identify a state's fundamental interests; typically, security and prosperity rank highest. The next step is to consider threats to these interests. The LIO lens essentially skips these steps by assuming that the LIO is a fundamental U.S. interest; anything that threatens the LIO is therefore a threat to U.S. interests. As I explained at the outset, however, the LIO is not an end/interest; instead, it is a means for achieving U.S. interests. Shifting to a grand-strategic framework should impose the analytic discipline required to avoid these errors. Second, adoption of a grand-strategic framework would require engaging with theories and theoretical disputes relevant to the formulation of U.S. international policy. Grand strategy reflects beliefs/theories that play a central role in identifying threats and provide the logical connection between a state's interests and the available means for achieving them. The LIO concept includes some theories/mechanisms about the nature of threats to U.S. interests and about possible solutions: authoritarian regimes are dangerous, democracies are not; economic engagement can reduce incentives for war; economic growth will convert authoritarian regimes to democracies; and so on. The LIO discourse proceeds as though these theories are widely accepted, when in fact scholarly debate over them continues. In addition, a range of additional theories must be employed to adequately analyze U.S. international policy, including those that address deterrence, power transitions, alliance formation, the security dilemma, and other causes of war. Employing a grand-strategic framework should result in this more complete and transparent theoretical analysis.99 Third, a grand-strategic framework would identify the full spectrum of broad options for achieving U.S. security and prosperity, ranging from neo-isolationist policies that would terminate U.S. alliances to global hegemony that requires intense military and economic competition with China. In contrast, the LIO lens starts with a single option and the assumption that it is desirable. A grand-strategic lens would generate comparisons and assessments of the range of possible grand strategies.

#### Strong US-China relations prevent every scenario for extinction

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Preface: Global Future Depends on Depth of China-US Cooperation

The world has achieved unprecedented peace, prosperity, and inter-dependence, but past achievements — and further progress — are threatened by a host of looming challenges. Global institutions that served us well and transformed the world are becoming victims of their own success and must be reformed or replaced to deal with new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities. Governments everywhere face rising expectations and increasing demands but find themselves less able to manage the challenges they face. The next round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major powers, cooperate. Moreover, the most difficult and most consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without sustained cooperation between the largest developing country, China, and the largest developed country, the United States. Stated another way, the ability of China and the **U**nited **S**tates to work together on critical global challenges will determine whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually beneficial developments or fails to cope with the issues critical to the **global future** and to the security and prosperity of the United States and China. This shared conviction persuades us that we must do more than just hope that our countries will find ways to cooperate. This report represents a joint effort to develop both the rationale and concrete mechanisms for sustained, proactive collaboration to address challenges resulting from long-term global trends and consequential uncertainties. It builds on the findings of independent efforts to identify megatrends and potential game-changers with the goal of developing a framework for the US-China relationship that will better enable us to meet the challenges facing the global community and the strategic needs of both countries. The Joint Working Group recognizes that China and the United States hold different views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is constrained by mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our **common strategic interests** and responsibility as major powers are more important than the specific issues that divide us; we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of bilateral disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to our long-term security and prosperity as is our ability to cooperate on key challenges to global security and our increasingly intertwined futures. We must cooperate on global challenges not as a favor to one another or because other nations expect us to exercise leadership in the international system. We must do it because failure to cooperate on key global challenges will have profoundly negative consequences for the citizens of our own countries. The Joint Working Group has no illusions about how difficult the task ahead will be. Leaders in both countries face relentless domestic pressures to focus on near-term issues, often to the detriment of long-term interests, as well as on looming US-China bilateral differences and mutual suspicions. This report seeks to illustrate why it is imperative and how it is possible to pursue long- and short-term interests at the same time.

How We Reached Key Assessments and Recommendations

Generous support from the China-United States Exchange Foundation enabled the Atlantic Council and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) to establish a Joint Working Group of experts from both countries. The members of the group met in Beijing and Washington in the spring and summer of 2012 to compare and integrate the findings of separate Chinese and US draft reports on global trends. The Chinese projection of trends, entitled Global Trends to 2030 and the Prospects for China-US Relations, was prepared by CIIS with contributions from the School of International Studies at Peking University. The US report, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, was prepared by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC).[1] The Atlantic Council contributed to the NIC report and members of the NIC team attended (as observers) the joint assessment meetings. This review confirmed that the independently developed reports were generally consistent in their assessments of global trends and provided a solid basis for development of scenarios to illustrate what might happen under different assumptions about cooperation between China and the United States. The scenarios in both analyses depict markedly different outcomes for China, the United States, and the world. When China and the United States cooperate to meet looming challenges, both countries benefit. When they fail to cooperate and pursue narrow interests or win-lose or zero-sum outcomes, both countries lose. Continuing down the path of drift and episodic cooperation that we are on now also leads to lose-lose outcomes. The obvious advantages of win-win outcomes and dangerous implications of behaviors that eschew or minimize cooperation create strong incentives to focus on megatrends, critical challenges, and enhancing the likelihood of success and mutual benefit through close and continuous collaboration. This report outlines the case for collaboration and makes several specific recommendations to make cooperation both possible and fruitful. It was drafted and circulated among group members for revisions and to ensure consensus. China and the United States have different interests, objectives, and perspectives on many matters, and the number of issues in dispute may well grow as we broaden our bilateral relationship and at times disagree with one another on the world stage. Resolving some of these issues will be difficult and require much time and effort. The resolution of these contentious issues in the US-China relationship, however, must not be made a prerequisite for cooperation on a limited but arguably more important set of issues with the clear potential to harm both of our interests. Continued drift toward strategic competition and failure to find a balance of interests on core issues will undermine support in both countries for cooperation on major global issues of mutual interest and benefit. Cooperation on shared global challenges may build trust and make it easier to resolve nettlesome bilateral issues. But that would be an ancillary benefit and should not be the primary reason for collaboration on the global challenges identified in the independently prepared studies and summarized elsewhere in this report. The primary reasons we need to work together on the global challenges are that they cannot be addressed successfully unless we do, and that failure to deal effectively with consequential megatrends will have deleterious consequences for China, the United States, and the world. It is difficult to envision a stable, prosperous global system absent a US-China relationship that is largely a cooperative one. Forces and megatrends that are visible but not well understood today will shape the futures of people everywhere. The list includes consequences of globalization that increase prosperity but also increase demand for water, food, and energy. It also includes demographic change and effects of climate change that will intensify the consequences of other megatrends and make them more difficult to manage. Some of the megatrends and the way they interact will threaten social and political stability unless managed effectively. All have profound implications for governance and **global stability**. How effectively governments meet and manage these challenges in the next ten to twenty years will determine how beneficial or detrimental they will be for our countries and our children. Successfully navigating the turbulent waters ahead will require understanding the challenges we face and foresight about the implications of alternative paths. Our common goal must be to avert or ameliorate negative outcomes, and to maximize the chances of achieving desirable outcomes. To accomplish this goal, China and the United States must establish and draw on a continuing dialogue on the evolution, implications, and possible policy responses to the most consequential megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive change. The framework and policy recommendations of this report seek to jumpstart that process by suggesting mechanisms for collaboration that begin bilaterally but eventually include other nations critical to finding paths to a better future for all.

I. Critical Importance of China-US Cooperation

The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly.. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune. Global challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny. What China and the United States do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world. , Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international crises and instability. , Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major powers, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an “each nation for itself” mentality that further undermines the ability of states to cooperate in the face of growing common challenges. , Global Revitalization and Cooperation: To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of increased demand for resources and the impact of climate change as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development. Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to prevent conflict and enhance security for all. China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together. The possible futures sketched out above (and developed at greater length below) are intended to stimulate thinking about how current trends and uncertainties could lead to very different global and national outcomes. For many reasons, the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades. Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership. Many factors will shape the future, some of which are beyond the control of any nation state, but China and the United States — and the character of the US-China relationship — will be critical. The mutual dependence on each other’s economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole was demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens.

II. Critical Megatrends

There are many global trends that are positive, including greater prosperity; global economic reconvergence after two centuries of Western economic preponderance; profound social changes driven by rapid scientific and technological changes; a growing global middle class; widespread improvement in global health and life expectancy; and overall reduction in war and violent deaths. The great advances in human prosperity over the last several decades and the potential for greater gains in the future are to be celebrated, but they also create new challenges shaped by megatrends in the “global operating environment”. These megatrends include: , Individual empowerment is an increasingly important factor both within states and internationally. The empowerment of individuals is fueled by education, rising prosperity, and a host of technologies. Empowered individuals, the growing middle class, and domestic NGOs are more willing to engage in political activities as well as to make more demands on government. The sense of national identity is becoming stronger in many places but so too are social identities based on ethnicity, religion, culture, political concerns, and shared causes such as the environment and public health. This trend sometimes also fuels extremism and separatism. , Power will be increasingly diffused as the number of players with actual or nascent capacity to influence international deve-lopments is increasing. The international system evinces increasing signs of fragmentation and stratification. In addition to the rise of China, India, and Brazil, middle powers such as Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, and Mexico are playing an ever more important role in the international arena. Further, the growing numbers and types of non-state actors such as international NGOs, multinational enterprises, and regional organizations mean states themselves no longer control the system. , Aging and urbanizing populations, accompanied by waves of domestic and international migration, will transform societies and strain capabilities. More than one billion people will be added to the global population by 2030 and an equal or greater number will move to cities. Rising incomes will enable as many as two billion more people to join the global middle class. Nearly all of the growth in the global population, urban dwellers, and the middle class will occur in developing countries. Critical demographic shifts will age populations and shrink the percentage of working-age cohorts in most of the developed and, increasingly, in parts of the developing world as well. China will be one of the developing countries with an aging population. Waves of immigration will create or exacerbate significant social problems, but there also will be a huge international marketplace for skilled and talented workers. , There will be increasing stresses and strains on the global commons. Many challenges to the environment and human security will be intensified by rapidly increased food, water, and natural resource consumption due to growing population, urbanization, and rapid expansion of the middle class. If not managed well, these challenges could have a significant and long-term adverse impact on all nations and the global system. , There is increasing concern that global climate change poses an existential threat to humanity. Climate change exacerbates water shortages and food production challenges; sparks greater migration and social conflict; acidifies the oceans; and leads to more extreme weather events, including sea-level rises magnifying the impact of storm surges threatening coastal cities and infrastructure. There is likely to be more focus by the international community on climate change consequence management, adaptation, and mitigation.

III. Key Uncertainties

The megatrends summarized above constitute a relatively predictable set of challenges facing individuals and nations, especially China and the United States. But they are not the only factors that will influence developments in the next two decades. The relatively predictable megatrends will interact with a number of critical uncertainties. Examples include: , The future of the global economy is volatile. The developed countries, especially in the Eurozone, may face a prolonged period of recovery. The developing countries, including China and India, face a “middle income trap”. The world could experience growing economic nationalism and trade protectionism as well as an accelerating adjustment of international industrial division of labor as China refocuses on domestic consumption-led growth, other nations increasingly displace China as the low-cost provider, and new manufacturing technologies and lower energy costs encourage the return of manufacturing to the United States and other developed countries. In addition, major economic crises could result from the increasing pressure on resource availability discussed previously. , The accelerating pace of technological development is likely to change the global operating environment for foreign policy and national security over the next two decades with uncertain consequences. A wide range of emerging technologies will affect the political, social, economic and security trajectories of states, international relations, and the international system, as have the Internet, mobile communications technology, and social media. These technologies range from new energy systems and manufacturing technologies such as 3D printing to bio- and nanotechnology breakthroughs affecting agricultural productivity, human enhancement, robotics, and information availability. On the negative side of the ledger, cyber hacking, cyber warfare, and genomics-enabled bioterrorism have the potential to be highly disruptive. , Nationalistic responses to increasing mutual vulnerability are likely as growing global interconnectedness and interdependence ensure that developments anywhere in the world, from slowly-developing threats like climate change to short-term crises like the 2008 financial crisis, can affect most nations and citizens yet be largely, if not completely, outside the control of individual states. National responses to common challenges and threats could be “each nation for itself” actions to achieve narrow national interests at the expense of other states and the common good. , Unpredictable events such as natural disasters, extreme weather events, pandemics, or nuclear weapon use by terrorists could be game-changers. An H5N1 or similar pandemic could shut down global transportation and kill tens of millions or more with a huge impact on the global economy, politics, and security. A series of extreme weather events, foreshadowed by Hurricane Sandy’s impact on the United States, could change the trajectories of global political efforts to deal with the consequences of climate change. , The future of both China and the United States is uncertain. China has many internal challenges that could limit its willingness to be a “joint responsible stakeholder” with the United States to meet global challenges and resolve regional conflicts. Similarly, the United States faces major economic challenges that could lead to long-term slow growth, a more inward focus, and a less active and influential role in catalyzing cooperation on global challenges. Conversely, one or both countries could achieve considerable success in its/their domestic arena(s) and feel emboldened to lead the transformation of the global system. , Conflicts could become more common and more intense as a result of social unrest, religious extremism, reduced provision of public goods, power shifts, and individual empowerment. The world’s security and stability may become increasingly fragile as a result of state failure, nuclear proliferation, or dramatic acts of terrorism, especially in unstable regions like the Middle East and South Asia. , Regional instability may have global impact. A major conflict in the Middle East, including over Iran’s nuclear weapons, could draw in outside powers, disrupt oil supplies, and send the global economy into recession. Failure to resolve or indefinitely shelve territorial disputes in East and Southeast Asia could limit the ability of regional states to cooperate in global as well as regional efforts to cope with global challenges. Military conflict over these disputes also could destabilize the Asia-Pacific region with grave consequences for the global economy and international stability. An existential crisis of the European Union could disrupt the cohesiveness of what is now the world’s largest economy.

IV. Governance and Cooperation Challenges of Megatrends and Uncertainties

Although no one can predict with confidence exactly how events will play out in the years ahead, we can be confident that the challenges and choices facing decision-makers at all levels and in all countries will be shaped by the interplay of megatrends, known uncertainties, unexpected “black swan” events, and the decisions of governments and nongovernmental actors. Waiting to see how events unfold is a possible but undesirable choice because waiting is, in effect, a decision to do nothing and hope for the best. We can and must do better than that by working to shape events in ways that reduce uncertainty, avoid or ameliorate undesirable trajectories, and increase the likelihood of win-win outcomes. Some of the challenges posed include: , Volatile global economy: Slower economic growth and potential crises such as a Eurozone meltdown, another global financial crisis, or a sustained spike in food prices could slow or reverse progress toward greater prosperity and better lives for more people. Growing inequality (worsening GINI coefficients[2]) could further compound the challenges. Although the rich and the poor alike may become richer, the absolute gaps between them likely will widen, both within and among countries and regions. Moreover, the middle class may continue to be squeezed not only in developed countries but also in developing countries despite more rapid economic growth, especially as the gap widens between the middle class and the super rich. , Increasing internal pressures on governments: Demands on governments at all levels likely will increase faster than the availability of resources required to satisfy them. More people with rising expectations and greater awareness of conditions at home and elsewhere will have more tools, especially social media, to organize and put pressure on governments to provide more services and opportunities. The rising middle class in the emerging economies likely will expect and demand more and better quality food and water, more reliable supplies of cleaner energy, improved infrastructure, and healthier environments. Governments could find it difficult to meet rising expectations, however, especially growing demand for increasingly limited resources, which will push prices upward and exacerbate economic and social instability. At the same time, some of the poorest countries with ineffective governments may be pushed into internal conflict and state failure by tribal, ethnic, and religious strife as well as economic and environmental stresses. These internal conflicts could lead to regional instability as environmental and economic migrants spill into neighboring states. Global cooperation gap widening: Increasing globalization and interdependence could make it more difficult for national govern-ments to manage new challenges on their own, but transnational institutions will be increasingly ill-suited or even incapable of meeting twenty-first century challenges. To meet the growing challenges, existing global mechanisms, most of which are legacy institutions from the post-World War II era designed to solve problems from the inter-war period, must be reformed or replaced. That will not be easy. There are 140 more countries today than there were when the global system was last reformed in the 1940s and all feel entitled to a seat at the table when decisions are made that will affect their own destinies. This widely shared ethos of democratic participation of all nations makes it difficult to strike a balance between equity of representation and efficacy of decision-making. , Domestic pressures and weak national governments: Gov-ernments may become less willing or able to cooperate with other nations as a result of domestic pressures on leaders to pursue narrow national interests. This will increase the likelihood of nations engaging in zero-sum behavior that will make it even more difficult to deal with the most challenging megatrends. , Extremism and fracturing of the nation-state: Extremism and separatism are likely to be fueled by individual empowerment and tribal, ethnic, religious, and other identities, strengthened by ubiquitous social media. The power and authority of the nation-state is likely to be increasingly circumscribed by the rising power of non-state actors and the growing importance of transnational challenges beyond the state’s control. The state is being challenged in many cases by separatist and extremist forces, including religious fundamentalists in Waziristan and Dagestan and regional nationalists in Catalonia and Scotland. , “Black swans” and lack of robust international institutions: Failure to establish robust international institutions and habits of cooperation could reduce the international community’s ability to respond to major crises, including black swan events. The latter are high impact but either improbable or simply unpredictable calamities such as pandemics, nuclear weapon or biological warfare attacks, or cyber meltdowns. If China and the **U**nited **S**tates act as rivals and give priority to parochial interests, it may be impossible for the international community to successfully confront the major challenges of the next twenty years. Owing to their size and importance in the global system, what China and the US do together as well as individually will profoundly affect the international community’s ability to engage in robust international cooperation in science and technology to find solutions to the world’s most pressing problems.

V. Scenarios Illustrate Interconnections and Alternative Outcomes

As the megatrends and uncertainties evolve over the coming two decades and beyond, China and the United States, along with the rest of the world, will face unprecedented challenges and unpredictable, disruptive change. We offer three global scenarios to illustrate how the complex megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive changes could play out, depending in large part on whether the relationship between China and the United States is primarily cooperative or conflictual. , Global Drift and Erosion: This scenario is characterized by the inability of China and the United States to work together effectively, if at all, to address key global challenges and to resolve regional conflicts. Problems created or exacerbated by the megatrends, key uncertainties, and their interactions worsen, creating a world that is less peaceful, less stable, and less prosperous. The debacle of the 2009 Copenhagen UN climate change conference demonstrated the global impact of the failure of the United States and China to agree on far-reaching steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this future, the US and China again fail to respond adequately to continuing problems such as economic imbalances associated with the efforts of many countries to break into and then move from middle income status to that of high income. There is disruptive socio-political change related in part to both economic and demographic transitions, and environmental problems involving inadequate energy, water, and food resources. Washington and Beijing could be too preoccupied with political and military competition and territorial disputes in the Western Pacific, as well as by bilateral differences over intellectual property and other trade issues, to tackle these pressing problems. Among possible developments, US-China tensions could adversely affect global responses to energy challenges. These range from threats to security of supplies resulting from conflict in the Middle East and Persian Gulf to the need for a global energy transition away from fossil fuels to minimize carbon emissions and the impact of energy price volatility on global economic growth. Further, China and the United States also could fail to cooperate in efforts to mitigate the potentially disruptive impact of greatly increased demand for food, water, and other resources created by the addition of more than one billion people to the global population by 2030 as well as possibly two billion or more people to the developing world middle class. Without adequate international cooperation and global governmental mechanisms, this could lead to deeper economic crises, unresolved political conflicts, and worsening environmental conditions. , Zero-Sum World: A second possible trajectory could lead to the emergence of an even more competitive and dangerous zero-sum world, in which nations pursue narrow national interests. For example, the world could experience intense monetary and trade protectionism, with countries seeking geopolitical advantage at the expense of international cooperation for the common good. It could see intensifying rivalries, creating hostilities and rendering cooperation on global challenges nearly impossible as global governmental mechanisms break down or are marginalized. In this scenario, the impact of megatrends and critical challenges on global developments is overwhelmingly negative. The world economy is in a tailspin, brought on, perhaps, by a deepening European recession followed by a new meltdown of the global financial system and then a worse recession than that sparked by the 2008 financial crisis. Regional conflicts and disputes in East Asia intensify suspicions and threaten to ignite conflict among the major powers. The United States and China not only fail to cooperate on longer-term global issues but also fail to work together to resolve immediate regional tensions which spin out of control, leading to military conflict that threatens to drag the US and China into direct confrontation. , Global Revitalization and Cooperation: A third possible trajectory could lead to a world in which sustained and effective cooperation builds/rebuilds key institutions to address old and emerging challenges as well as “black swans”. Globalization and global integration continue apace with more successful efforts to mitigate or prepare for negative consequences. This scenario is characterized by greater strategic stability among major powers and by sustained prosperity and economic growth in China, the United States, and most other countries. Through cooperative development and deployment of new technologies countries implement effective measures to manage energy, water, governance, and other challenges. The result would be a wide range of win-win outcomes for all nations. It is difficult to find **any** credible path to such “global revitalization and cooperation” that does not include a cooperative US-China relationship. This makes efforts to achieve such an outcome **imperative** for the leaders of both countries, despite the differences and suspicions between them. Many variants of these scenarios are possible, but the dangers of a fragmented, competitive, or adversarial world are as clear as the advantages of cooperation. Consultations with experts in China, the United States, and many other countries indicate widespread recognition that failure to address megatrends and looming challenges cooperatively will lead to suboptimal and even catastrophic outcomes. But general recognition is insufficient to establish priorities, identify critical linkages, and develop concrete proposals for collective action. The stakes are too high to rely on chance and informal procedures.

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#### Strong US-China relations is key solve climate change

Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 02-2018’, " Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy," National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation and Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/harvard-nscs-paper-final-160224.pdf>, MMC

Over the past two decades, disagreements between developing and developed countries have often frustrated efforts to reach consensus on an effective international response to the problem of global climate change. Key disputes have centered on the appropriate prioritization of economic development versus climate mitigation, responsibility for historic emissions versus contribution to current and forecasted emissions, and total emissions versus emission per capita. While differences between developing countries’ perspectives and developed-country perspectives on these issues are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the imperative to move beyond these disputes toward a more cooperative and coordinated approach to global climate mitigation is becoming urgent. At this critical juncture, the recent joint announcements between China and the United States concerning climate change actions represented an important development in global climate negotiations and were appropriately hailed as offering a new model for improved cooperation between emerging and developed economies. Given the size of the two countries’ economies and their large contributions to global GHG emissions, the actions outlined in the joint announcements per se will have a significant impact on future mitigation efforts—and, indeed, did much to facilitate a successful outcome in Paris. By demonstrating these actions, China and the United States may encourage other countries to increase their climate mitigation ambitions. This paper has identified three specific areas of international climate policy, namely marketbased mechanisms, comparison of efforts, and trade policy and climate policy interactions, where China and the United States can deepen their cooperation. Cooperation on marketbased climate policies, particularly cap-and-trade, is important, not only because marketbased approaches offer the most cost-effective approach to mitigating GHG emissions, but also because emissions trading systems make it possible to address equity concerns by adjusting the level of the emissions cap and the allocation of emission allowances. A logical focus for China–U.S. cooperation with respect to market-based mechanisms is capacity building. A functioning cap-and-trade system requires properly designed government and market institutions. At a micro level, the United States and China can exchange experience and expertise on topics such as allowance allocation, price ceilings and floors, allowance banking and borrowing, and other detailed emissions trading rules. At a macro level, both China and the United States confront challenges to implementing cap-and-trade systems— in the United States because of political polarization and in China because of features of the regulated electricity market and the power of state-owned enterprises. Cooperation and communication can help both countries overcome these barriers, while also advancing theoretical and empirical understanding of cap-and-trade and other market-based approaches. Cooperation on standards and procedures for comparing mitigation efforts can strengthen the technical basis for other aspects of China–U.S. cooperation, particularly in the area of cap-and-trade systems, and facilitate the linkage of homogeneous or heterogeneous climate policies. Cooperation in this area can also increase transparency and consistency in climate negotiations, improve trust among parties, and advance efforts to track collective progress toward achieving global mitigation targets. But China and the United States have different preferences and interests in terms of the scope and timeframe of mitigation efforts and other issues. Thus it will be important to recognize from the outset that no single perfect comparison metric is likely to satisfy both countries’ needs. Instead, a suite of metrics is likely to offer the best option for comprehensively reflecting and comparing the mitigation efforts undertaken by each country. More broadly, it will be important to develop a rigorous, systematic, and transparent system for tracking domestic policy developments in the context of an international climate policy framework. Interactions between trade and climate policy constitute a third important area for future U.S.–China cooperation. Reforms can be initiated within the WTO and UNFCCC, which currently provide the dominant frameworks for global coordination on trade and climate change. But China and the United States should also explore opportunities to advance progress in this area through more flexible plurilateral and bilateral relationships. Cooperation between the two countries to develop GHG standards and methods for comparing the impact of domestic climate policies would be particularly helpful in reducing the potential for future trade conflicts and facilitating the coordination of climate and trade policies. Climate change has added a new dimension to a bilateral relationship that is already one of the most important of the twenty-first century. While China and the United States have different national interests in many areas, climate change represents an important area where their interests, and those of every other country interested in the wellbeing of its citizens and future generations, converge. But the success of the China–U.S. relationship in this arena will be determined less by the ability to find common ground than by the ability to find solutions that properly address the real socioeconomic and political differences that exist between these two nations. If an effective response to climate change eventually requires the participation of all countries, despite their different cultures, states of economic development, and political systems, successful China–U.S. cooperation under the hybrid Paris climate policy architecture may well prove crucial in paving the way for broader international cooperation to reduce the risk of global climate change.

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#### Cooperation is key to prevent US-North Korean nuclear war

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The long-simmering confrontation between the United States and North Korea has reached a moment of unprecedented tension. The risk that unintended war will break out due to misjudgment is high. Indeed, as others have observed, East Asia is witnessing a “Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion.”

According to Graham Allison, director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, it is now time “to examine previously unthinkable options” on the Korean Peninsula—such as scaling back joint US-South Korean military exercises in exchange for a freeze on North Korean tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Considering these “unthinkable” options, Allison writes, would follow in a tradition established during the Cuban Missile Crisis by John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, who both “blinked,” and whose behavior ultimately amounted to cooperative crisis management. One of the most unthinkable options for the Korean Peninsula—but perhaps the most promising—is for the United States and China to finally pursue a formal end to the Korean War.

Two main stakeholders. The situation on the Korean Peninsula today is fraught, to say the least. North Korea remains in diplomatic isolation. It has continued testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, resulting in further escalation of tensions. The United States and South Korea have exhibited increasing hawkishness, stepping up joint military exercises that center on striking key facilities in North Korea as well as the country’s leadership (“decapitation”). Washington and Seoul’s combined forces have enhanced their preemptive strike capability—but if US-South Korean forces attacked the North in the name of counterproliferation or regime change, the result would inevitably be all-out war and region-wide catastrophe.

Arguably, the US-North Korea confrontation has reached the level of mutually assured destruction. The two sides’ military capabilities are not rigorously balanced, as Washington and Moscow’s nuclear second-strike capabilities were balanced during the Cold War. But a military confrontation would cause intolerable damage to both sides and catastrophe for the whole region. Seoul would become an inferno. In Japan, nuclear power plants and US military bases would be targeted with missiles. North Korea’s special forces might resort to guerrilla or terrorist tactics involving weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps even Yanbian, a Chinese region near the North Korean border with a large population of ethnic Koreans, would be destabilized. The use of force is therefore not an option. The only viable solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis is cooperative crisis management. Previously unthinkable options simply must be explored.

But the stakeholders who can end the nuclear crisis are not the United States and North Korea. Instead, as Allison has correctly suggested, they are the United States and China. This is not merely because the United States, as the region’s predominant military power, is exerting military pressure on North Korea, or that Beijing provides Pyongyang an economic lifeline (making China the gatekeeper for international economic sanctions against the North). Rather, Washington and Beijing hold the key to ending the crisis because they are the key signatories of the Korean War Armistice Agreement—which brought Korean War hostilities to an end but left the war itself in a state of suspended animation.

To this day, despite rhetorical frictions between Beijing and Pyongyang, China and North Korea share a “blood alliance” forged during the Korean War. The latest research on the war—based on declassified North Korean military documents that US and UN forces seized during the war, as well as on archival materials from Russia and China—reveals that Mao Zedong played a more active role in initiating the war than previously understood. China is usually portrayed as entering the war in October 1950, after UN forces, pursuing a counterattack against North Korea, reached the neighborhood of the Yalu River, which forms the border between China and North Korea. But well before then—indeed, well before the outbreak of war in June 1950—Mao had made a strategic decision to support Kim Il-sung’s invasion of the South. Kim badly needed a larger army if he was to invade the South, and in the summer of 1949 Mao granted him approximately 30,000 ethnic Korean troops from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), fully equipped with modern arms left by the Soviet Red Army upon its departure from the country in 1948, and with additional supplies from the PLA. In the early stages of China’s civil war, the 166th Division—an elite PLA force comprised of ethnic Koreans—had formed the backbone of Communist forces fighting Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces in Manchuria. Now these troops were transferred to Kim’s command, reappearing as the 6th Division of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). The 6th Division played a decisive role in the Korean War—launching an initial surprise attack against Kaesong on June 25, 1950, paving the way for the KPA’s 3rd Division to mount a lightning attack against Seoul on June 28, with the fighting then continuing south to Taejon. (Much of this only became clear with the 1993 publication of a study by Ryo Hagiwara known in English as The Korean War: A Conspiracy of Kim Il-sung and MacArthur.)

More than just a blood alliance, however, explains China’s behavior on the Korean Peninsula today. Just as Nikita Khrushchev deployed nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba to strengthen the Soviet Union’s strategic position vis-à-vis the United States, China depends on heavily-armed North Korea to help neutralize US forces in East Asia. The only real difference is that Beijing is savvy enough to disguise its actions—to let the confrontation on the Peninsula be perceived as involving merely the United States and North Korea.

In fact, as Graham Allison has pointed out with considerable insight, the real animating force behind the North Korean nuclear crisis, and indeed behind tensions on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Korean War, is strategic confrontation between the United States and China. It is therefore the responsibility of Beijing and Washington to reduce the tensions that could cause a catastrophic war. The two sides would do well to heed the lesson that Kennedy drew from the Cuban Missile Crisis—that “while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”

Now is the time. Among previously unthinkable measures to end the North Korean nuclear crisis, the most effective would be simply to formally end the abnormally protracted Korean War. After all, the root cause of the North Korean nuclear crisis is an ongoing Korean Cold War—contested between the United States and China (and at one time, discreetly, by the Soviet Union) but disguised as an ideological battle over Korean unification, with North and South contending for regime legitimacy. But the Korean Cold War has now reached the threshold of nuclear catastrophe, and it must end. Ending the war would reduce North Korea’s motivation to assert the legitimacy of its regime, or guard against “US nuclear blackmail,” by equipping itself with nuclear-armed missiles. And China, freed from concerns that war would break out on the peninsula or that the North Korean regime would collapse, would be able to implement more effective economic sanctions against North Korea and thereby contain nuclear proliferation.

If Washington and Beijing committed themselves to the project, negotiations toward a formal peace treaty would not have to be exceedingly complicated. The parties could agree to minimal preconditions: North Korea would stop its missile and nuclear tests while the United States and South Korea would agree to constrain their joint military exercises (an idea already proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi). Kim Jong-un, meanwhile, could be sidelined during the talks, just as Fidel Castro was left completely out of communications between Washington and Moscow at the critical moments of the Cuban Missile Crisis. After the crisis, Castro and his regime survived for more than half a century, contending with economic sanctions and causing the rest of the world only modest problems.

When the Korean War is finally concluded, a new regional confidence-building framework, based on the erstwhile six-party talks, could be established—in much the same way that Washington and Moscow established a crisis hotline following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Formally ending the Korean War should be the beginning, not the end, of a years-long process of denuclearizing North Korea. It could even lead to the establishment of an East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone. In any event, now is the time for Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping to cooperate, as Kennedy and Khrushchev cooperated before them, to prevent nuclear catastrophe and negotiate a peace agreement for the Korean Peninsula.

### ! – Space coop

#### China-US space cooperation prevents conflict and miscalc

**Yang 18** Adam Yang, The Diplomat, 3-17-2018, Adam Yang is a Major in the U.S. Marine Corp and a student at the Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia "How Should the US Engage China in Space?," Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/how-should-the-us-engage-china-in-space/>) AD

The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy categorized China as a revisionist power, and through this lens, it seems strategically sound for the United States to shield its precious technical advantages from a potential adversary. Nevertheless, some NASA officials insist that the United States should still collaborate with China to capitalize on a revolutionary period of high technical exchange between China and other space powers. Other officials warn that if the U.S. and China do not find meaningful ways to cooperate in space, **relations could devolve into greater mistrust and lead to conflict**. To guide strategic thinking on U.S. space policy, this article submits that policymakers may gain strategic insights on how to address China’s growing influence in the space domain by examining its actions in the maritime domain. Deriving Strategic Insights from Sea to Space Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. To derive strategic insights from the maritime environment for the space domain, this article surveys how China: 1) applies force, 2) manipulates laws, 3) shapes the environment, 4) cooperates internationally, and 5) conducts diplomacy. First, China possesses three major maritime agencies that apply force in order to protect and pursue its interests: the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the Maritime Law Enforcement Forces that include the Coast Guard, and the Maritime Militia. As Andrew Erickson notes, each agency represents the largest of its kind globally. The PLAN commands over 300 ships (whereas U.S. Navy has 277 as of 2017) and its Coast Guard has over 1,200 ships. In their research on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, scholars Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty find that China utilized its military and paramilitary forces 148 times from 1995 to 2013 – more than all other active claimants (Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan) combined in the same period. Their research concluded that as China’s capabilities increased, Beijing was more likely to use force to advance its interests and less likely to defer to legal or multilateral solutions. From a space perspective, U.S. policymakers can surmise that if China had a comparable offensive capability in the space domain, it might also prefer utilizing force to challenge rivals over other means. Though China currently does not have an offensive space capability on par with the scale of its maritime forces, the U.S. Department of Defense 2017 Annual Report to Congress asserted that the PLA is aggressively acquiring a range of counterspace capabilities. Given the fact that there are no international limitations on developing ground-based counterspace weapons, China may pursue an equivalent path of developing a high quantity of systems to overwhelm adversaries during conflict. Second, China could reinterpret laws as a pretext to apply force. In the maritime domain, China reinterprets the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to challenge U.S. freedom of navigation patrols through the South China Sea. China claims waters extending past 12 nautical miles and into the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), saying that foreign states must refrain from threatening the “territorial integrity or political independence” of the owning state. Concurrently, in 1992, China promulgated domestic maritime laws that extended its sovereign claims and deemed the commercial or research activities of other states illegal in contested waters. The international community at large does not recognize this reimagining of the EEZ; however, it does provide China some legal footing and domestic cover to deploy maritime forces in this region. Similarly, the Central Military Commission is exploring the legalities for the use of force in space. PLA doctrine proclaims the need to destroy, damage, or disrupt an adversary’s space capability to secure victory in the information space. Nationally, China codified its security strategy of active defense – using defensive counterattacks in order to spoil the offensive actions of an adversary – in its National Security Law of 2015. By watching the evolution of China’s space-related domestic laws or reinterpretations of international laws, U.S. policymakers may find China strategically telegraphing its intentions through legal maneuvering. Third, when China feels international laws are unfavorable, it may create an alternate framework that advances its own interests. Shortly after a tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague ruled against China’s activities in the South China Sea in 2016, China announced that it would create a “maritime judicial center” and a “maritime arbitration center” to promote its own vision for maritime law. China claimed that this endeavor would advance the nation’s role as a maritime power and support the development of its Belt Road Initiative. Skeptics assert that China initiated this endeavor to harden its claims on disputed territories and to divert cases away from UNCLOS courts. By doing so, China can create legal precedents to interpret international maritime laws and begin to undermine the international maritime system framed around UNCLOS. In the space arena, China is not anywhere close to rearranging an entire judicial system around its views; however, it actively participates in international space organizations and introduces measures that could limit the ability for the United States to project force. Through the United Nations, China and Russia have twice (2008 and 2014) proposed the legally binding Treaty of Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The primary U.S. objections to the treaty were that it did not include verification mechanisms, only applied to space-based weapons, and did not include ground based ASAT weapons – a primary counterspace capability China is advancing. Fourth, policymakers could also examine China’s maritime cooperation initiatives to envision potential space cooperation. China’s counterpiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden has slowly emerged as a valuable mechanism to improve U.S.-China cooperation as seen through the counterpiracy exercises of December 2014. On a grander scale in June 2017, China laid out an ambitious vision for cooperation in relation to the “Maritime Silk Road” as part of its larger Belt and Road Initiative. This plan envisions the establishment of cooperative principles, environmental norms, maritime security, and “collaborative governance” to achieve mutual prosperity. If one believes in China’s sincerity, working cooperatively across these lines could **greatly reduce security tensions and set conditions for long-term mutual gain.** Subsequently, China is pursuing international cooperation in space – not only for security and economic reasons, but also to bolster the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party to domestic and international audiences. The European Space Administration (ESA) has already expressed desires to cooperate with China on human space flight and the use of its future space station. China especially values its relationship with ESA due to the opportunities to trade and transfer technologies denied by the United States. China and Russia have also agreed to cooperate on human space flight and deep space exploration. Though these initiatives are not on the scale of a Maritime Silk Road, they do offer U.S. policymakers opportunities to work with a rising space power for positive ends. Finally, the United States should pay attention to China’s diplomatic and engagement efforts with other nations. Contrary to the cooperative tenets for a Maritime Silk Road, in 2016, China convinced Cambodia to block an Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) joint statement that recognized The Hague’s arbitration ruling on the South China Sea dispute in favor of the Philippines. In June 2017, Vietnam resisted China’s demands to vacate an oil venture within its EEZ, but eventually capitulated when China threatened to use force. The most concerning aspect for Vietnam was an atypical silence from its neighbors – particularly from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore. Apparently, China’s political and economic leverage over these nations prevented them from publicly sympathizing with Vietnam or rebuking China’s actions. Seemingly, when pressed, China uses soft and hard power tactics bilaterally to dislodge multilateral initiatives that counter it interests. Could China disrupt the U.S.-European alliance as it did with ASEAN unity? At this stage, Chinese-European cooperation in space seems well intentioned. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers should consider whether China’s growing space relations with Europe, Russia, or any other space power could complicate U.S. interests in other areas. As China strengthens its partnerships, its ability to shape laws, institutions and the strategic preferences of others increase as well. Conclusion The United States sits at an important period to develop a comprehensive space strategy that addresses China’s growing influence. U.S. cooperation with the Soviets in space during the Cold War was not due to a desire for true cooperation, but a means to manage a potential crisis related to the management of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The United States could develop a similar mechanism for limited engagement with China to send positive signals and reduce misperceptions. China’s activities in space have already intersected with U.S. interests and will only increase in frequency and intensity over time. In the end, for the United States to compete and lead in the space domain, it must engage new players and shape the contours of the game. If Washington is worried about how China will play the game, it can always look in the maritime arena for strategic clues.

### ! – Bioterror and Pandemics

#### Co-op key to solve disease and bioterror – lack of co-op causes failure of aid and global disease pandemics – extinction

Bouey and Feng ‘17

Jennifer, behavioral epidemiologist @georgetown, and Cheng, dir. of global health program @ research center for public health, 05-08-17, "US-China Dialogue on Global Health Background Report," Georgetown Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues , https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10119.pdf

The health threat posed by migration has recently reared its head in China. An outbreak of yellow fever that began in Angola in December 2015 spread to China three months later, marking the first case of yellow fever ever reported in all of Asia, followed by 10 more Chinese cases imported from Angola by May. Yellow fever is a sometimes deadly disease caused by a mosquito-borne virus. While no cure exists, there is a vaccine, but it is generally administered only to those living in or traveling to areas where the disease is endemic. As such, China’s 1.4 billion citizens are almost universally unvaccinated. The Chinese cases came from Chinese workers returning home after having worked in Angola, where over 200,000 Chinese workers are employed on work visas for China’s aid and investment projects in the country.46 Chinese authorities do require travelers to Angola to be vaccinated for yellow fever, but there are fears that many of the Chinese workers there may not have abided by this rule. The spread of yellow fever to China is particularly worrisome given the region’s massive population and the fact that the primary vector of transmission— the Aedes aegypti mosquito—is common across much of China and nearby countries in South and Southeast Asia. Many epidemiologists have voiced concerns about how dangerous this confluence of factors could prove to be. So far, the United States and China have each responded to Angola’s yellow fever epidemic separately. In addition to increasing domestic mosquito monitoring and control activities to boost its own preparedness, the Chinese government provided Angola with half a million dollars in emergency assistance in February, before the outbreak had even spread to China.47 The CDC’s Mozambique Field Epidemiology Training Program graduates have collaborated with Angola’s Ministry of Health to track down suspected cases of yellow fever and intervene accordingly.48 With so much recent discussion between U.S. and Chinese health authorities regarding cooperative health security efforts in Africa, the tragic yellow fever outbreak offers the two countries an opportunity to achieve significant collaborative action on global health, if they choose to embrace it. The recent concerns of yellow fever epidemic also brought attention to China’s vaccine production. The global vaccine industry has long been dominated by a few multinational companies. In the past decade, vaccine manufacturers from China, India, and other emerging economies entered the international market and helped to drive down the vaccine price. For Jiankang Zhang, representative for PATH’s China Programs, the growth of China’s vaccine industry is “a very positive development for global health, as governments and international procurement agencies will be able to afford more life-saving vaccines and thus protect more lives.” A Chinese vaccine manufacturer obtained the first WHO prequalification vaccine (the Japanese encephalitis vaccine) in October 2013.49 Hope has been high that other vaccines manufactured from China will be qualified and enter the global market before the next pandemic. In the wake of the yellow fever epidemic in 2016, China’s Sinovac Biotech pledged to provide sufficient yellow fever vaccine supply for all Chinese expatriate workers.50 As the world is wondering what the next global pandemic will be, China’s vaccine manufacturing capacity may soon become one of the keys to stemming a potential global crisis. A final global health threat for the United States and China to consider as an area for greater cooperation is bioterrorism. Bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism is long established, but there is little evidence of collaboration in combating bioterrorism. Microsoft founder Bill Gates recently brought this issue into sharp relief at the Munich Security Conference that was attended by 450 senior decision makers from around the globe. Gates warned that “whether it occurs by a quirk of nature or at the hand of a terrorist, a fast-moving airborne pathogen could kill more than 30 million people in less than a year.”51 Among other recommendations, he advocated that countries need to prepare for pandemics in the same manner that the military prepares for war—with “germ games” and other pandemic exercises. He concluded that bioterrorism now ranks with nuclear war and climate

### ! – AI

#### Cooperation key to safe AI development – the impact is miscalc and rogue tech – escalation and paranoia should give you a low threshold for the impact

Hass and Balin 19

Ryan, fellow in foreign policy program @ brookings, and Zach, publications coordinator @ brookings,1-10-2019, "US-China relations in the age of artificial intelligence," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/research/us-china-relations-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

The military domain presents the greatest risk for miscalculation. It also is where the need is greatest for ongoing, direct, authoritative bilateral communication to develop a better shared understanding of ethical boundaries around AI, particularly given the potential implications for warfighting. The bilateral relationship already faces an acute security dilemma, where actions on one side make the other feel less secure and push it to develop countermeasures. As AI technologies become more integrated into weapons systems and those systems gain autonomous capabilities, this security dilemma could grow more pronounced, causing each side to nationalize innovation streams and limit transparency in order to seek an edge over the other. In other words, an existing security dilemma could quickly morph into an AI nightmare. The stakes are high. As others have pointed out, the United States and China stand on the cusp of rapid change in the conduct of war, not unlike the employment of cavalry, the advent of the rifled musket, or the merging of fast armor with air support to achieve a blitzkreig.[[5]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/us-china-relations-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence/#footnote-5) Both countries are investing heavily to merge AI-enhanced capabilities and enable machine-based decision processes with minimal human interaction. In the event of a confrontation between U.S. and Chinese forces (e.g., in the South China Sea), robotics and AI could play a critical role. Rapid escalation is an acute risk, particularly if the pace of technological advancements in capabilities exceeds the development of protocols for maintaining human agency in decision-making loops. The real possibility of unintended and rapid escalation should provide incentive for both sides to begin developing boundaries around uses of AI in warfighting. The normative development process around previous arms control treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, could offer applicable lessons that the United States and China could draw from.

### 1nc – Peacekeeping

#### China leadership is key to UN peacekeeping operations

---UNPKOs = United Nations Peace Keeping Operations

Julienne 18 — Marc Julienne is Head of China Research within the Centre for Asian Studies of the French institute of international relations. Marc Julienne THE UNITED NATIONS OF CHINA: A VISION OF THE WORLD ORDER. “From passiveness to proactivity: China’s evolving role in peacekeeping operations” European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018. JSTOR, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21647. Accessed 5 Jul. 2022](http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21647.%20Accessed%205%20Jul.%202022). WMK

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) replaced the Republic of China (Taiwan) as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1971. China’s involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) did not start before the late 1980s, during Deng Xiaoping’s period of reform and opening up. This involvement has since gone through several phases of “gradual adaptation, gradual expansion, and gradual improvement” (逐步适应、逐步扩大、逐步提; zhubu shiying, zhubu kuoda, zhubu tisheng), and has evolved from “passive and simple” participation to “proactive and constructive” (主动和建设型; zhudong he jianshe xing) participation.[8] Today, China proudly claims to be the largest contributor to UNPKOs among the UNSC permanent members (although out of all UN members it is the 12th largest contributor of troops, police, and military experts). In January 2018, China had 2,634 staff participating in UNPKOs in South Sudan, Lebanon, Mali, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Western Sahara, Cyprus, and Afghanistan. [9] China’s role in UNPKOs has been transforming rapidly, especially since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012-2013. China is contributing in terms of troops, but it also intends to contribute in terms of norms and concepts, and it therefore tries to influence reform processes in the UN. China’s new role in UN peace and security actions, however, is facing challenges. China’s growing contribution to UNPKOs China’s first participation in a UNPKO was in 1990, when it sent five military personnel to the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East. China’s contribution to UNPKOs was then low but stable during the 1990s, and started to increase rapidly in the early 2000s, reaching its peak in 2015 with more than 3,000 Chinese blue helmets worldwide. Under Xi, China’s contribution to UNPKOs has entered a new, more proactive, phase. In 2014, China dispatched 400 contingent troops to Mali, in addition to the 400 engineers, doctors, and security guards sent there the previous year. That same year, the decision to send 700 peacekeeping infantry battalion to South Sudan confirmed a new trend. During the 2015 UN Peacekeeping Summit, Xi restated China’s commitment to becoming a major actor in international peace and security. He announced that China will: join the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System; set up a standing peacekeeping force of 8,000 troops alongside a standing peacekeeping police force; train 2,000 foreign peacekeepers; carry out 10 de-mining assistance programmes; and provide $100m in military aid to the African Union.[10] By December 2016, China had set up a 300-strong standing peacekeeping police force (ie. the equivalent of two Formed Police Units – FPUs), which is based in Dongying (Shandong province) and is composed of troops from the People’s Armed Police.[11] By September 2017, the standing peacekeeping force had completed the registration of 8,000 troops, including six infantry battalions, three engineers companies, two transport companies, four second grade hospitals, four security companies, three fast reaction companies, two medium-sized multipurpose helicopter units, two transport aircraft units, one UAV unit, and one surface naval ship.[12] This shows the wide scope of missions that Chinese peacekeepers intend to deal with. China also stepped up its contribution to the UN Peacekeeping Police, which was set up in 2000 and whose numbers rose considerably in 2013 with the dispatch of its first FPU to the UN Mission in Liberia. Comprising 140 police staff, it constitutes almost the entirety of China’s worldwide total of 153 peacekeeping police. It is therefore surprising that the Chinese provisional representative to the UN, Wu Haitao, did not mention this in his statement during the UN Peacekeeping Police Summit in September 2017.[13] Praising China’s active role in peacekeeping police in current UN missions, he only mentioned South Sudan, Cyprus, and Afghanistan (13 staff altogether). The trend towards increasing Chinese contribution to UNPKOs in conflict areas, such as South Sudan, is also linked to China’s interest in protecting the growing numbers of Chinese nationals abroad, argues Li Dongyan, from the China Academy of Social Sciences. She believes that this trend continues, noting that “China refers to both the UK’s operation in Sierra Leone, as well as France’s operation in Mali”. These two operations were launched on the initiative of the two European powers, without a UN mandate, to evacuate foreign citizens (in Sierra Leone) and to support the local army (in Mali). China’s particular interest in these two operations further supports the notion that China is likely preparing to send national forces abroad in the future.

#### Peacekeeping is key to stop global conflicts from escalating

Hegre et al. 19 — Hegre, H., Hultman, L., &amp; Nygård, H. M. (2019). Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations. The Journal of Politics, 81(1), 215–232. <https://doi.org/10.1086/700203> WMK

In this paper, we have evaluated a number of potential UN PKO scenarios and their prospects in reducing conflict. The UN’s new peace-building agenda, spearheaded by the newly appointed Secretary General António Guterres, puts the focus squarely on managing the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict. We have shown that PKOs are an efficient tool for managing these pathways. By simulating different scenarios, we have estimated the effect on the future incidence of conflict of different types of missions and of varying the money spent on PKOs. The results show that PKOs have a clear conflict-reducing effect. The effect of PKOs is largely limited to preventing major armed conflicts. However, there is a discernible indirect effect since the reduction of conflict intensity also tends to increase the chances of peace in following years. There are also some interesting regional differences. PKOs have the strongest effect in three regions that have been particularly afflicted by conflict: West Asia and North Africa; East, Central, and Southern Africa; South and Central Asia.

#### Nuclear war

Brooks 14 **–** Professor of Law at Georgetown and a senior fellow with the New America/Arizona State University Future of War Project (Rosa, “Embrace the Chaos,” *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/14/embrace-the-chaos/>)

In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars. In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends. All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers. Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world’s wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe’s 3.5 billion poorest people). Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself — all in a matter of days or even hours. What’s more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable. Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I’ve written previously: We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should … give us pause when we’re tempted to conclude that today’s trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That’s great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn’t much to go on…. That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as “high consequence, low probability.” How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there’s a low probability of nuclear catastrophe — or just tell us that we haven’t had a nuclear catastrophe yet?… Lack of catastrophic change might signify a system in stable equilibrium, but sometimes — as with earthquakes — pressure may be building up over time, undetected…. Most analysts assumed the Soviet Union was stable — until it collapsed. Analysts predicted that Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak would retain his firm grip on power — until he was ousted. How much of what we currently file under “Stable” should be recategorized under “Hasn’t Collapsed Yet”? This, then, is the character of world messiness in this first quarter of the 21st century. So on to the next question: Where, in all this messiness, does the United States find itself?

### 1nc – African Instability

#### Chinese displacement of US leadership is *sky-rocketing* poverty reduction and *enhancing* political stability

Hodzi 18 (Obert Hodzi is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki, PhD in Political Science from Lingnan University, Hong Kong in 2016, “Delegitimization and ‘Re-socialization’: China and the Diffusion of Alternative Norms in Africa,” International Studies 55(4) 297–314, <http://journals.sagepub.com/home/isq>)

As China’s global influence expands, its foreign policy is increasingly focused on advancing ideas, norms and values that are often at odds with the liberal international order. For instance, China’s model of governance and development is often advanced as an alternative to the Washington consensus giving Africa an alternative source of norms. Increasingly, African countries are looking to China for leadership and inspiration in poverty reduction and for a model to achieve rapid economic growth. The implication is an increased questioning of the human rights based approach to development dominance in the liberal order. China’s strong state backed by a single dominant stable ruling party driving the national economic development agenda is gradually seen as prerequisites for Africa’s extraordinary economic growth. Ethiopia and Rwanda, two countries with the highest economic growth in Africa, emphasize the Chinese model that favours stability over competitive electoral democracy and individual civil and political rights. Combined with China’s major investments in infrastructural development, such as the standard-gauge railway in East Africa, Beijing is carving out a significant zone of influence and shaping foreign policy orientations of African countries.

#### African instability causes climate change, terrorism, and pandemics

Charles A. Ray 21, Member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe, “Does Africa Matter to the United States?”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1/11/2021, https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/does-africa-matter-to-the-united-states/

Africa matters in terms of size, population, and rate of population growth. It is the continent currently most affected by climate change but is also a continent that can have a devastating impact on climate change globally because of the importance of the Congo Basin rainforest, which is the second-largest absorber of heat after the Amazon rainforest. The destruction of this important ecosystem could further accelerate global warming. As residents of the region come into increasing contact with the animals of the rainforest, this region could be the origin of the world’s next viral pandemic. Violent extremism and terrorism are increasing in Africa, and while now mostly localized, the danger has the potential to spread beyond the continent. Crises—natural and man-made—cause massive relocations of populations, both on the continent and abroad, which can have negative economic, social, and political impacts.

Why Africa Matters

The African continent is the world’s second-largest, with the second-fastest growth rate after Asia. With 54 sovereign countries, four territories, and two de facto independent states with little international recognition, the continent has a current population of 1.3 billion. By 2050, the continent’s population is predicted to rise to 2.4 billion. By 2100, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, will have a population of one billion, and half the world’s population growth will be in Africa by then.

The population of African countries is also overwhelmingly young. Approximately 40% of Africans are under 15, and, in some countries, over 50% is under 25. By 2050, two of every five children born in the world will be in Africa, and the continent’s population is expected to triple. These developments have positive and negative potential impacts on the United States and the rest of the world. Young Africans have, for the most part, completely skipped the analog age and gone directly digital. Comfortable with technology, they form a huge potential consumer and labor market. If, on the other hand, the countries of Africa fail to develop economically and do not create gainful employment for this young population, then there is the risk that they will become a huge potential source of recruits to extremist and terrorist movements, which currently target disadvantaged and disenchanted youth.

Lack of economic opportunity, increased urbanization, and climate-fueled disasters will also contribute to movement of people seeking better lives, which will impact economies and security not only on the continent of Africa, but also the economic and security situations around the world. Nations, lacking adequate critical infrastructure, education, and job opportunities are ripe for internal unrest and radicalization. In particular, inadequate health delivery systems, when coupled with natural disasters, such as droughts or floods that limit food production, cause famine and mass movements of populations.

The Challenges for U.S. Policy

Prior to World War II, the U.S. policy towards Africa was not as active as it was toward Europe, Asia, or Latin America. During the Cold War, Africa policy was primarily viewed from a perspective of super-power competition. The end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism introduced this as a major component in U.S. Africa policy along with competition with a rising China and increased Chinese engagement in Africa.

Before his first official trip to Kenya, U.S. President Barack Obama said, “Africa had become an idea more than an actual place . . . with the benefit of distance, we engaged Africa in a selective embrace.” This is probably an apt description of U.S. policy towards African nations despite the bipartisan nature of that policy. The United States, with the many domestic and international issues it has to cope with, can ill afford to continue to ignore Africa. Going forward, U.S. policy must include a hard-headed look at where Africa fits in policy priorities.

The incoming Biden administration will face a number of important issues and challenges as it develops its Africa policy. The most pressing issues are the following:

Climate Change: Climate change is an existential problem that affects the entire globe, but Africa has probably suffered more from the effects of climate change than other continents—and the problem will only get worse with time. In an October 2020 article, World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Secretary-General Petteri Taalas said,

Climate change is having a growing impact on the African continent, hitting the most vulnerable hardest, and contributing to food insecurity, population displacement and stress on water resources. In recent months we have seen devastating floods, an invasion of desert locusts and now face the looming specter of drought because of a La Nina event. The human and economic toll has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Climate change impacts water quality and availability, and millions in Africa will likely face persistent increased water stress due to these impacts. A multi-year drought in parts of South Africa, for instance, threatened total water failure in several small towns and had livestock farmers facing financial ruin. Another pressing climate-change issue is the need for protection of the Congo Basin rainforest. This 178-million-hectare rainforest is the world’s second largest after the Amazon and is currently threatened by agricultural activities in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Countries in the Congo Basin need to address the preservation issue, while also enabling sustainable agricultural activities to ensure food security for the region’s population. In addition to the impact on global climate caused by destruction of the rainforest, such destruction also brings human populations into closer contact with the region’s animals, creating the risk of future animal-to-human transmission of new and possibly more virulent viruses similar to COVID-19, which will have a global impact. In a January 2021 CNN report, Dr. Jean-Jacques Muyembe Tamfum, who as a researcher helped discover the Ebola virus in 1976, warned of possible new pathogens that could be as infectious as COVID-19 and as virulent as Ebola.

Rule of Law/Mitigation of Corruption: A key to African development, given the increasing urbanization, population increases, and youthfulness of the continent’s population, will be an increase in domestic and international investment to build the industries that can provide meaningful employment and improved standards of living. In order for this to be successful, African nations will need to address the issues of rule of law and corruption. Investors will not risk money if the business climate comes with a level of political risk that is too high. Government leaders throughout Africa need to establish legislation that provides an acceptable level of security for investments and take action to curb the endemic corruption that currently discourages investment. Corruption in Africa ranges from wholesale political corruption on the scale of General Sani Abachi’s looting of $3-5 billion of state money during his five years as Nigeria’s military ruler to the bribes paid by businessmen to police and customs officials. The “tradition” of having to pay bribes, or “sweeteners,” drives away domestic investment and scares away foreign investment, leaving many countries mired in poverty.

Violent Extremism and Terrorism: A number of African nations are currently plagued with rising extremist movements. While primarily a domestic issue, the mass movement of people fleeing violence and the disruption of economic activity have the potential to negatively impact the rest of the world. African nations need regional responses to curb extremist and terrorist organizations, many of which are supported by international terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda. In addition, the underlying conditions that helped to create these movements must be addressed. Terrorist groups in Africa range from relatively large and dangerous groups, such as Boko Haram, a group in Nigeria that has received support from al Qaeda and that aims to implement sharia law in the country; Al-Shabab, an al Qaeda affiliate aiming to overthrow the government in Somalia and to punish neighboring countries for their support of the Somali regime; and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, a fundamentalist Christian group. Terrorist groups in the fragile political climate of Libya also pose a threat to sub-Saharan Africa.

#### Terrorism goes nuclear---extinction

Bunn 21 — Matthew Bunn is the James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and the Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. Matthew Bunn "Twenty years after 9/11, terrorists could still go nuclear," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9-16-2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/twenty-years-after-9-11-terrorists-could-still-go-nuclear/, accessed 7-10-2022, WMK

But that was then. Today, both al Qaeda and another major jihadist terror group, the Islamic State, have suffered tremendous blows, with their charismatic leaders dead and many others killed or captured. A US-led counterterrorism coalition destroyed the Islamic State’s geographic caliphate in Iraq and Syria. In recent years, many terrorist attacks have not been much more sophisticated than driving a van into a crowd. Al Qaeda has not managed to carry out a single successful attack in the United States since 9/11. Is a terrorist nuclear attack still something to worry about?

The short answer, unfortunately, is “yes.” The probability of terrorists getting and using a nuclear bomb appears to be low—but the consequences if they did would be so devastating that it is worth beefing up efforts to make sure terrorists never get their hands on a nuclear bomb’s essential ingredients. To see the possibilities, we need to look at motive, capability, and opportunity.

Motive. Violent Islamic extremists desperately want to strike back at the “crusader forces” who have inflicted such punishing blows on their organizations. And both the Islamic State and al Qaeda would like a spectacular action to put them firmly back at the forefront of the violent Islamic extremist movement. Years ago, al Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith argued that because Western actions had killed so many Muslims, al Qaeda had “the right to kill four million Americans, one million of them children.” That kind of hatred still festers. (Abu Ghaith is serving a life sentence in a US prison.)

Nuclear explosives are only one of the paths to mass slaughter that terrorists have pursued. Nuclear efforts must compete for terrorists’ attention with tried-and-true conventional weapons, biological weapons—whose dangers the pandemic has highlighted—chemical weapons, and more. Many of these other types of weapons would be easier for terrorists to acquire, and so their use may be more likely. But the history-changing power of a mushroom cloud rising over a major city has proved attractive to terrorists in the past and may again.

Capability. Government studies make clear that if a sophisticated, well-funded terrorist group got hold of the needed plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), they might well be able to put together a crude nuclear bomb. Unfortunately, it does not take a Manhattan Project to build a bomb, when you have weapons-usable fissile material. Indeed, the group needed to make a crude bomb might not have a footprint much bigger than the 9/11 attackers had. Despite the enormous destruction that has been rained on al Qaeda and the Islamic State over the last 20 years, a cell of terrorists could be working on a nuclear project even now, somewhere far from US attention and drone strikes.

The intense counterterrorism campaigns of the last two decades have surely reduced terrorists’ ability to plan and carry out such a complex effort. But we simply do not know what capability might remain. The Taliban’s rapid return to power in Afghanistan could add to that capability, making that country a terrorist haven again—but there are many other largely ungoverned or terrorist-controlled places where such a project could be undertaken.

And the capability side of the equation can change at remarkable speed. In January 2014, the US intelligence community did not mention the Islamic State in its annual assessment of threats to US security. By summer, the group had seized much of Iraq and Syria and declared a global caliphate.

Opportunity. Fortunately, around the world, security for plutonium and HEU is far better than it once was, making it far harder for terrorists to get their hands on the needed ingredients for a bomb. More than half of all the countries that once had such material on their soil have gotten rid of it. While stolen HEU or plutonium was once showing up in parked cars and airplane luggage racks in Europe, there hasn’t been a major seizure of potential nuclear bomb material for a decade now.

Nevertheless, with the Obama-era nuclear security summits now far in the rearview mirror, the momentum of nuclear security improvement has slowed. There is still a need to ensure that nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities are protected against the full range of plausible threats—especially from insiders, who appear to pose the biggest nuclear security problem. The rise of domestic violent extremists in the United States and other advanced democracies makes the insider threat even more challenging. There is still a need for realistic tests and assessments of nuclear security systems’ real capabilities against intelligent adversaries looking for ways to beat them. And there’s still a need to strengthen nuclear security culture—to make sure the staff and guards at nuclear facilities are giving security the priority it needs, day-in and day-out.

If terrorists ever did manage to turn the heart of a modern city into a smoldering radioactive ruin, they would change history. The economic, political, and social consequences would reverberate far and wide. Fears that it could happen again—possibly stoked by terrorist claims that they had more bombs already hidden in cities and would detonate them unless their demands were met—could lead people to flee major cities. The reactions after 9/11—a more aggressive US foreign policy, racist animosity, expanded government powers, cutbacks in civil liberties—would be expanded manyfold, particularly once people realized that the material for such a bomb could be hidden in any suitcase.

President Biden has warned of these dangers. Now is the time for him to act. Despite the many other priorities on his desk, it is time for him to launch a new, expanded nuclear security initiative, working to ensure that nuclear stockpiles worldwide are secure and accounted for to the highest standards, that major obstacles are placed in the path of nuclear smugglers, that states are deterred from helping terrorists with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and that terrorist nuclear plots are found and stopped. The risk of a nuclear 9/11 will persist as long as high-capability terrorists and the materials needed to make a nuclear bomb both exist in the world.

### ! Warming

#### Warming causes extinction---runaway tipping points

Cribb 17 – Julian Cribb, Principal of JCA, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Former Director, National Awareness, 2017 (“The Baker,” *CSIRO*, Surviving the 21st Century Chapter 4, p. 91-94)

This event, known as the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum or PETM, happened only about ten million years after the dinosaurs were smashed by an asteroid impact. This ‘hyperthermal’ period took place quite suddenly (in geological terms)—in less than 2000 years—and lasted for about 170,000 years before the planet again cooled. The heat spike was accompanied by a major wipe-out of ocean life in particular, though most small land mammals survived. Investigating the records of old marine sediments Zeebe was able to show there had been a sharp, 70 %, leap in atmospheric CO 2 concentrations at the time. However, he concluded there was only sufficient carbon available to force the climate to warm by 1–3 °C and that some other mechanism must have been triggered by the initial warming, which then drove the Earth’s temperature to fever pitch, up by another 4–6 °C (Zeebe et al. 2009). This process is the ‘ runaway global warming ‘ which now menaces us. The significance of PETM is that it appears that about the same volume of carbon was dumped by natural processes into the Earth’s atmosphere and oceans as humans are currently dumping with the burning of fossil fuels and clearing of the world’s forests—about 3 trillion tonnes in all—and it was this that triggered the hyperthermal surge in planetary heating. As to the mechanism that could suddenly release a huge amount of extra carbon into the atmosphere and oceans and project global temperatures up by 6–9 °C, the most likely explanation is the one described at the start of this chapter—the rapid melting and escape of billions of tonnes of frozen methane, CH 4 , currently locked in tundra and seabed sediments. This phenomenon, dubbed the “clathrate gun ” (Kennett et al. 2003), is now linked by scientists not only with the PETM event but also, according to palaeontologist Peter Ward, with the Great Death of the Permian, the worst annihilation in the history of life on Earth (Ward 2008). The significance of the clathrates is that they consist of methane, a gas that is 72 times more powerful than CO 2 as a climate forcing agent in the short run, and 25 times stronger over a century or so. The clathrates could be released by a process known as ‘ ocean overturning ’, a shift in global current patterns caused by moderate warming, which brings warmer water from the surface down into the depths, to melt the deposits of frozen gas. Unlocking several trillion tonnes of methane would cause global temperatures to rocket upwards sharply. Once such a process gets under way, most experts consider, warming will happen so fast it is doubtful if humans could do anything to stop it even if they instantly ceased all burning of fossil fuels. This ‘double whammy’ of global warming caused by humans releasing three trillion tonnes of fossil carbon which then precipitates an uncontrollable second phase driven by the melting of all or part of the five trillion tonnes of natural methane deposits (Buff et & Archer 2004) is the principal threat to civilisation in the twenty-first century and, combined with nuclear conflict (Chap. 4), to the survival of the human species. The IPCC’s fifth report states that the melting of between 37 and 81 % of the world’s tundra permafrost is ‘virtually certain’ adding “There is a high risk of substantial carbon and methane emissions as a result of permafrost thawing ” ((IPCC 2014a), p. 74). This could involve the venting of as much as 920 billion tonnes of carbon. However, the Panel did not venture an estimate for methane emissions from the melting of the far larger seabed clathrates and a number of scientists have publicly criticised the world’s leading climate body for remaining so close-lipped about this mega-threat to human existence. The IPCC’s reticence is thought to be founded on a lack of adequate scientific data to make a pronouncement with confidence—and partly to fear of the mischief which the fossil fuels lobby would make of any premature estimates. However, it critics argue, by the time we know for sure that the Arctic and seabed methane is escaping in large volumes, it will be too late to do anything about it. The difficulty is that no-one knows how quickly the Earth will heat up, as this depends on something that cannot be scientifically predicted: the behaviour of the whole human species and the timeliness with which we act. Failure to abolish carbon emissions in time will make a 4–5 °C rise in temperature likely. As to what that may mean, here are some eminent opinions : • Warming of 5 °C will mean the planet can support fewer than 1 billion people—Hans-Joachim Shellnhuber, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (Kanter 2009) • With temperature increases of 4–7 °C billions of people will have to move and there will be very severe conflict—Nicholas Stern, London School of Economics (Kanter 2009) • Food shortages, refugee crises, flooding of major cities and entire island nations, mass extinction of plants and animals, and a climate so drastically altered it may be dangerous for people to work or play outside during the hottest times of the year—IPCC Fifth Assessment (IPCC 2014b) • Corn and soybean yields in the US may decrease by 63–82 %—Schlenker and Roberts, Arizona State University (Schlenker & Roberts 2009a) • Up to 35% of the Earth’s species will be committed to extinction—Chris Thomas, University of Leeds (Thomas et al. 2004) • Total polar melting combined with thermal expansion could involve sea levels eventually rising by 65 m (180 ft), i.e. to the 20th floor of tall buildings, drowning most of the world’s coastal cities and displacing a third or more of the human population (Winkelmann et al. 2015) • Intensified global instability, hunger, poverty and conflict. Food and water shortages, pandemic disease, disputes over refugees and resources, and destruction by natural disasters in regions across the globe—Chuck Hagel, US Secretary for Defence (Hagel 2014) • “Almost inconceivable challenges as human society struggles to adapt… billions of people forced to relocate.… worsening tensions especially over resources… armed conflict is likely and nuclear war is possible”— Kurt Campbell, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Campell et al. 2007). • “Unless we get control of (global warming), it will mean our extinction eventually”—Helen Berry, Canberra University (Snow & Hannam 2014).

### I/L China Solves African Instability

#### Chinese leadership is key to African stability---its seen as more credible than Western aid which makes it uniquely effective

Lammich 19 — Lammich, Georg. University of Duisburg-Essen "Stability Through Multilateral Cooperation: China and Regional Security in Africa." African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review, vol. 9 no. 1, 2019, p. 100-123. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/726051. WMK

To counter these potential risks to China’s influence and reputation, close collaboration with the AU and other African subregional organizations, that are clearly non-Western actors and seen as mostly independent from US influence, offers a viable solution. The partial syntonization of China’s policies with those of the AU in areas that are either less important or in line with the Chinese security and foreign policy strategy is, on the one hand, deflecting neocolonial criticism and, on the other, balancing the interventionist position of the West. Although China’s stance toward international intervention is far more passive than the principles of mandatory intervention articulated in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU and the clashes between the Chinese concept of “noninterference” with the AU’s notion of “nonindifference,” both have shown many similarities in their position on national sovereignty and interstate conflicts. China is highlighting those cases where the views of the AU and key African players converge with their own positions and use them as reference points for their military engagement or the absence thereof on the continent (Van Hoeymissen 2011: 102). Thus, in 2008, Beijing justified its criticism of international sanctions against Zimbabwe with the remark that the Chinese position was in line with that of the AU and the SADC, which both opposed sanctions and were regarded by China as the consensus of African countries on the current situation (United Nations 2008a; Van Hoeymissen 2011: 100). Apart from the rhetorical level, there is a growing appreciation of the AU as a capable actor in conflict resolution, and China has emphasized its willingness to take concrete measures to help Africa reinforce its collective security mechanism. Hence, China has supported the AU in various areas related to peace and security, particularly the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the hybrid UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), provided military aid, and conducted several training courses for AU troops and security personnel at the Peace and Security Department in China (Woldemichael 2012: iii). As stated in China’s African policy paper (2006), “China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support for and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.” A decade after this proclamation, China-AU security partnerships have stretched from soft confidence-building measures and preemptive diplomacy to the development of specific conflict solution mechanisms and direct military support. The security-related dialogue and consulting mechanisms between China and the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa have evolved and several regular exchange formats have been created. In 2008 a strategic dialogue mechanism between China and the AU that deals with “major international and regional issues of common concern” (MOFA 2011) was established. The African Union Commission (AUC) is also participating in the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security (ICACPPS), China’s regular exchange with African foreign secretaries (Huang 2011: 264–65; C. Zhang 2016). China sees the AU as the “premier pan-African institutional actor in relation to peace and security matters” (Ukeje 2018: 304) and is increasingly institutionalizing the relation with the AUC and deepening the interregional linkages. One of the goals of the Fifth FOCAC Ministerial Conference held in Beijing in July 2012, which the AU attended for the first time as a full member, was to strengthen cooperation on African peace and security between China and the AU. The action plan adopted at the conference determined that China would launch the initiative on the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, provide financial support for AU peacekeeping missions in Africa and the development of the African Standby Force, and train more AU peacekeepers and officials in peace and security affairs. In September 2015, President Xi announced that China will provide free military aid of $100 million over four years to support the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (Xi 2015). Three months later, at the 2015 FOCAC summit in Johannesburg, China confirmed its commitment to supporting the AU’s capacity for peacekeeping and promised an additional $US60 million in grants to the ASF and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis (FOCAC 2015). In addition, to direct financial and logistic support to AU peace missions, China is also contributing indirectly to the AU’s military capacity by tying its bilateral military aid to African countries’ contributions to AU missions. Several countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria, Burundi, and Uganda, have thus received additional military aid justified by China, due to their contribution to regional security schemes (Shinn 2008; United Nations 2009). The AU has become a major pillar of China’s security strategy in Africa, and it seems that despite the mixed results of AU missions in Africa, China will continue its support for regional African security solutions. China has shown its willingness to support regional initiatives in Africa despite other multilateral or even bilateral solutions that might, for the time being, also serve its interests on the continent. Whether the AU can also establish itself as the premier partner for issues that border on peace and security (terrorism, climate change, piracy, and migration, to name a few) will depend first and foremost on the ability of the AU to mobilize a broad pan-African consensus on these matters (Ukeje 2018: 307). China’s support for the AU and African security in general is not based on any specific program, which leaves a great amount of latitude in its long-term commitments (Van Hoeymissen 2011: 100). Technical and financial support often reflect current issues of China’s foreign policy priorities or come in the wake of big events like the FOCAC summit or top-level visits from China. The contribution to the AU mission in Darfur can thus be interpreted as a reaction to international criticism of the close ties between Beijing and Khartoum and the contribution to AMISOM as a move to protect international trade routes (Shichor 2007). This flexibility creates some uncertainty on the African side and prevents the reliable long-term inclusion of Chinese support for capacity development in Africa’s security sector.

#### The Western LIO model is *privatization* --- it’s an *economic disease* as per *statistical* evidence

\*empirical comparison of Latin America with East Asia, income inequality, state investment/social safety nets, adjustment based on local characteristics

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The Washington Consensus has brought a serious debate and critiques. The structuralist thinkers such Dani Rodrick and Joseph E. Stiglitz have explicitly mentioned strong critiques towards the Washington Consensus. They oppose the consensus offered by John Williamson and say the Washington Consensus has become a source of crisis and problem for developing and less-developed countries. Both Rodrick and Stiglitz have challenged the term which described as the fundamental policies of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury Department where Stiglitz calls it as a “one size fits all” treatment of individual economies. Stiglitz said that the treatment suggested by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank is too simple: one dose, fast stabilize, liberalize and privatize, without prioritizing or watching for side effects (Stiglitz, 2002).

The reform package addressed by Williamson did not work out as it was intended. Based on the statistical data, the Latin American countries which mostly adopted the Washington Consensus policies have a lower economic growth than East and Southeast Asian countries opposing the Washington Consensus policies. The economic growth of Latin America reached 5.5% during 1960–1980, where East Asia achieved only 5.5% during the same period. However, during 1990–2004, the economy in Latin America only achieved 2.7%, where East Asia can reach 7.8% on that period (World Bank Statistics). Tremendous economic growth is shown by East and Southeast Asian countries when they applied contrary policies to Washington Consensus by having strong government role and nationalize many companies such as in China, Taiwan and South Korea, as well as India.

According to Stiglitz, the Washington Consensus has made a slower GDP growth as well in Latin America where they are mostly the follower of the IMF and the World Bank. On the other hand, Latin America also experienced tremendous volatility of growth and there was no stability during the 1890s period of Washington Consensus. The worst thing according to Stiglitz was that the rise of unemployment in Latin America during 1990–2004 and the declined of per capita income. Furthermore, under the Washington Consensus inequitable sharing becomes a serious concern because the Washington Consensus policies produced limited growth only and even when the growth did occur, it was not equitably shared. The equality issues are not even considered seriously from the consensus policies which later caused social and political problems in some countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Dani Rodrick mentioned that the government role cannot totally be separated from economic activities (Rodrick, 2006). In developing countries, the roles of government are not only to address market failure such as controlling conflicts of interest and ensuring the soundness and safety of the financial system, but also to promote equity and provide safety nets. For structuralist, Washington consensus is considered as a failure consensus because it did not understand the limitation of the markets and it focused on very limited a set of instruments. As the consequences, the Washington Consensus ignored the industrial policies, land reform, strengthening the financial sector, improving education, Competition policy, and government issues in both public and private sectors (Stiglitz, 2005).

According to Marxist/dependency theorists, the Washington Consensus is not suitable for developing or third world countries. However, it can bring an economic disease for development and prosperity in those countries. The Marxist thinkers such as Alfredo Saad Filho and Costas Lapavitsas have seriously advocated for equality and adjust the development distribution and better social class in the society. The Marxist economists argued that the Washington Consensus categorizes the third world nations into a backdrop of the reform which makes the third world nations have a dependency on the mercy of the developed countries or western countries (Lapavitsas, 2001). They believe that the consensus proposed by Williamson is the source for greater global crisis and economic problem (Saad-Filho, 2010).

Marxist/dependency thinkers believe that the Washington Consensus is a tool to further the establishment of the capitalism. For the Marxist, this capitalism system may lead to even greater social and economic problems for the workers in developing and less-developed countries because of their low bargaining power and weak position as subject from the western imperialists. The policies in the consensus will push the developing countries and less-developed countries to adopt the capitalism system which brings them under the control of the developed countries and global financial institutions. The reform package offered from the Washington Consensus is considered by the Marxist as a worse instrument that will be used by developed and huge economic countries to expand the imperialist influence and power to the third world countries and makes them dependent for political, social and economic on western countries and international financial institutions.

Many scholars then believe that the Washington Consensus policies have failed to handle the economic structure efficiently in developing countries. The case in East Asia can be a good example where Taiwan and South Korea can show a wonderful success for their economic growth with a larger role from the domestic government by growing domestic savings and undertaking the industrial policies inside the region. It is the same like what happens in China, India, Indonesia and some other Countries in the region where the governments play a big role in the market and economic activity, as well as applies the trade system with their own characteristic and model.

The biggest critique towards the Washington Consensus came when global financial crisis starting in 2008. The developing and less-developed countries confidently oppose and reject the Washington Consensus policies and against the international financial institutions such International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for their insignificant contribution and solutions. On the other hand, the prior to the global financial crisis in 2008, the economic crisis which happened in Argentina in 1999–2002 is believed as the result of the Washing Consensus failure. During the 1990s, Argentina became a loyal follower of the Washington Consensus policies suggested by the IMF and the World Bank. However, its economy finally was collapse. Many economists and scholars believe that the cause of this crisis is due to the application of fixed exchange rate which became increasingly uncompetitive, failure to get an effective control over the fiscal accounts, and the collapse of the macroeconomic in the country.

The Need of New Reforms

The failure of the Washington Consensus has provided many lessons that can be learned by new government leaders in developing and less-developed countries to concern on their policies and international financial institutions to do a reform and create a new economic package or policies to boost global growth and development. The neo-liberalist people have to believe that the Washington Consensus has failed to give a solution for global development. However, it has given a bad experience for countries adopting the policy package from this consensus.

During the 1990s and 2000s, the international financial institutions such as the international Monetary Fund and the World Bank have suggested the Washington Consensus package for the developing and less-developed countries. In fact, this idea did not bring a successful achievement for global development. The countries that adopted the Washington associated policies experienced a bad economic growth and collapse, whereas the countries that opposed the Washington package can show a great economic growth. For instance, there is a big contrast between Latin American countries adopting the Washington package and East Asian countries which did not adopt the Washington package in some important respect. East Asian countries are slow to liberalize the capital market than the Latin America and some African countries. Furthermore, they are also slow to liberalize the trade and they adopted strong government industrial policies such as making many successful state-owned enterprises.

The differences in terms of policy account for the performance differences between Latin American/African countries and East/Southeast Asian countries. The East/Southeast Asian countries show more growth and faster growth, the benefits of growth more widely shared, and more stable although the 1997/98 Asian crisis happened, they can recover it quickly like Indonesia.

The Washington Consensus has come to the end. The question now what is the alternative one to replace and give a positive global development. Therefore, we will need a new consensus or a new reform. According to structuralist thinker such as Stiglitz, the economic package should not ignore the relationship between the economic success and the social and political stability or structure. The objective of the policies should not only concern to increase the GDP, but have to achieve a sustainable and equitable democratic development. The most important point now is to chase new reforms to finish soon and create good global governance. The reforms will work by reforming the global financial system to make it more stable and to reduce the risks facing the developing countries such as reforming the global reserve system and developing better mechanism for shifting risk (Stiglitz, 2005).

Globalization and Inclusive World Economy

The failure of the Washington Consensus has provided many experiences regarding the international development, and today in the post Washington consensus we are dealing with the globalization as a global instrument to accelerate global prosperity growth. Globalization at its simplest can be seen as the increase over time of international trade (referred to as merchandise trade) and services (Otter, 2014). Furthermore, globalization can be defined as a process of international integration through the interchange of world views, products, ideas and other aspects of culture (Al-Rodhan, Stoudmann and Nayef, 2006). Globalization is almost the same with the Washington Consensus which highlights the trade and market liberalization. Dorron Otter in his book, The Business Environment, mentioned that according to Neoclassical/neoliberal such as Adam Smith, trade will be very important to expand the market which allows bigger specialization and increases productivity at the domestic level. Therefore, the globalization based on neoliberal/neoclassical view will give good benefits: firstly, it provides a source of external funding that boosts the amount of money available to fuel trade internally, and secondly it enables further room for the expansion of markets on an international scale (Otter, 2014). The comparative advantage theory can be applied and work here totally.

The Marxist/socialist has difference views regarding the globalization than the neoliberal/classical views. According to Marxist/socialist, globalization will not be a solution for international development because it will create a bigger dependency of the third world countries on the developed nations or western imperialist. The globalization will drive the developing and less-developed countries to greater problems such as disparity, inequality, poverty, and unbalanced development among the countries. On the other hand, the structuralist thinkers argue that the globalization could be a good instrument to achieve global development and prosperity if there are some structural and institutional reforms and reparation. Structuralist thinkers believe that the third world countries cannot reach the level of developed nation or industrialist nations directly or soon after the world war II, but they need to catch up this level by taking the globalization to move up step by step.

Therefore, the domestic and international levels need to undertake certain strategies and policies to achieve positive development and prosperity if the globalization is to work in such a way as to build an inclusive world economy. Stiglitz argued that the domestic level should pay a serious concern to focus on the importance of equity and employment. In addition, the domestic level has to make a balanced role of government and market by promoting and regulating markets, providing institutional and physical infrastructure, and promoting education, innovation and technology. The domestic government has to play good and enough roles toward the macroeconomic sector. The financial sector should get bigger concern from the government in order to create a more stable and positive financial market, and the government has to make good and strong social and political policies as the key aspect to achieve a good and stable capital investment.

On the other side, the international level has to make some reforms in order to reach a better global development. Stiglitz said that in order to enhance sustainable, equitable, stable, and democratic development, the international level should pay a serious concern towards several aspects regarding the reformation of the global economic architecture. The global economic architecture should produce new strategies and policies by focusing on efficiency, stability, equity among countries, and ability of developing countries to pursue their objectives. The international institutions have to allow developing and less-developed countries to have bigger authority to adjust their fundamental economy, social and politic towards the globalization characteristics and system. The global economic strategies and policies have to be in appropriate with the local characteristics and models in order to allow the third world nations to achieve faster economic acceleration by having more suitable platform and economic package.

Beijing Consensus

The rise of China as the new economic super power has contributed to the change of the international economic architecture. China role in terms of economy has challenged the position of the United States as the most dominant player at the international level (Albertoni & Arguello, 2015). Its increasing development has decreased the influenced of the United States, especially among the developing countries (Turin, 2010). Therefore, many people are now discussing a new economic term called “Beijing Consensus.” The Beijing Consensus was firstly introduced by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004 through his paper published by the United Kingdom’s Foreign Policy. Ramo sees that the economic policies produced in Beijing have become concern for many countries and influence the international economic architecture. The Chinese economic model/ Beijing Consensus offers a different model and characteristic than the guidelines offered by the Washington Consensus.

The major aspects of differences between the Beijing Consensus and the Washington Consensus are the role of GDP, financial sovereignty, and government intervention. When the Washington Consensus puts more concern on how to maximise the liberalisation of market and gives full freedom for market, the Beijing Consensus still puts the role and intervention of the government in the market as an important aspect to drive the development. Firstly, in the Washington Consensus, the GDP is the main focus or centralisation to determine the growth of a country. However, for the Beijing Consensus, economic sustainability and the wealth distribution will also become as the important aspects. Secondly, in terms of financial sovereignty, the Washington Consensus will believe that the financial sovereignty automatically will be produced by the general development, whereas the Beijing Consensus sees that the financial sovereignty will be obtained through the policies of self–determination, because this more deliberate action to financial sovereignty will give a more secure future for economy of a country (Hubner, 2013). Lastly, the government in the developing countries are mostly having problem with corruption in the government and politics in which put those developing countries likely unstable in some cases and it can bring to risk than potential growth. Unfortunately, the Washington consensus will use general guidelines for all type of countries, whereas the Beijing Consensus will allow the developing countries to adjust the economic system in line with their local characteristics. Then, it becomes the reason for Samantha Hubner to suggest those developing countries to consider the classical liberalism and it will likely be safer to be used in developing countries because it will consider the laws of human nature (Hubner, 2013).

#### Illiberalism --- it promotes *long-term planning*, democracy freezes action

Baker 17 (Thomas Baker – PhD in Sociology from the National University of Singapore, “The Real Source of China’s Soft Power,” The Diplomat. November 18, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/the-real-source-of-chinas-soft-power/>)

First, they are seeing Chinese soft power through an American lens. That the United States was the case study for Nye’s theory is not a problem; the problem is assuming that other nations need to be like America in order to be attractive. This is to universalize the particular and speaks of the ethnocentrism of many American policy thinkers. Since China is diametrically opposite to America, the conclusion is that China lacks fundamental criteria to be an attractive country. China’s attractiveness is in fact very different from the United States’, and American observers may be blind to what makes China attractive. This is not “soft power with Chinese characteristics,” as Mikael Weissmann calls it facetiously, but requires an understanding of how the rest of the world thinks. As my colleague Bill Case has proposed, China is in fact a very attractive model to leaders and politicians in Southeast Asia and no doubt in other parts of the world. Leaders see in China a powerful nation able to defy American and Western dictates, whilst ensuring economic stability and prosperity for its citizens. China emerges as a solution for struggling regimes in Southeast Asia as they navigate difficult economic scenarios or, in the case of Malaysia’s embattled Prime Minister Najib Razak, a corruption scandal that threatens the legitimacy of his premiership. China provides a useful model for already illiberal and authoritarian-leaning political leaders and regimes to sustain themselves. American and other Western observers fall into the trap of assuming that freedom, civil liberties, and democracy are more desired than economic stability and prosperity. As Chua Beng Huat has argued in the case of Singapore, liberalism is not a necessary precondition for the functioning of an advanced capitalist nation. Instead the legitimacy of Singapore’s leaders comes from their performance as economic managers and their ability to respond to citizen demands. Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” argument increasingly looks anachronistic. Many people in developing and poorer nations look up to Singapore, and increasingly China, as a model of political stability coupled with economic growth and prosperity. If people have to give up a few civil liberties – which many do not enjoy anyway – then why not, if it means less corruption, better infrastructure, more jobs, and increased income. Looking at China’s rapid development – and as more people see it – China will grow in stature amongst lay opinion. Democracy is increasingly seen to produce inaction and stalemate as evidenced in countries across the European Union, United States, and Australia. Many Indonesians increasingly opine that things were better under authoritarianism and pejoratively call the post-1998 era “democrazy.” China, by contrast, is seen to take a no-nonsense approach to problems; it has clear objectives and gets things done. Rights may be trampled or limited in this process, but to many people who live in clogged cities like Jakarta or Manila or in underdeveloped regions, China’s model of action and development look like a godsend. In an era of economic uncertainty, declining social mobility, economic inequality, rising unemployment, and casualization, the American model looks increasingly less appealing. If the election of Donald Trump is symptomatic of these problems, then it is little wonder that people are looking to other countries to emulate. On the other side of the Pacific, China continues to grow in stature and appears to be a paradigm of stability and prosperity. China’s success is of course not guaranteed, but in a world of economic uncertainty, the China model increasingly looks more attractive than Pax Americana.

### ! – African Instability

#### African instability causes terrorism and global war

Mead 13 (Walter Russel Mead, Distinguished Fellow at Hudson Institute, the James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, December 15, 2013. “Peace In The Congo? Why The World Should Care” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/>)

One of the biggest questions of the 21st century is whether this destructive dynamic can be contained, or whether the demand for ethnic, cultural and/or religious homogeneity will continue to convulse world politics, drive new generations of conflict, and create millions more victims. The Congo conflict is a disturbing piece of evidence suggesting that, in Africa at least, there is potential for this kind of conflict. The Congo war (and the long Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighboring countries) is not, unfortunately alone. The secession of South Sudan from Sudan proper, the wars in what remains of that unhappy country, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the rise of Christian-Muslim tension right across Africa (where religious conflict often is fed by and intensifies “tribal”—in Europe we would say “ethnic” or “national”—conflicts) are strong indications that the potential for huge and destructive conflict across Africa is very real. But one must look beyond Africa. The Middle East of course is aflame in religious and ethnic conflict. The old British Raj including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka offers countless examples of ethnic and religious conflict that sometimes is contained, and sometimes boils to the surface in horrendous acts of violence. Beyond that, rival nationalisms in East and Southeast Asia are keeping the world awake at night. The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are dynamite, and that the potential for new conflicts on the scale of the horrific wars of the 20th century is very much with us today. The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts. That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly. The problem is that these wars spread. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or trigger wider conflict with India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends. Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is of more importance to American security than many people may understand. The line between Africa and the Middle East is a soft one. The weak states that straddle the southern approaches of the Sahara are ideal petri dishes for Al Qaeda type groups to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential access to funds, fighters, training and weapons from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading, money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us.

#### African civil wars are the *only* scenario for great power conflict --- bipolarity stops wars *except* those motivated by fears that civil wars will threaten resources essential for *state survival*

Yeisley **11** (Mark O. Yeisley – PhD in IR from Duke University, assistant professor of IR @ the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. <KEN> “Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise of China,” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Spring 2011. DOA: 11/19/19. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/winter/yeisley.pdf>)

Volumes of scholarly literature detail China’s rise to great-power status and the likely implications thereof.37 Given its prodigious economic growth, it is natural to question whether such a rise will be accompanied by US-Sino conflict. Such an outcome is unlikely, primarily because of a return of nuclear parity within a bipolar environment.38 There are concerns over China’s increasing need for fuel imports to support its expanding infrastructure. China shows little concern with the political ideologies of regimes with which it trades; yet, its willingness to deal with states like Iran and Sudan could worsen relations with the United States.39 China’s ongoing military modernization also appears designed in part to deny the United States the ability to deter it in the near future through strategies focused primarily on interruptions of its oil supply via area denial or control of critical eastern sea lines of communication. China is expanding its web of regional alliances via arms transfers and other inducements that may result in a wall of allies the United States will find difficult to penetrate to protect its interests in the Eastern Hemisphere.40 China is also willing to protect those interests militarily where necessary; some aver the 1996 Taiwan crisis indicated China may be prepared to take Taiwan by force in a preemptive attack.41 Yet, evidence suggests its neighbors welcome the economic opportunities China presents to them and believe its intentions are peaceful and focused on domestic stability and growth rather than regional dominance.42 Since it is unlikely that any regional attempts to balance a rising China are forthcoming, at least in the near term, it falls to the United States as the peer competitor to do so. While US military preeminence is still clear, trends appear to indicate the United States will find it increasingly difficult to compete with China for strategic resource requirements as China’s geostrategic influence expands. Bipolarity, Nuclear Weapons, and Sino-US Proxy Conflict in Africa It is likely China will achieve economic and then military parity with the United States in the next two decades. China currently possesses 240 nuclear warheads and 135 ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States or its allies; that number of nuclear warheads is estimated to double by the mid 2020s.43 As during the Cold War, a bipolar system in which war between the United States and China is too costly will lead to policy decisions that seek conflict resolution elsewhere.44 [Insert Footnote 44] 44. Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 17–19, argues that the costs of such conflict will cause both sides to carefully avoid direct conflict. [Exit Footnote 44] But why would China’s rising necessarily lead to geostrategic competition with the United States, and where would this most likely occur? Unlike the Cold War, access to strategic resources rather than ideology would lie at the heart of future US-Sino competition, and the new “great game” will most likely be played in Africa. Despite Communist Party control of its government, China is not interested in spreading its version of communism and is much more pragmatic in its objectives—securing resources to meet the needs of its citizens and improve their standard of living.45 Some estimates show that China will overtake the United States to become the world’s largest economy by 2015, and rising powers usually take the necessary steps to “ensure markets, materials, and transportation routes.”46 China is the leading global consumer of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, zinc, tin, and iron ore, and its metal needs now represent more than 25 percent of the world’s total.47 In contrast, from 1970 to 1995, US consumption of all materials, including metals, accounted for one-third of the global total despite representing only 5 percent of the world’s population.48 China is the largest energy consumer, according to the International Energy Agency, surpassing the United States in consumption of oil, coal, and natural gas in 2009.49 As the two largest consumers of both global energy and materials, the United States and China must seek foreign policy prescriptions to fulfill future resource needs. While the United States can alleviate some of its energy needs via bio- or coal-based fuels, hydrogen, or natural gas alternatives, China currently lacks the technological know-how to do so and remains tied to a mainly nonrenewable energy resource base. Since the majority of these needs are nonrenewable, competition of necessity will be zero-sum and will be conducted via all instruments of power.50 Africa is home to a wealth of mineral and energy resources, much of which still remains largely unexploited. Seven African states possess huge endowments of oil, and four of these have equally substantial amounts of natural gas.51 Africa also enjoys large deposits of bauxite (used to make aluminum), copper, lead, nickel, zinc, and iron ore, all of which are imported and highly desired by China. Recent activity serves to prove that China seeks greater access to natural resources in Africa by avidly promoting Chinese development in a large number of African nations. South Africa, the continent’s largest economy, has recently allowed China to help develop its vast mineral wealth; it is China’s number one African source of manganese, iron, and copper.52 Chinese involvement in Africa is not wholly extractive; the continent provides a booming export market for China’s goods and a forum to augment its soft power in the region by offering alternatives to the political and economic baggage that accompanies US foreign aid.53 Of primary interest is open access to Africa’s significant deposits of oil and other energy resources. For example, China has 4,000 military personnel in Sudan to protect its interests in energy and mineral investments there; it also owns 40 percent of the Greater Nile Oil Production Company. 54 Estimates indicate that within the next few decades China will obtain 40 percent of its oil and gas supplies from Africa.55 Trade and investment in Africa have also been on the rise; trade has grown more than 10 percent annually in the past decade. Between 2002 and 2004, African exports to China doubled, ranking it third behind the United States and France in trade with the continent. Chinese investment is also growing; more than 700 Chinese business operations across Africa total over $1 billion. Aid and direct economic assistance are increasing as well, and China has forgiven the debt of some 31 African nations.56 Africa is thus a vital foreign interest for the Chinese and must be for the United States; access to its mineral and petroleum wealth is crucial to the survival of each.57 Although the US and Chinese economies are tightly interconnected, the nonrenewable nature of these assets means competition will remain a zero-sum game. Nearly all African states have been independent entities for less than 50 years; consolidating robust domestic state institutions and stable governments remains problematic.58 Studies have shown that weak governments are often prime targets for civil conflicts that prove costly to control.59 Many African nations possess both strategic resources and weak regimes, making them vulnerable to internal conflict and thus valuable candidates for assistance from China or the United States to help settle their domestic grievances. With access to African resources of vital strategic interest to each side, competition could likely occur by proxy via diplomatic, economic, or military assistance to one (or both) of the parties involved. Realist claims that focusing on third-world issues is misplaced are thus fallacious; war in a future US-China bipolar system remains as costly as it was during the Cold War. Because of the fragile nature of many African regimes, domestic grievances are more prone to result in conflict**;** US and Chinese strategic interests will dictate an intrusive foreign policy to be both prudent and vital. US-Sino proxy conflicts over control of African resources will likely become necessary if these great powers are to sustain their national security postures, especially in terms of strategic defense.60 What does this mean for the future of US grand and military strategy, foreign policy prescriptions, future defense acquisition priorities, and military doctrine and training?

## ATs

### AT: LIO Good---TL

#### 1 – Empirics – LIO has failed with EVERY crisis their ev cites

Zelikow 22 — Philip Zelikow Professor of History at the University of Virginia. A former U.S. diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations., “The Hollow Order,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 22 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system, accessed 7-1-2022, WMK

In their statement, China and Russia achieved peak hypocrisy. But the existing world order, which aspired to build a global commonwealth, had already been failing. The free world’s leaders had long ago started favoring performative commitments over the real action needed to safeguard the planet from crises. They expanded NATO without meaningfully responding to increasing Russian aggression. Distracted and chastened by misadventures in the Muslim world, Washington in particular disengaged from practical deeds, even as its rhetorical commitment to the international order varied. The United States’ high defense spending had more to do with satisfying domestic constituencies than with supporting any positive strategy. The world’s transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources was based on hollow pledges and private action. As support for globalization waned, the United States and other countries retreated from trade agreements and neglected international institutions for civilian and common economic action. The world’s drive in the early years of this century to improve global health and human development petered out.

The emptiness of the supposed international system was especially obvious at the end of 2019, when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. Charged with unprecedented global responsibilities, China and the United States stepped down, not up. Beijing withheld crucial information about the outbreak. Washington withdrew from the World Health Organization just when it most needed U.S. leadership. Wealthy countries began a mad scramble to develop vaccines, but they moved too slowly to create other treatments and hoarded whatever shots and therapeutics pharmaceutical companies could produce, leaving the rest of the world behind. The best estimates suggest that the virus caused about 15 to 20 million deaths and trillions of dollars of economic damage.

By the spring of 2020, “for all practical purposes the G7 ceased to exist,” wrote the foreign policy experts Colin Kahl and Thomas Wright in August 2021. “Pandemic politics,” they continued, “ultimately dealt the final blow to the old international order.”

Six months after they published those words, Russia invaded Ukraine. It was an attack that could truly have buried the old system, as Moscow believed it would. Yet Ukraine’s inspiring fight has helped the G-7 roar back to life. Its members have organized an economic counteroffensive, and they have joined a coalition providing military aid. Amid the wreckage of so many past hopes, it is possible to imagine a reconstructed world order emerging from this crisis.

But for a new system to succeed, its would-be architects must organize actions, not more theatrics. Over the course of world history, the most powerful idealism has usually been the idealism of what works. Today, that means crafting a practical international order focused on a few basic problems that rally broad interest. Many leaders want to stop unprovoked wars of aggression, especially those that might spark a third world war. They would welcome a new vision of economic order that does not ignore security but is also not a huckster’s promise that everything can be made at home. They would like to convert jolting energy shocks, such as the one caused by Russia’s invasion, into a managed transition to a more carbon-free future. They want to be better prepared for the next pandemic. And most world leaders, and even many ordinary Americans, still hope that China will choose to be part of these solutions, not one of the wreckers of a new international system.

These aspirations may seem modest. They do not include holding war crimes trials or spreading democracy. But effective common action on just these items will be an enormous task. The world order is deglobalizing and dysfunctional, facing challenges that have never been more planetary in scope. Leaders must craft a system focused on actually addressing these issues rather than on striking the right pose.

#### 2 - Interventionism – LIO norms are hollow and coercive – they’re a guise for endless intervention

Staniland 18 --- PhD from MIT (Paul Staniland is Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Misreading the “Liberal Order”: Why We Need New Thinking in American Foreign Policy,” July 29, https://www.lawfareblog.com/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinking-american-foreign-policy)//CMR

Pushing back against Trump’s foreign policy is an important goal. But moving forward requires a more serious analysis than claiming that the “liberal international order” was the centerpiece of past U.S. foreign-policy successes, and thus should be again. Both claims are flawed. We need to understand the limits of the liberal international order, where it previously failed to deliver benefits, and why it offers little guidance for many contemporary questions. First, advocates of the order tend to skim past the policies pursued under the liberal order that have not worked. These mistakes need to be directly confronted to do better in the future. Proponents of the order, however, often present a narrow and highly selective reading of history that ignores much of the coercion, violence, and instability that accompanied post-war history. Problematic outcomes are treated as either aberrant exceptions or as not truly characterizing the order. One recent defense of the liberal order by prominent liberal institutionalists Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, for instance, does not mention Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, or Libya. Professors Stephen Chaudoin, Helen Milner, and Dustin Tingley herald the order’s “support for freedom, democracy, human rights, a free press.” Kori Schake writes that Western democracies’ wars are “about enlarging the perimeter of security and prosperity, expanding and consolidating the liberal order.” Historian Hal Brands argues that the order has advocated “political liberalism in the form of representative government and human rights; and other liberal concepts, such as nonaggression, self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.” Other analysts have persuasively argued that these accounts create an “imagined” picture of post-World War II history. Patrick Porter outlines in detail how coercive, violent, and hypocritical U.S. foreign policy has often been. To the extent an international liberal order ever actually existed beyond a small cluster of countries, writes Nick Danforth, it was recent and short-lived. Thomas Meaney and Stephen Wertheim further argue that “critics exaggerate Mr. Trump’s abnormality,” situating him within a long history of the pursuit of American self-interest. Graham Allison—no bomb-throwing radical—has recently written that the order was a “myth” and that credit for the lack of great power war should instead go to nuclear deterrence. Coercion and disregard for both allies and political liberalism have been entirely compatible with the “liberal” order. The last two decades have been a bumpy ride for U.S. foreign policy. Since 9/11, we have seen the disintegration of Syria, Yemen, and Libya, a war without end in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Arab Spring, the rise and resurgence of the Islamic State, and the distinctly mixed success of strategies aimed at managing China’s rise. At home, the growth of a national-security state has placed remarkable power in the hands of Donald Trump. Simply returning to the old order is no guarantee of good results. Grappling openly with failure and self-inflicted wounds—while also acknowledging clear benefits of the order—is essential for moving beyond self-congratulatory platitudes. Second, the liberal order in its idealized form had very limited reach into what are now pivotal areas of U.S. security policy: Asia, the Middle East, and the “developing world” more broadly. The core of the liberal order remains transatlantic, but Asia is now growing dramatically in wealth and military power. What is the record of the order in the region? There was certainly some democracy promotion when authoritarian regimes began to totter, but there was also deep, sustained cooperation with dictators like Suharto and Ferdinand Marcos; while there are some regional institutions (such as ASEAN), they are comparatively weak; while there are some rules, they have been deeply contested. Close U.S. allies like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (the latter two experiencing long bouts of U.S.-allied autocracy) were not integrated into a broad alliance pact like NATO. India and Pakistan were never part of the core order, and China was only very partially integrated (primarily into the economic pillar of the order, and through ad hoc security cooperation from the 1970s). Southeast Asia has been a site of warfare and authoritarianism for much of its post-1945 history. The United States has long considered the Middle East vital to its security, but the extent to which the United States should invest its own blood and treasure in protecting the area was always up for debate. It was only in the 1970s that the United States decided it was prepared to use force to defend the region; “dual containment” in the 1990s was always controversial, while the invasion of Iraq and its chaotic aftermath revealed deep fissures over how much presence was enough. Meanwhile, liberalism, democracy, human rights, and international institutions have not made much of a mark in the region. Jake Sullivan, in a rather odd defense of the order, suggests that “Middle Eastern instability has been a feature, not a bug, of the system.” This is not reassuring about the order’s ability to structure politics in the area. The same can be said about the order’s history in Africa, with deep Western involvement in civil wars, support for authoritarian regimes, and often-counterproductive demands for economic liberalization contributing to ongoing instability. The legacy of the “liberal order” is both far more complex and shallower outside of the north Atlantic core than within it. Invocations of the order are seen with greater cynicism and suspicion in these areas than in Washington or Berlin. Yet they are precisely the regions that are increasingly the focus of U.S. security policy. Finally, and as the preceding already suggests, the idea of “liberal order” isitself frequently too vague a concept, and was too incomplete a phenomenon, to offer guidance on a number of key contemporary questions. Allison goes so far as to call it “conceptual Jell-o.” The extremely abstract principles that experts use to define the order are confronted with a reality of extreme historical variation. This amorphousness undermines its usefulness as an actual guide to future foreign policy. U.S. alliances in Western Europe since World War II looked dramatically different than those in East Asia. Both have achieved their basic goals, so which should be the model for the future? The United States often applied pressure to coerce its allies into adopting economic and security policies conducive to U.S. interests—going so far as to threaten abandonment of close European allies—even as it simultaneously built key elements of the liberal order. The core of the liberal order was a more tenuous and contested political space than we often remember. This inconsistency applies to involvement in the domestic politics of other states. The United States has regularly embraced authoritarian leaders (and distanced itself from democratic regimes), while at other times it has helped to push these leaders out in the face of domestic mobilization. Advocates of the order tend to stress the latter and dismiss the former as aberrant, but both strategies contributed to the ultimate victory of the liberal order over the Soviet bloc. The order’s history offers support for aggressively promoting democracy, accepting democratization when it emerges, and strongly supporting friendly dictators. This makes it unhelpful for grappling with the question of whether and how to promote democracy. The same is true of military interventions and covert operations abroad. U.S. leaders invested heavily in Cold War proxy wars and the overthrow of foreign regimes, while at other times and places they avoided such interventions. This history carries important implications for addressing today’s policy challenges. Simply appealing to the order does not, for instance, tell us much about how to deal with a rising China: Since the liberal order included highly institutionalized alliances, loose “hub-and-spoke” arrangements, and coalitions of the willing, and was characterized by both preventive wars and containment, it is extremely unclear what the order suggests for America’s China strategy. While “rules-based” order is a term in vogue, it doesn’t tell us what the rules should actually be, or how they should be decided. Nor does appealing to the liberal order help us understand whether the United States needs to be deeply involved or largely absent from the Middle East, or somewhere in between. Under the order, democracy promotion and assertive liberal intervention sometimes occurred, but so too did restraint and an acceptance of autocracy. There are no answers in the liberal international order for navigating the enormously difficult terrain of the contemporary Middle East.

#### 3 – their authors cherry-pick data – their ev engages in the myth of the LIO it’s a nostalgic misreading of history – every so-called US led success was devoid of LIO principles

Staniland, PhD, 18

(Paul, PoliSci@MIT, AssocProfPoliSci@UniversityOfChicago, 7-29, https://www.lawfareblog.com/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinking-american-foreign-policy)

Witnessing the chaos, critics of the Trump administration have made its damage to the post-1945 “liberal international order” a central part of their criticism. In their view, the United States created and led a post-World War II order—made up of international rules and institutions, free trade, and democracy—that generated enormous benefits now threatened by the Trump administration’s actions. A post-Trump foreign policy, they argue, needs to re-embrace the fundamentals of this order. Pushing back against Trump’s foreign policy is an important goal. But moving forward requires a more serious analysis than claiming that the “liberal international order” was the centerpiece of past U.S. foreign-policy successes, and thus should be again. Both claims are flawed. We need to understand the limits of the liberal international order, where it previously failed to deliver benefits, and why it offers little guidance for many contemporary questions. First, advocates of the order tend to skim past the policies pursued under the liberal order that have not worked. These mistakes need to be directly confronted to do better in the future. Proponents of the order, however, often present a narrow and highly selective reading of history that ignores much of the coercion, violence, and instability that accompanied post-war history. Problematic outcomes are treated as either aberrant exceptions or as not truly characterizing the order. One recent defense of the liberal order by prominent liberal institutionalists Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, for instance, does not mention Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, or Libya. Professors Stephen Chaudoin, Helen Milner, and Dustin Tingley herald the order’s “support for freedom, democracy, human rights, a free press.” Kori Schake writes that Western democracies’ wars are “about enlarging the perimeter of security and prosperity, expanding and consolidating the liberal order.” Historian Hal Brands argues that the order has advocated “political liberalism in the form of representative government and human rights; and other liberal concepts, such as nonaggression, self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.” Other analysts have persuasively argued that these accounts create an “imagined” picture of post-World War II history. Patrick Porter outlines in detail how coercive, violent, and hypocritical U.S. foreign policy has often been. To the extent an international liberal order ever actually existed beyond a small cluster of countries, writes Nick Danforth, it was recent and short-lived. Thomas Meaney and Stephen Wertheim further argue that “critics exaggerate Mr. Trump’s abnormality,” situating him within a long history of the pursuit of American self-interest. Graham Allison—no bomb-throwing radical—has recently written that the order was a “myth” and that credit for the lack of great power war should instead go to nuclear deterrence. Coercion and disregard for both allies and political liberalism have been entirely compatible with the “liberal” order. The last two decades have been a bumpy ride for U.S. foreign policy. Since 9/11, we have seen the disintegration of Syria, Yemen, and Libya, a war without end in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Arab Spring, the rise and resurgence of the Islamic State, and the distinctly mixed success of strategies aimed at managing China’s rise. At home, the growth of a national-security state has placed remarkable power in the hands of Donald Trump. Simply returning to the old order is no guarantee of good results. Grappling openly with failure and self-inflicted wounds—while also acknowledging clear benefits of the order—is essential for moving beyond self-congratulatory platitudes. Second, the liberal order in its idealized form had very limited reach into what are now pivotal areas of U.S. security policy: Asia, the Middle East, and the “developing world” more broadly. The core of the liberal order remains transatlantic, but Asia is now growing dramatically in wealth and military power. What is the record of the order in the region? There was certainly some democracy promotion when authoritarian regimes began to totter, but there was also deep, sustained cooperation with dictators like Suharto and Ferdinand Marcos; while there are some regional institutions (such as ASEAN), they are comparatively weak; while there are some rules, they have been deeply contested. Close U.S. allies like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (the latter two experiencing long bouts of U.S.-allied autocracy) were not integrated into a broad alliance pact like NATO. India and Pakistan were never part of the core order, and China was only very partially integrated (primarily into the economic pillar of the order, and through ad hoc security cooperation from the 1970s). Southeast Asia has been a site of warfare and authoritarianism for much of its post-1945 history. The United States has long considered the Middle East vital to its security, but the extent to which the United States should invest its own blood and treasure in protecting the area was always up for debate. It was only in the 1970s that the United States decided it was prepared to use force to defend the region; “dual containment” in the 1990s was always controversial, while the invasion of Iraq and its chaotic aftermath revealed deep fissures over how much presence was enough. Meanwhile, liberalism, democracy, human rights, and international institutions have not made much of a mark in the region. Jake Sullivan, in a rather odd defense of the order, suggests that “Middle Eastern instability has been a feature, not a bug, of the system.” This is not reassuring about the order’s ability to structure politics in the area. The same can be said about the order’s history in Africa, with deep Western involvement in civil wars, support for authoritarian regimes, and often-counterproductive demands for economic liberalization contributing to ongoing instability. The legacy of the “liberal order” is both far more complex and shallower outside of the north Atlantic core than within it. Invocations of the order are seen with greater cynicism and suspicion in these areas than in Washington or Berlin. Yet they are precisely the regions that are increasingly the focus of U.S. security policy. Finally, and as the preceding already suggests, the idea of “liberal order” is itself frequently too vague a concept, and was too incomplete a phenomenon, to offer guidance on a number of key contemporary questions. Allison goes so far as to call it “conceptual Jell-o.” The extremely abstract principles that experts use to define the order are confronted with a reality of extreme historical variation. This amorphousness undermines its usefulness as an actual guide to future foreign policy. U.S. alliances in Western Europe since World War II looked dramatically different than those in East Asia. Both have achieved their basic goals, so which should be the model for the future? The United States often applied pressure to coerce its allies into adopting economic and security policies conducive to U.S. interests—going so far as to threaten abandonment of close European allies—even as it simultaneously built key elements of the liberal order. The core of the liberal order was a more tenuous and contested political space than we often remember. This inconsistency applies to involvement in the domestic politics of other states. The United States has regularly embraced authoritarian leaders (and distanced itself from democratic regimes), while at other times it has helped to push these leaders out in the face of domestic mobilization. Advocates of the order tend to stress the latter and dismiss the former as aberrant, but both strategies contributed to the ultimate victory of the liberal order over the Soviet bloc. The order’s history offers support for aggressively promoting democracy, accepting democratization when it emerges, and strongly supporting friendly dictators. This makes it unhelpful for grappling with the question of whether and how to promote democracy. The same is true of military interventions and covert operations abroad. U.S. leaders invested heavily in Cold War proxy wars and the overthrow of foreign regimes, while at other times and places they avoided such interventions. This history carries important implications for addressing today’s policy challenges. Simply appealing to the order does not, for instance, tell us much about how to deal with a rising China: Since the liberal order included highly institutionalized alliances, loose “hub-and-spoke” arrangements, and coalitions of the willing, and was characterized by both preventive wars and containment, it is extremely unclear what the order suggests for America’s China strategy. While “rules-based” order is a term in vogue, it doesn’t tell us what the rules should actually be, or how they should be decided. Nor does appealing to the liberal order help us understand whether the United States needs to be deeply involved or largely absent from the Middle East, or somewhere in between. Under the order, democracy promotion and assertive liberal intervention sometimes occurred, but so too did restraint and an acceptance of autocracy. There are no answers in the liberal international order for navigating the enormously difficult terrain of the contemporary Middle East.

### AT: Inevitable/Sustainable

#### LIO unsustainable---

#### [x] --- COVID

Huang 21 — Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL Huang Q. The Pandemic and the Transformation of Liberal International Order. J Chin Polit Sci. 2021;26(1):1-26. doi: 10.1007/s11366-020-09698-0. Epub 2020 Oct 16. PMID: 33082701; PMCID: PMC7565235. WMK

The first challenge to the current liberal order comes from the entrenchment of authoritarianism during the pandemic, as characterized by authoritarian resilience, autocratization,4 and the consolidation of competing political-economic models built by leading authoritarian countries. As numerous democracies test the boundaries of freedom and control, authoritarian leaders across the world exploit the coronavirus crisis to tighten control over their people even further. The sweeping measures and institutional arrangements utilized by these leaders to combat the virus will leave significant legacies on both domestic politics and foreign policies. Interpreted in the path-dependence framework, the decisions made at certain “formative moments or conjunctures” can influence the long-term institutional trajectories. These institutions can be “sticky” and resistant to changes [43]. Moreover, riding the wave of autocratization, leading authoritarian countries like China have consolidated their competing political-economic models vis-à-vis the Western-dominated model. As increasingly powerful and ambitious patrons in the global arena, they have provided alternative sources of economic power, security, aid, ideology, as well as institutional platforms to the autocrats and emerging autocrats, without imposing political conditionality that favors liberal values. The pandemic has provided opportunities to consolidate their positions and promote their models worldwide.

The entrenchment of authoritarianism is first and foremost reflected by the durability of authoritarian regimes during the pandemic. To the disappointment of those seeking cracks in the authoritarian regimes hit hard by the pandemic, the autocrats around the world have largely survived the tests resulting from the pandemic. In particular, the resilience of communist regimes, such as China and Vietnam, has provided clear examples of entrenched authoritarianism during the pandemic. In the case of China, confronted with the worst health crisis faced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the regime’s capacity is questioned by many scholars and observers. Pei argues that the pandemic has shown the regime’s lack of capacity in responding to the health crisis and exposed the fragility of Xi Jinping’s strongman rule. The regime will be trapped in economic stagnation and increasing social unrest domestically and in great-power competition abroad. As a result, it will start to “unravel by fits and starts” [44]. This assessment is consistent with Pei’s earlier diagnosis of the CCP’s serious illnesses and regime decay, as well as other scholars’ observation of China’s “frozen” political system [45, 46]. However, the evidence so far suggests that the regime has not only managed to survive the crisis but also boosted its legitimacy.

Early in the outbreak, China’s failure to respond was perceived as a manifestation of the breakdown of top-down governance structures [47]. Chinese people were angry at the government’s handling the crisis in its initial response. The authorities chose to withhold information about the virus from the public, punished doctors for “spreading rumors,” and prioritized stability over transparency. When the situation erupted beyond control, the influx of photos, videos, blogs, and diaries on social media depicting the ordeals of Wuhan citizens ignited both anger and fear among the public. The CCP rushed to calm the public, started a massive machine of mobilization, and implemented extreme lockdown measures. Grassroots organizations were also mobilized by the state to enforce quarantines and lockdowns, provide essential services, and collect information and monitor citizens, greatly enhancing the state’s capacity at political and social control [48]. The state soon regained control of the situation, although life was far from being back to normal.

The shock caused by the pandemic was followed by the massive outbreaks in Europe and later the United States, overwhelming the capacity of one country after another. Chinese state media and social media produced vivid stories describing the disastrous responses in many Western democracies, especially their failures to copy China’s “homework” for combating the coronavirus. It looked as though China was the only haven in the world and many Chinese people abroad struggled to find their way back home.

Both authoritarian and democratic countries have demonstrated mixed performances in responding to the pandemic. There are successful cases in democracies, such as that of South Korea, which presents an effective model for combating the coronavirus. There are also failed cases among autocracies, such as Iran, which struggled to contain the outbreak during its initial stage [49, 50]. However, the failures of many democratic countries, especially the United States, to control the virus quickly and effectively helped reverse course in China and boost the CCP’s domestic legitimacy. The comparison led many Chinese to believe that an authoritarian government is a better option for China, especially in times of crisis and during the rhetorical siege by the Western countries. The CCP gladly sells the idea of a better political system to its people through intensive nationwide propaganda, manipulation of social media, and spontaneous expression of national pride by its people. The success story of Vietnam which shares similar political-economic model with China further contributes to the discourse of a superior political system. In a survey conducted in April, researchers asked citizens to rate their countries’ performance in dealing with the pandemic. China ranked highest among 23 countries, with a score of 85 out of 100, followed by Vietnam (77). In the rating of the political leaders’ response to the crisis, both countries (China, 86 out of 100; Vietnam, 82) outpaced major Western countries, including New Zealand (67), Germany (35), the United States (32), the United Kingdom (30), and Italy (25) [51]. Another report based on online surveys finds that trust in the Chinese government was as high as 95% in April [52].

Beyond China, other authoritarian leaders exploited the crisis to further tighten control over their people. In Russia, which closely monitored its neighbor’s tech-driven model of control, the pandemic provided an opportunity for Russian authorities to develop new surveillance capabilities equipped with facial-recognition and geolocation tracking systems [53]. In Iran, the hard-liners leveraged the massive pressures from the pandemic to consolidate power. Members of the Revolutionary Guards were dispatched to enforce strict quarantine measures, while ramping up efforts to monitor and silence citizens on the basis of “national security” [54–56]. Moreover, conservatives capitalized on the missteps made by the moderate, civilian-led government. They launched campaigns to undermine it, portraying the Revolutionary Guards as “the guardian of public health and the champion of the fight against the invisible enemy” [57].

Coupled with authoritarian resilience, a wave of autocratization has surged around the world during the pandemic. In Hungary, a country already experiencing rapid erosion of freedoms and democratic norms in recent years, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán secured an indefinite state of emergency that allows him to rule by decree. Journalists can be jailed for up to five years for spreading misinformation that hinders the government’s response to the pandemic [58]. Similarly, in the name of maintaining order and combatting disinformation during the pandemic, extraordinary emergency powers were invoked in both Thailand and the Philippines. These powers allowed the Thai authorities to censor or shut down media and the latter to imprison those accused of spreading false information on social media and other platforms [59, 60].

By late April, more than 84 countries had enacted emergency laws to give executives more power to handle the coronavirus [61]. Previous researches already found that states of emergency often associate with a heightened risk of autocratization [62]. Before the pandemic, more than one-third of the world’s population already lived in autocratizing countries. Moreover, for the first time since 2001, the majority of countries in the world are autocracies (92 in total) [63]. The pandemic has reinforced anti-democratic trends, with 48 countries at high risk of pandemic backsliding and 34 others at medium risk [64]. While the urgency and presence of the coronavirus will eventually dissipate, the effect of the authoritarian measures and the institutional legacies will likely remain, influencing both domestic politics and foreign policies.

Rather than witnessing “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” [11], the world is now seeing a regime landscape mixed with thriving authoritarianism and democracy. To complicate the matters further, the challengers to the current order have exploited the pandemic to assert their political systems and ideologies, which are seen as incompatible with the Western standards and values. Ikenberry asserts that neither China nor Russia has a model that is appealing to the rest of world [10]. However, because of the ideological divergence, authoritarian political-economic models built by these two countries are increasingly welcomed by sitting dictators and emerging autocrats. China and Russia have already become alternative providers of goods such as developmental assistance and military security, which used to be monopolized by major Western powers [23]. Now, they are using such leverages to rival the liberal order led by the United States, building “parallel structures of global governance that are dominated by authoritarian states and that compete with older, more liberal structures” [65].

In comparison to Russia, China has maintained more extensive institutional networks. China has created, expanded, and led important international institutions (such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), regional forums (the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation), security organizations (the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), and infrastructure investment projects (the Belt and Road Initiative). These institutions have become the cornerstones of its alternative political-economic model. In this model, the powerful and ambitious patron provides alternative sources of economic power, security, aid, ideology, as well as institutional platforms for the dictators and emerging autocrats, without imposing political conditionality that favors liberal values.

The pandemic allows these challengers to consolidate their positions and promote their political-economic models globally. In the case of China, it has sought to build a “health silk road” by sending medical teams and resources to numerous countries around the world. According to a report released by China’s State Council Information Office, the country had offered or provided assistance to 150 countries and 4 international organizations as of June [66]. Major Western powers have widely criticized these efforts for their intention to capitalize on the pandemic and project China’s influence globally. But China has won many hearts in the region where it has projected its economic and diplomatic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative in recent years. Countries that welcome China’s growing influence include major autocratizing countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including Serbia, Hungary and the Czech Republic [67, 68]. As a result, China can utilize its reciprocating relations with the receivers of medical goods and to garner additional support for its authoritarian political-economic model vis-à-vis the Western liberal model. Moreover, the exacerbation of nationalism in both democracies and autocracies further reinforces the consolidation of authoritarianism and authoritarian political-economic models during the pandemic.

#### [x] --- Nationalism

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Besides the challenge brought by the entrenchment of authoritarianism, the second challenge to current order stems from the exacerbation of nationalism. One of the underlying tensions of the current order exists between states seeking to assert their agency against the seemingly inexorable and homogenizing forces of globalization promoted by the liberal order. States refuse to be hollowed out by the globalizing forces and seek to assert their authority and legitimacy both within their territorial boundaries and in transnational processes. Nationalism has been a tool for modern states to legitimize their power at home and position themselves in the international arena. Besides its linkage to language and symbolism, nationalism is “a sociopolitical movement and an ideology of the nation” [69]. The pandemic provides fertile ground for nationalism to thrive in both democratic and authoritarian countries, as states reclaim their place and authority left by the retreat of globalizing forces. With help from nationalist and populist politicians, nationalism has blended with populism and authoritarianism and become stronger in both democratic and authoritarian hosts.

Confronted with the pandemic, many countries rushed to fend for themselves instead of joining together in multilateral efforts. State leaders worldwide unilaterally closed borders, restricted incoming travelers, grappled with solutions to meet their own soaring demands for medical supplies, and prepared to fix their damaged economies. States have reasserted their roles in responding to crises, guarding their sovereignty, and managing their own economies in the uncertain times, while the globalizing forces promoted by the current order are in the retreat. The self-serving calculations of national interests, in both political and economic spheres, have dominated many leaders’ thinking since the outbreak of the pandemic and are likely to continue influencing policymaking in the post-pandemic struggle for recovery. The exacerbation of nationalism has eroded the popularity and authority of international institutions that buttress the principle of multilateralism and the seemly unstoppable forces of globalization promoted by the current order. It also pushes states to make choices that are most aligned with their national interests, from both material and ideological perspectives.

As Walt argues, “The pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism” [7]. Bieber observes that even before the pandemic, exclusionary nationalism mixed with far-right politics and populism had already overshadowed major countries around the world. The pandemic reinforces nationalism in several important ways: a “marriage” between nationalism and authoritarianism, bias against others (including ethnic minorities and other marginalized groups) presumed to be associated with the pandemic, and the rise of deglobalization and anti-globalization [70]. These changes will likely reinforce existing nationalistic dynamics. These dynamics are evident during the pandemic at both state and society levels, as well as in both democratic and autocratic settings, as exemplified by the developments in the United States and China. Both countries have been involved in escalated “narrative battle” powered by nationalism [71].

In the United States, controversial labels, from the “Chinese Virus” to the “Kung Flu”, were disseminated by President Trump as state leaders tried to find a scapegoat to blame for their own failures in responding to the pandemic. Even after the Administration wasted nearly two months responding to the crisis, many politicians were quick to defend Trump: “We don’t blame Trump, we blame China.” Senator Lindsey Graham claimed that the Chinese government was responsible for all American deaths [72]. Only a few days later, the U.S. intelligence and national security officials said that the U.S. government was exploring the possibility that the coronavirus leaked from a lab in Wuhan [73]. Trump and the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo soon joined the chorus. They ignored the assessments made by many scientists and weaponized the coronavirus for political purpose. Both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party continued to blame China in an attempt to maximize their appeal to the voters and increase their odds of winning the 2020 election [74].

While the state leaders in the US were pandering to a nationalist base, xenophobic sentiment surged across the country. Within just four weeks (March 19–April 15), at least 1497 incidents of coronavirus-related discrimination targeting Chinese and other groups of Asian origins were reported in the United States. These incidents included verbal harassment, refusal of services, and even physical assault [75]. The Pew Research Center also found that negative views of China had risen to its highest point since the center started collecting data on Americans’ views of China in 2005. About two-thirds (66%) of American adults had a negative view of the country, a significant increase of 20 percentage points since Trump took office [76].

In China, nationalist strategies were also used at the state level. Early in the outbreak, the United States was blamed by China for its failure to provide sincere and substantive support toward China and for its overaction by raising its travel advisory level, bringing American citizens back, and blocking Chinese visitors. Later, the U.S. military was accused of intentionally spreading the virus in Wuhan, a theory promoted by Zhao Lijian, the spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs [77]. Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its decision to expel American journalists working for The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, further fueling nationalist sentiment in China.

Likewise, the Chinese people’s views of the United States drastically declined during the pandemic. Before the United States stepped up its efforts to shift the blame toward China, a survey by the Eurasia Group Foundation (February 15–March 3) found that China had witnessed the starkest decline among ten countries in their views toward the United States and American democracy. Favorable views of the United States decreased by nearly 20 percent as negative views increased by 11%, compared to a 2019 report. Positive views of American democracy also declined by 15%. About half of the respondents believed that the United States had made the world a worse place in the past 20 years [78]. An article published by a Chinese nationalist tabloid reported that Chinese people had seen the harm of U.S. hegemony and the darker side of democracy [79].

Politicians from both sides are playing a dangerous game by exploiting the nationalistic feelings in their respective societies to serve their own political agendas. Both sides have politicized the coronavirus and related scientific researches, further rousing animosity between the two countries. Beyond these two cases, many other nationalist and populist leaders around the world have sought to decry globalization and “others”. The pandemic has given them the weapon they need. While Trump proclaimed on Twitter, “We need the wall more than ever!”, France’s rightist National Rally party’s leader Le Pen blamed “the religion of borderlessness” for the virus outbreak. During the pandemic, state leaders and political parties in Hungary, India, Germany, Italy, and Spain have targeted ethnic minorities and other marginalized groups [67, 80–83]. Foreign workers and F1 students were the latest victims of current U.S. administration’s populist and nationalist strategies [84, 85].

In the last decade, the world has witnessed the rise of nationalist and populist leaders in national and subnational politics throughout many regions [86–88]. The pandemic enables these leaders to rally their supporters and attack what they see as the illusion of solidarity between nations and the failure of international institutions, including the European Union and the World Health Organization (WHO). Moreover, states’ recalculations of national interests are likely to reinforce their appeals because the pandemic has exposed the risk and vulnerability of global dependency regarding the supply chains and strategic resources. As a result, the pandemic will likely prompt a renationalization of production and transform global integration to a more limited form that is oriented toward regional and bilateral engagements [89].

Even in Europe, the region that serves as “the proof that human society was becoming transnational, transcending its national stage and moving towards a global community”, confidence in globalization has declined. As we witness the “universal reversion to nationalist policies and defense of particularistic national interests at the expense of transnational solidarity”, international institutions are more likely to suffer from the pandemic [90]. The pandemic has given “a political gift for nativist nationalists and protectionists” and will have long-term impact on many aspects of globalization, including the free movement of people and goods [91]. States are able to reclaim their place and assert their authority and legitimacy within their territorial boundaries and in transnational processes. As politicians in both democracies and autocracies exploit nationalism to serve their political agendas during the pandemic, they continue to deepen the divisions and tensions between countries, hinder multilateral cooperation, and contribute to the fragmentation of the existing international order.

#### [x] --- globalization and populist backlash

Mearsheimer 19 (John J, President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security, Volume 43, Issue 4, Spring 2019)

SUMMARY The various causal processes described above have all played an important role in subverting the liberal international order. Although each one has a distinct logic, they have often operated synergistically. For example, the negative effects of hyperglobalization on the lower and middle classes have combined with the nationalist resentment over immigration and the sense of lost sovereignty to fuel a strong populist backlash against the principles and practices of the liberal order. Indeed, that anger has often been directed at the liberal elites who have benefited from the order and who vigorously defend it. That resentment, of course, has had significant political consequences. It has caused deep political divisions in the United States and other Western democracies, led to Brexit, helped put Trump in the White House, and fueled support for nationalist leaders around the world. Where Are We Headed? One might acknowledge that the liberal international order is in terminal decline, but argue that it can be replaced with a more pragmatic version, one that avoids the excesses of the post–Cold War order.85 This more modest liberal order would pursue a more nuanced, less aggressive approach to spreading liberal democracy, rein in hyperglobalization, and put some significant limits on the power of international institutions. The new order, according to this perspective, would look something like the Western order during the Cold War, although it would be global and liberal, not bounded and realist. This solution is not feasible, however, because the unipolar moment is over, which means there is no chance of maintaining any kind of liberal international order for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, President Trump has no intention of pursuing a "liberal-lite" world order, and without his support, that option is a nonstarter. But even if Trump were not an obstacle and the international system were to remain unipolar, the United States would fail if it lowered its sights and attempted to construct a less ambitious liberal order. Indeed, it would end up building an agnostic international order instead. It is impossible to build a meaningful liberal global order with modest or more passive policies. The enterprise requires too much social engineering in too many places. If it has any chance of succeeding (I think it has none), the liberal unipole and its allies must relentlessly pursue highly ambitious global policies, which is why the United States and its liberal partners acted the way they did in the wake of the Cold War. That approach, however, is now politically infeasible because of past failures. Consequently, the liberal democracies have no choice but to take small steps here and there to remake the world in their own image, while adopting a live and let live approach toward most countries in the world. That humble approach would effectively produce an agnostic order. But that is not going to happen, because the system is multipolar and great power politics are once again at play. Thus, the key question is: What kinds of realist orders will dominate the landscape in the new multipolar world? THE NEW REALIST ORDERS There are likely to be three different realist orders in the foreseeable future: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders—one led by China, the other by the United States. The emerging thin international order will be concerned mainly with overseeing arms control agreements and making the global economy work efficiently. It is also likely to pay more serious attention than in the past to problems relating to climate change. In essence, the institutions that make up the international order will focus on facilitating interstate cooperation. The two bounded orders, in contrast, will be concerned principally with waging security competition against each other, although that will call for promoting cooperation among the members of each order. There will be significant economic and military competition between those two orders that will need to be managed, which is why they will be thick orders. Two key features of the new multipolar world will profoundly shape the emerging orders. First, assuming that China continues its impressive rise, it will be involved in an intense security competition with the United States that will be the central feature of international politics over the course of the twenty-first century. That rivalry will lead to the creation of bounded orders dominated by China and the United States. Military alliances will be core components of those two orders, which are now beginning to form and will resemble the Soviet-led and U.S.-led orders in the Cold War. Beijing and Washington, however, will sometimes have reasons to cooperate on select military issues, an endeavor that will fall within the purview of the international order, as it did during the Cold War. Again, the focus will be principally on arms control agreements and will involve Russia as well as China and the United States. The existing treaties and agreements dealing with proliferation are likely to remain in place, because all three great powers will want to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. But Beijing, Moscow, and Washington will have to negotiate new treaties limiting their arsenals, as the superpowers did during the Cold War.86 Nevertheless, the U.S.-led and Chinese-led bounded orders will be largely responsible for dealing with core security matters.

### AT: LIO Good – Warming

#### LIO can’t solve warming

Patrick 21 — Stewart M. Patrick is a James H. Binger Senior Fellow in Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations., “The International Order Isn’t Ready for the Climate Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-10-19/climate-crisis-international-order-isnt-ready, accessed 7-1-2022, WMK  
The planet is in the throes of an environmental emergency. Humanity’s continued addiction to fossil fuels and its voracious appetite for natural resources have led to runaway climate change, degraded vital ecosystems, and ushered in the slow death of the world’s oceans. Earth’s biosphere is breaking down. Our depredation of the planet has jeopardized our own survival.

Given these risks, it is shocking that the multilateral system has failed to respond more forcefully and has instead merely tinkered at the margins. Although the United States and the European Union have adopted measures to slow the pace of global warming—by setting more aggressive greenhouse gas reduction targets, for example—nothing guarantees that they will adhere to those pledges, and such steps do little to encourage decarbonization in China, India, and other major emitters. These efforts also fail to address other facets of the looming catastrophe, not least collapsing biodiversity.

The natural world obeys no sovereign boundaries, and neither does the worsening ecological crisis. It is time to take bold steps to overcome the disconnect between an international system divided into 195 independent countries, each operating according to its own imperatives, and a global calamity that cannot be resolved in a piecemeal fashion. It is time to govern the world as if the earth mattered. What the world needs is a paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy and international relations—a shift that is rooted in ecological realism and that moves cooperation on shared environmental threats to center stage. Call this new worldview “planetary politics.” All governments, starting with Washington, must designate the survival of the biosphere as a core national interest and a central objective of national and international security—and organize and invest accordingly.

#### China international order solves

Walt 21 — Stephen Walt. “China Wants a ‘Rules-Based International Order,’ Too” Foreign Policy. March 31st, 2021 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/china-wants-a-rules-based-international-order-too/> WMK

By contrast, China favors a more Westphalian conception of order, one where state sovereignty and noninterference are paramount and liberal notions of individual rights are downplayed if not entirely dismissed. This vision is no less “rules-based” than the United States’, insofar as it draws on parts of the United Nations charter, and it would not preclude many current forms of international cooperation, including extensive trade, investment, collaboration on vital transnational issues such as climate change. China is also a vocal defender of multilateralism, even if its actual behavior sometimes violates existing multilateral norms. Nonetheless, a world in which China’s preferences prevailed would be different than one in which the U.S. vision proved to be more influential.

#### Empirics---LIO structurally cannot solve environmental crisis

Zelikow 22 — Philip Zelikow Professor of History at the University of Virginia. A former U.S. diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations., “The Hollow Order,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 22 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system, accessed 7-1-2022, WMK

In their statement, China and Russia achieved peak hypocrisy. But the existing world order, which aspired to build a global commonwealth, had already been failing. The free world’s leaders had long ago started favoring performative commitments over the real action needed to safeguard the planet from crises. They expanded NATO without meaningfully responding to increasing Russian aggression. Distracted and chastened by misadventures in the Muslim world, Washington in particular disengaged from practical deeds, even as its rhetorical commitment to the international order varied. The United States’ high defense spending had more to do with satisfying domestic constituencies than with supporting any positive strategy. The world’s transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources was based on hollow pledges and private action. As support for globalization waned, the United States and other countries retreated from trade agreements and neglected international institutions for civilian and common economic action. The world’s drive in the early years of this century to improve global health and human development petered out.

### AT: China LIO Bad

#### \*China is also committed to a rules-based order---their argument is US hypocrisy

Walt 21 — Stephen Walt. “China Wants a ‘Rules-Based International Order,’ Too” Foreign Policy. March 31st, 2021 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/china-wants-a-rules-based-international-order-too/> WMK

But the distinction between the United States’ supposed commitment to a system of rules and China’s alleged lack thereof is misleading in at least three ways. First, it overlooks the United States’ own willingness to ignore, evade, or rewrite the rules whenever they seem inconvenient. If we are honest with ourselves, we have to acknowledge that Washington sometimes thinks it is perfectly okay for might to make right and for winners to take all. The collapse of the Soviet Union, when the United States took full advantage of a weakened post-Soviet Russia, is a perfect example.

Second, as Harvard University’s Alastair Iain Johnston has shown, China accepts and even defends many principles of the existing order, although of course not all of them. That situation may change in the future, of course, but even a vastly more powerful China would undoubtedly seek to retain whatever features of the present order serve its interests.

Third, statements such as Blinken’s imply that abandoning today’s rules-based order would leave us in a lawless, rule-free world of naked power politics, unregulated by any norms or principles whatsoever. This is simply not the case: Scholars of widely varying views understand that all international orders—global, regional, liberal, realist, or whatever—require a set of rules to manage the various interactions that inevitably arise between different polities.

Examples can be found throughout the international relations literature: 44 years ago, theorist Hedley Bull defined an “international society” as “a group of states … bound by a set of common rules” and the University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer recently referred to international orders as “an organized group of international institutions,” which he says “are effectively rules that the great powers devise and agree to follow.” The statesman Henry Kissinger argues that all world orders rest on a “set of commonly accepted rules” and the Princeton University professor G. John Ikenberry’s many works on the U.S.-led “liberal” order all emphasize its “rules-based character.” The political scientists Beth Simmons and Hein Goemans agree, writing, “any intergroup order must be defined by rules of group membership and … political authority.” Even skeptics of the liberal order, such as the scholar Patrick Porter, acknowledge the role that rules played within that system, while emphasizing how the United States has used its superior power to compel other states to comply with the rules it prefers.

In short, the issue is not the United States’ preference for a “rules-based” order and China’s alleged lack of interest in it; rather, the issue is who will determine which rules pertain where. Or as the Rand Corp.’s Michael Mazarr recently put it, “At its core, the United States and China are competing to shape the foundational global system—the essential ideas, habits, and expectations that govern international politics. It is ultimately a competition of norms, narratives, and legitimacy.”

The differences between the American and Chinese conceptions are relatively straightforward. The United States (generally) prefers a multilateral system (albeit one with special privileges for some states, especially itself) that is at least somewhat mindful of individual rights and certain core liberal values (democratic rule, individual freedom, rule of law, market-based economies, and so on). These ideals may be applied imperfectly at home and pursued inconsistently abroad, but the U.S. commitment to them is not just empty rhetoric. Among other things, it underpins U.S. efforts to persuade or compel other states to alter their own domestic arrangements. Not surprisingly, the United States also likes many existing institutions (the IMF, NATO, the World Bank, the reserve role of the dollar, to name a few) because they give the United States greater influence.

By contrast, China favors a more Westphalian conception of order, one where state sovereignty and noninterference are paramount and liberal notions of individual rights are downplayed if not entirely dismissed. This vision is no less “rules-based” than the United States’, insofar as it draws on parts of the United Nations charter, and it would not preclude many current forms of international cooperation, including extensive trade, investment, collaboration on vital transnational issues such as climate change. China is also a vocal defender of multilateralism, even if its actual behavior sometimes violates existing multilateral norms. Nonetheless, a world in which China’s preferences prevailed would be different than one in which the U.S. vision proved to be more influential.

### AT: China Rise Violent

#### China prefers peaceful rise

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But this policy mantra has two fundamental problems: it mischaracterizes China’s strategic intentions in the region, and it is based on a U.S. strategic objective that is probably no longer achievable. First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest. China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region. Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence in the region—unless that presence is clearly and exclusively aimed at coercing or containing China. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chinese almost certainly recognize that exclusive control or “domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective. So what would Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism because the mutual benefits of economic interdependence prevail and the neighbors have no reason—and inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia. A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.

### \*AT: Thucydides Trap/China war defense

#### No Thucydides trap---peaceful transition is possible---interdependence and MAD prevents escalation. Tensions never spillover

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The popular ‘Thucydides trap’ argument and power transition theory in IR suggest that a war is more likely to take place between a rising power and a ruling state when their power gap narrows during the international order transition (Allison, 2017; Organski, 1958). I argue that this argument is too deterministic and pessimistic for two reasons. First, nuclear deterrence based on the ‘mutual assured destruction’ logic among great powers will make direct military conflicts unthinkable, if not impossible. Second, the world has been fundamentally changed by the deepening globalization and integrated supply chains. Although some politicians in the United States advocate the ‘decoupling’ with China, it is a politically motivated rhetoric rather than a well-crafted strategy (Farrell & Newman, 2020). As David Ignatius points out, ‘the United States and China have an increasingly competitive relationship, but they need each other, too, like conjoined twins. Hasty attempts at separation could harm them both. Open research made U.S. technology great; making it more difficult for the best brains to live and work here would be folly’ (Ignatius, 2020). In other words, it will be much harder, more painful, and harmful for the United States and China to decouple from one another, economically and technologically.

Then the question is: how will the United States and China compete or ‘fight’ without war when the power disparity continues to narrow between the two nations during the international order transition? In this paper I introduce a new ‘institutional peace’ argument, which suggests that the future international order transition will not feature a military conflict between the United States and China, although diplomatic standoffs and even military tensions might take place more frequently than before. Institutional competition and conflicts among great powers will become a new game (though not the only game) in town during the period of international order transition. Consequently, these institutional dynamics will generate incremental change that may lead to a more peaceful international order transition.

The ‘institutional peace’ argument presumes that deepening globalization and the existing nuclear deterrence situation have changed the nature of international order transition. Both the United States and China, as nuclear powers, will do their best to compete for power and influence, but at the same time, they will avoid direct military conflicts because a nuclear showdown will not only destroy their adversaries, but themselves as well. Therefore, international institutions, one pillar of the international order,2 will become the focal point of competition among great powers, especially between the United States and China, during the order transition.

#### No miscalc---both sides are primed for de-escalation and the competition will be non military

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Challenging a popular view that China’s rise will lead the United States and China to fall into the ‘Thucydides trap’—a possible hegemonic war between the two—this paper argues that the international order transition will be different this time. Instead of using military means to change the international order, China and the United States have relied on various institutional balancing strategies to compete with one another for an advantageous position in the future international order. Institutional competition in the form of institutional balancing among great powers will strengthen the dynamics and utility of international institutions, encourage states to offer new public goods, and eventually ensure a more peaceful order transition in the international system.

Since the end of the Cold War, China and the United States have engaged in institutional balancing in both economic and security orders in the Asia Pacific. By targeting US domination and existing rules in global finance institutions, China’s AIIB initiative has encouraged some intense but healthy institutional competition in the arena of global infrastructure finance. Through multilateral cooperation with the ASEAN states in the ARF and ASEAN-dominated institutions, China has also challenged the legitimacy and dominating role of the US-led hub-and-spokes bilateral system in the regional security architecture. One unintended consequence of institutional balancing between the United States and China is the proliferation of multilateral security institutions, such as the SLD, the ADMM-Plus, and the revival of the Quad 2.0 in the region. The AIIB and ARF cases have shown that the international order transition led by institutional balancing might be more peaceful than previously perceived.

Two caveats, however, are worth noting to support this optimistic view of the international order transition. The first one is that the MAD logic of nuclear deterrence should remain valid among great powers. Interdependence based on the mutual vulnerability in the context of nuclear weapons was the key factor making the antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union remain ‘cold’ during the Cold War. Given the technological innovations in military weaponry, it becomes questionable whether nuclear deterrence will still be sustained between the United States and China (Christensen, 2012; Glaser & Fetter, 2016; Lieber & Press, 2006; Lieber & Press, 2017; Wu, 2020). As some scholars point out, institutional competition among states might ‘lock in an unjust status quo, produce exclusion, or generate grievances that turn into struggles, they may in fact induce conflictual change’ (Mérand & Pouliot, 2020, p. 129). If one side no longer believes in MAD, military force will become a legitimate mechanism to change the international order, and therefore, a hegemonic war cannot be ruled out.

It is worth noting that Asia is an inherently dangerous place. Soon after the Cold War, some scholars predicted that Asia was ‘ripe for rivalry’ because of the mounting territorial disputes as well as bourgeoning nationalism (Friedberg, 1993). The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis almost triggered a military conflict between China and the United States. The Taiwan issue might be the most likely reason for China and the United States to go to war in the future. The nuclear tests and missile crises ignited by North Korea remind us that the Cold War has not ended on the Korean Peninsula. The maritime and territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have damaged China’s relations and trust with its neighbors. During the coming international order transition effective nuclear deterrence might prevent China and the United States from fighting a direct war or a hegemonic war; however, it will not stop conventional military conflicts among regional actors or even proxy wars between the United States and China if these security flashpoints are not managed and controlled well (Taylor, 2018). International and regional institutions can potentially help to build trust and alleviate these regional tensions among states. However, in order to make ‘institutional peace’ work, the United States and China—as two nuclear powers in the region—need to reach a strategic consensus, which is to compete fiercely by ‘all measures short of war’ (Wright, 2017).

There is a positive sign that the militaries from the United States and China have remained rational under the logic of MAD. It has been reported that General Mark Milley, the Chairman of US Joint Chiefs, was seriously worried that Trump might ‘go rogue’ and even launch a nuclear war in the final days of his presidency. More importantly, some US intelligence reports showed that ‘the Chinese believed the United States was going to attack them’ (Woodward & Costa, 2021, p. 128). In order to deescalate a possible military conflict or even a nuclear war, Milley secretly called his Chinese counterpart, General Li Zuocheng, on October 30, 2020, four days before the election, to assuage Chinese concerns that the US was planning to attack China. In his own words, Milley said,

General Li, I want to assure you that the American government is stable and everything is going to be okay. We are not going to attack or conduct any kinetic operations against you …. there’s going to be tension. And I am going to be communicating with you pretty regularly … We’re not going to have a fight. General Li said ‘Okay. I take you at your word’.(Woodward & Costa, 2021, pp. 128–130)

It is clear that both the US and Chinese military leaders are fully aware of the catastrophic consequence of military conflicts between the two nations. Nevertheless, civil politicians in both states might still play with fire to escalate bilateral tensions for political gains in the future. Interestingly, the military in both nations might play a ‘peace-guardian’ role in avoiding a war, particularly a nuclear one, between the two nations.

#### Empirics and theory---transition doesn’t cause war UNLESS China is excluded from the international order

Shifrinson 20 — Joshua Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. Joshua Shifrinson (2020) The rise of China, balance of power theory and US national security: Reasons for optimism?, Journal of Strategic Studies, 43:2, 175-216, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2018.1558056 WMK

Despite the prevalence of these assumptions, however, there are both empirical and theoretical reasons to question whether rising states are prone to prey upon declining states. Few studies examine the evolution of rising state attitudes towards declining states.18 That said, a large literature examining the relationship between power shifts and war – an outcome one might expect if rising states were primed to challenge declining states19 – finds only a tenuous link between shifts in the distribution of power and conflict.20 Rather, this research suggests that only rising states ‘dissatisfied’ with the existing international order and holding ‘revisionist’ attitudes are prone to challenge declining states and provoke conflict.21 Otherwise, rising states tend to pursue policies that do not result in war22 and may even try to avoid courting conflict.23

Similarly, even in cases where rising states notionally hold revisionist or dissatisfied preferences, it is ambiguous whether such attitudes drive rising state strategies towards particular declining states. Not only do notionally revisionist actors often seek allies among the existing great powers – meaning that they may cooperate with decliners to court them as partners – but rising state strategies towards decliners do not always align with judgments of risers’ intentions and motives.24 For instance, Wilhelmine Germany – a state seen by many scholars as a prototypical dissatisfied, revisionist actor – nevertheless supported Austria-Hungary before 1914; likewise, a surging and equally revisionist Soviet Union still attempted to align with the United Kingdom after World War Two.25 In short, not only is there an incomplete link between rising state preferences and conflict during a power shift, but risers’ revisionist or dissatisfied proclivities do not determine the more focused policies used to guide their relations with declining states.

More importantly, there are also theoretical reasons rooted in balance of power realism to question whether rising states are inveterate predators. To be clear, ‘balance of power realism’ is not a single theory so much as a family of arguments that are themselves divided over when and why states compete by manipulating the distribution of power.26 Nevertheless, as a group, balance of power theory is driven by core understandings that (1) states are the primary actors in international affairs, with the great powers the most important among this set; (2) to obtain security – whether defined in terms of minimising threats to their survival, aggregating power, or other objectives – states tend to offset and oppose one another; (3) opposition – including the possible resort to force – tends to grow more intense the more another state is seen as particularly powerful or threatening; and (4) states carry out this opposition by balancing and aggregating capabilities by arming themselves (internal balancing) and/or forming alliances (external balancing).27

Although different iterations of balance of power theory carry different assumptions as to the frequency and intensity of balancing, the approach as a whole underlines two reasons why rising states may avoid preying upon decliners and – under certain conditions – engage in supportive strategies. First, states threatened by another actor can arm, ally and threaten war to protect themselves.28 Hence, rising powers that challenge their relatively declining peers are apt to provoke counterbalancing.29 In fact, rising states that expand precipitously and overtly threaten declining states may catalyse a significant counterbalancing coalition, court insecurity spirals with threatened rivals, and even encourage one or more declining states to lash out in a preventive conflict.30 Rising states are therefore incentivised to anticipate these dangers, cap their foreign ambitions and limit the risk of counterbalancing so long as other states can penalise their aggrandisement.

### AT: Power Vacuum

#### *Regional fill-in* solves

Roy 19 (Dr. Indrajit Roy, Politics Department at the University of York, Junior Research Fellow at Wolfson College and Research Associate at the Department of International Development, University of Oxford, “Interview with Indrajit Roy: Human rights and the Role of Emerging Markets in the Liberal World Order,” 9-17, <https://www.pep-voxjournal.co.uk/single-post/2019/09/17/Interview-with-Indrajit-Roy-Human-rights-and-the-Role-of-Emerging-Markets-in-the-Liberal-World-Order>)

3. How about the US pulling out of multilateral organisations, will there be a power vacuum that might appeal to another county like China?

There might not be as much of a vacuum as we fear. For example, you have multilateral organisations such as the African Union, you have the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]. You have, perhaps not the western dedication to human rights, but attempts for peace harmony and security. So, you may not have a normative commitment to democracy, but one for the commitment to peace. These other models for peace, gives them a chance of developing sustainable mechanisms. I’m not trying to gloat over US withdrawal, but in a sense, I am. Now you get different parts of the world which have a chance, even though it might be messy and embroiled with conflict. There’s no reason to believe that the withdrawal of the US will lead to power vacuum, but actually might give developing powers a chance to regain normal life, for example Afghanistan. West Asia had its own civilisation for 1000s of years, it had communities and sophisticated mechanisms, much better then the alternative conflicts that the West brought. The withdrawal of the liberal international order might actually allow for the return of peace for them. Today, in a lecture on South Asia, I was showing Afghanistan in the 1970s, society was peaceful, people could go to schools, women wore skirts while walking down streets of Kabul. Not to say that wearing miniskirts is an indication of development, but the point is that people were living normal lives as human beings. This was before Afghanistan was sought to be brought into the ‘liberal world order’, before the invasion into Afghanistan which had been brought about by US-backed mujahedin. To answer your question, withdrawal of the ‘liberal world order’, or the US so to speak, from multilateral organisations may just be the best thing for emerging powers. There will be a bit of a power vacuum but not so much as to lead to a Hobbesian state of anarchy.

## LIO Good

### 1ac – Harari

#### LIO collapse causes extinction---rogue tech, bio arms-racing, and climate change.

Harari ’18 [Yuval; September 26; Professor of History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem; "We need a post-liberal order now," https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/09/26/we-need-a-post-liberal-order-now]

If the liberal order is collapsing, what new kind of global order might replace it? So far, those who challenge the liberal order do so mainly on a national level. They have many ideas about how to advance the interests of their particular country, but they don’t have a viable vision for how the world as a whole should function. For example, Russian nationalism can be a reasonable guide for running the affairs of Russia, but Russian nationalism has no plan for the rest of humanity. Unless, of course, nationalism morphs into imperialism, and calls for one nation to conquer and rule the entire world. A century ago, several nationalist movements indeed harboured such imperialist fantasies. Today’s nationalists, whether in Russia, Turkey, Italy or China, so far refrain from advocating global conquest.

In place of violently establishing a global empire, some nationalists such as Steve Bannon, Viktor Orban, the Northern League in Italy and the British Brexiteers dream about a peaceful “Nationalist International”. They argue that all nations today face the same enemies. The bogeymen of globalism, multiculturalism and immigration are threatening to destroy the traditions and identities of all nations. Therefore nationalists across the world should make common cause in opposing these global forces. Hungarians, Italians, Turks and Israelis should build walls, erect fences and slow down the movement of people, goods, money and ideas.

The world will then be divided into distinct nation-states, each with its own sacred identity and traditions. Based on mutual respect for these differing identities, all nation-states could cooperate and trade peacefully with one another. Hungary will be Hungarian, Turkey will be Turkish, Israel will be Israeli, and everyone will know who they are and what is their proper place in the world. It will be a world without immigration, without universal values, without multiculturalism, and without a global elite—but with peaceful international relations and some trade. In a word, the “Nationalist International” envisions the world as a network of walled-but-friendly fortresses.

Many people would think this is quite a reasonable vision. Why isn’t it a viable alternative to the liberal order? Two things should be noted about it. First, it is still a comparatively liberal vision. It assumes that no human group is superior to all others, that no nation should dominate its peers, and that international cooperation is better than conflict. In fact, liberalism and nationalism were originally closely aligned with one another. The 19th century liberal nationalists, such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini in Italy, and Adam Mickiewicz in Poland, dreamt about precisely such an international liberal order of peacefully-coexisting nations.

The second thing to note about this vision of friendly fortresses is that it has been tried—and it failed spectacularly. All attempts to divide the world into clear-cut nations have so far resulted in war and genocide. When the heirs of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Mickiewicz managed to overthrow the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire, it proved impossible to find a clear line dividing Italians from Slovenes or Poles from Ukrainians.

This had set the stage for the second world war. The key problem with the network of fortresses is that each national fortress wants a bit more land, security and prosperity for itself at the expense of the neighbors, and without the help of universal values and global organisations, rival fortresses cannot agree on any common rules. Walled fortresses are seldom friendly.

But if you happen to live inside a particularly strong fortress, such as America or Russia, why should you care? Some nationalists indeed adopt a more extreme isolationist position. They don’t believe in either a global empire or in a global network of fortresses. Instead, they deny the necessity of any global order whatsoever. “Our fortress should just raise the drawbridges,” they say, “and the rest of the world can go to hell. We should refuse entry to foreign people, foreign ideas and foreign goods, and as long as our walls are stout and the guards are loyal, who cares what happens to the foreigners?”

Such extreme isolationism, however, is completely divorced from economic realities. Without a global trade network, all existing national economies will collapse—including that of North Korea. Many countries will not be able even to feed themselves without imports, and prices of almost all products will skyrocket. The made-in-China shirt I am wearing cost me about $5. If it had been produced by Israeli workers from Israeli-grown cotton using Israeli-made machines powered by non-existing Israeli oil, it may well have cost ten times as much. Nationalist leaders from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin may therefore heap abuse on the global trade network, but none thinks seriously of taking their country completely out of that network. And we cannot have a global trade network without some global order that sets the rules of the game.

Even more importantly, whether people like it or not, humankind today faces three common problems that make a mockery of all national borders, and that can only be solved through global cooperation. These are nuclear war, climate change and technological disruption. You cannot build a wall against nuclear winter or against global warming, and no nation can regulate artificial intelligence (AI) or bioengineering single-handedly. It won’t be enough if only the European Union forbids producing killer robots or only America bans genetically-engineering human babies. Due to the immense potential of such disruptive technologies, if even one country decides to pursue these high-risk high-gain paths, other countries will be forced to follow its dangerous lead for fear of being left behind.

An AI arms race or a biotechnological arms race almost guarantees the worst outcome. Whoever wins the arms race, the loser will likely be humanity itself. For in an arms race, all regulations will collapse. Consider, for example, conducting genetic-engineering experiments on human babies. Every country will say: “We don’t want to conduct such experiments—we are the good guys. But how do we know our rivals are not doing it? We cannot afford to remain behind. So we must do it before them.”

Similarly, consider developing autonomous-weapon systems, that can decide for themselves whether to shoot and kill people. Again, every country will say: “This is a very dangerous technology, and it should be regulated carefully. But we don’t trust our rivals to regulate it, so we must develop it first”.

The only thing that can prevent such destructive arms races is greater trust between countries. This is not an impossible mission. If today the Germans promise the French: “Trust us, we aren’t developing killer robots in a secret laboratory under the Bavarian Alps,” the French are likely to believe the Germans, despite the terrible history of these two countries. We need to build such trust globally. We need to reach a point when Americans and Chinese can trust one another like the French and Germans.

Similarly, we need to create a global safety-net to protect humans against the economic shocks that AI is likely to cause. Automation will create immense new wealth in high-tech hubs such as Silicon Valley, while the worst effects will be felt in developing countries whose economies depend on cheap manual labor. There will be more jobs to software engineers in California, but fewer jobs to Mexican factory workers and truck drivers. We now have a global economy, but politics is still very national. Unless we find solutions on a global level to the disruptions caused by AI, entire countries might collapse, and the resulting chaos, violence and waves of immigration will destabilise the entire world.

This is the proper perspective to look at recent developments such as Brexit. In itself, Brexit isn’t necessarily a bad idea. But is this what Britain and the EU should be dealing with right now? How does Brexit help prevent nuclear war? How does Brexit help prevent climate change? How does Brexit help regulate artificial intelligence and bioengineering? Instead of helping, Brexit makes it harder to solve all of these problems. Every minute that Britain and the EU spend on Brexit is one less minute they spend on preventing climate change and on regulating AI.

In order to survive and flourish in the 21st century, humankind needs effective global cooperation, and so far the only viable blueprint for such cooperation is offered by liberalism. Nevertheless, governments all over the world are undermining the foundations of the liberal order, and the world is turning into a network of fortresses. The first to feel the impact are the weakest members of humanity, who find themselves without any fortress willing to protect them: refugees, illegal migrants, persecuted minorities. But if the walls keep rising, eventually the whole of humankind will feel the squeeze.

### AT: China Led Order

#### Chinese led order is incoherent and fails

Stephen 21 — Matthew D Stephen WZB Berlin Social Science Center, China’s New Multilateral Institutions: A Framework and Research Agenda, International Studies Review, Volume 23, Issue 3, September 2021, Pages 807–834, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viaa076> WMK

However, China’s attempts to “upload” its preferred normative vision to multilateral institutions, even its own, are not always successful. For example, while Xi Jinping initially promoted the idea of an AIIB under the principles of win-win cooperation (ASEAN-China Centre 2013), this has not been reflected in official discourses of the AIIB. The World Internet Conference offers an even clearer example. At the first meeting in 2014, attendees awoke on the last day to find copies of a “Wuzhen Declaration” pushed under their hotel room doors, which repeated key Chinese talking points on internet governance. Upon the objections of several attendees, it was not officially promulgated (Wall Street Journal 2014).

The clumsiness of such attempts at normative entrepreneurialism point toward the difficulty for China in using multilateral formats to promote normative change, let alone an alternative ideology to aspire for global hegemony (Allan, Vucetic, and Hopf 2018). This probably reflects the ideological incoherence of contemporary Chinese society, with its awkward mix of Maoist terminology, Dengist pragmatism, and increasing appeals to classical Chinese thought (Holbig 2013; Madsen 2014; Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova 2018). More likely is that China’s institutions will contribute to normative change simply by avoiding the overtly liberal ideas present in existing institutions that link states’ international legitimacy to their domestic affairs (Zhang 2011, 2016).

### AT: LIO Unsustainable

#### China heg is not sustainable---structural factors

Mueller 22 — John Mueller is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also a member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University. John Mueller, “China Has Been a Failure at Hegemony, So Let’s Just Chill,” Cato Institute, 01-11-22, https://www.cato.org/commentary/china-has-been-failure-hegemony-so-lets-just-chill, accessed 7-4-2022, WMK

Many in the U.S. foreign policy establishment and elsewhere are sounding an alarm over concerns that, as China develops, it will become the dominant power in its region, a “hegemon” that will have too much “influence” there and do damage to U.S. security interests. For example, in 2017 the National Intelligence Council opined that “geopolitical competition” was on the rise and the Chinese sought “to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which U.S. influence does not dominate.”

Accordingly, as it is often suggested, military hardware must be deployed to somehow keep that from happening.

However, to a degree, we already know what Chinese “hegemony” looks like. Over the last decade, China has established a major military and especially economic presence, and it has tried to convert this condition into influence. These experiments in hegemony — China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which has stressed construction loans to countries across Eurasia, and its rather belligerent “wolf diplomacy” antics — have substantially foundered and have, if anything, proved to be counterproductive. The experience does not bode well for future efforts, and it does not justify alarm.

Its much‐​hyped Belt and Road Initiative was once deemed by some to be a key element of a plot by the Chinese to “rule the world.” However, from the beginning there were warnings from Chinese scholars and business leaders questioning the economic rationale for many of the investments. In addition, economist Barry Naughton of the University of California at San Diego notes that the idea was in part economically misguided, and Tufts University’s Michael Beckley has estimated that the scheme would “probably exacerbate China’s woes” by funding “hundreds of financially dubious projects in unstable countries, more than half of which have credit ratings below investment‐​grade.”

These suggestions have proved to be justified. Expenditures of hundreds of billions on the project have failed to deliver either returns for investors (including state‐​run banks) or political returns for China, notes Taiwan‐​based analyst Tanner Green. The project was there, he says, “only because it is the favored brainchild of an authoritarian leader living in an echo chamber” — for other Chinese to attack BRI is “to attack the legitimacy of the party itself.”

By 2019, BRI lending by China had fallen from a peak of $75 billion in 2016 (at a time when its promulgating author, Chinese President Xi Jinping, was touting BRI as “a project of the century”) to just $4 billion. Although some of these projects will likely succeed, there were reports by the end of 2020, like this one by James Kynge and Jonathan Wheatley at the Financial Times, that the money had often been doled out “with a combination of hubris, ambition, and naivete.” Descriptors like “unravelling,” “fallen off a cliff,” and “ill‐​conceived” were being applied by experts, including Matt Ferchen at Merics, a Berlin‐​based think‐​tank, who wrote that China was now “mired in debt renegotiations with a host of countries.”

In fact, as Stanford’s Elizabeth Economy notes, there has been something of a backlash and “stories of Chinese corruption and scandals with infrastructure projects are contributing to rising Sinophobia.” China has shot back saying critics are “prejudiced” and lacking “objectivity and a fair understanding” of the initiative; others have sought to play down criticisms of Chinese labor practices or accusations of debt traps.

Rising concerns have nonetheless pushed the European Union to launch a global investment project that is apparently intended to be a counter to China’s BRI, and the United States seems to want to follow suit. But, as Foreign Policy’s James Palmer noted recently, “all this feels both outdated and unnecessary,” pointing out that “the heyday of BRI hype, even in China, was at least three years ago,” while the current focus is on the “white elephant nature of projects and the relative lack of deliverables for China.”

China’s clumsy “wolf warrior” diplomacy of recent years has also failed to deliver. As Stanford’s Thomas Fingar notes, “muscular displays of Chinese military power may have been intended to dissuade neighboring countries from lending support to imputed U.S. military planning, but they seriously undercut efforts to reassure other countries that they had no reason to fear China’s ‘peaceful rise.’”

Moreover, they have pushed countries it sought to intimidate, such as Japan, India, South Korea, and Australia, to become far more hostile. Thus, historian Arne Westad points out that the efforts “have all backfired: East Asia is much warier of Chinese aims today than it was a decade ago,” and he cites a Pew Research Center poll showing the percentage of South Koreans who viewed China’s rise favorably fell from 66 percent in 2002 to 34 percent in 2017. In Australia the percentage trusting China to act responsibly in the world dropped from 52 percent to 16 percent between 2018 and 2021.

As David Shambaugh, a China specialist at George Washington University, concludes: “If Beijing is trying to recreate a twenty‐​first‐​century version of the imperial ‘tribute system,’ it will inevitably fail, as other sovereign Asian nations do not desire to fall into such a patron‐​client relationship with China again.”

Fingar and Jean Oi summarize the situation: “China’s relationship with more or less all countries is more fraught today than it was before Xi launched the BRI and China began to flex its economic and military muscles in ways neighbors found worrisome.”

#### China can’t become a hegemon

Yue 21 — Yue, J. (2021). The limits to China’s peaceful rise – Deep Integration and a new Cold War. Global Policy, 13(1), 91–106. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13040> WMK

The Chinese regime’s peaceful rise rhetoric reveals the country’s developmental quandary in the age of globalization. Rampant corruption as well as the regime’s strong links with Wall Street finance and intimate collaboration with Western industrial capital have fostered a thriving system of crony comprador capitalism (Ho, 2013; Meisner, 1996, p. 300; Pei, 2016),28 characterized by unprecedented state capture by public and private institutional interests who not only are ‘self-serving’, but also ‘serve the interests of global capital’ (Kwong, 2006; Yue, 2018a, pp. 271–331).29 With this ‘worst form of capitalism’ becoming solidly entrenched, the current campaign waged by the seemingly all-powerful paramount leader Xi Jinping against the ‘ultrarich and famous’ high-tech oligarchs, is motivationally dubious, which has in no small part more to do with affirming ‘politics in command’ (zhengzhi guashuai, 政治挂帅) than with reversing ‘state capture’ by private interests.

In fact, from 2002 onward, the liberal globalization approach to economic development has undergirded the CCP’s guiding ideology of ‘building a socialism of (changed from “with”) Chinese characteristics’,30 symbolizing that the country’s dependent pathway of development has since been fully institutionalized (Yue, 2018a, pp. 111 & 317). The ruling elites are so obsessed with the alleged benefits of globalization as to make the country’s embrace of global capitalism a ‘political correctness’. Since under most circumstances globalization is not open to criticism, China’s commitment to the techno-nationalism that it is widely perceived to have embraced remains deeply in doubt.31

The seemingly grandiose ‘Made in China 2025’ initiative,32 as some Western observers have put it, is ‘an act of desperation’ rather than a plan to dominate’.33 Viewing China’s rise as more hype than reality, Michael Beckley (2018), who has measured power as the ‘function of net resources’, convincingly argued that ‘the United States’ economic and military lead over China is much larger than typically assumed – and that the trends are mostly in America’s favor’. Inspired by Susan Strange’s IPE-based inquiry into American structural power, Sean Starrs (2013), by factoring in the critical role of transnational corporations (TNCs) ‘in the era of transnational modular production networks’, empirically confirmed that ‘American economic power has not declined – it has globalized’. A most recent review done by LSE IDEAS (a policy think tank) asserted that ‘China is not yet a military challenge in the same way as Russia (or the Soviet Union) was during the Cold War’ (Watkins, 2021).

But perception matters in practical terms, whether it is genuine or feigned. In the face of China’s perceived ‘rise’, the US administration, from Obama’s second term in office onward, felt increasingly justified in reinforcing the containment of China to complement its engagement policy, and even began, after Trump’s rise to power, to contemplate decoupling from China, given mounting uncertainty about the regime’s intentions and the security challenge posed by China’s economic rise, increasing military expenditure, and more aggressive international posture.34 That scenario seems a good fit with the ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ paradigm espoused by John Mearsheimer, who has compared China to the autarkic empires of Germany or Japan before 1945.

Comparisons of this kind are far less relevant to reality than they seem. For one thing, the perceived ‘power transition’ (2011–20) was ‘occurring’ when the rising or risen China still lagged far behind the declining USA scientifically and technologically, and seemed destined to remain so into the far distant future. This stands in stark contrast with the power transition from Britain to Germany in the 1901–1910 decade, in which imperial Germany emerged as a superior scientific powerhouse (Table 1). The fallacy of the power shift model is further confirmed by a series of astounding or even humiliating concessions on market access China was obliged to make on a unilateral basis to both the USA and EU in 2020, the year in which the alleged ‘power transition’ to Chinese dominance was complete.35

The prevailing power transition theory (PTT) wrongly assumes that emerging powers are inevitably dissatisfied with the status quo, and are poised to overturn the existing international order. Odd Arne Westad (2021) has refuted this cliché, contending that ‘there is little evidence that the regime is out to destroy the international system designed by and still dominated by Western power. Rather, it seems intent on getting more out of it’. This is due to the brutal fact is that its entrapment in semi-peripheral development has made China not a solid superpower candidate, but rather a fragile great p ower. The country’s elites’ universally uncritical embrace of global capitalism, especially the leadership’s tireless championship of free trade, is a vivid reflection not of the Chinese economy’s structural strength but of its substantial structural weakness.

Moreover, the intellectual background of the post-Mao leadership, including Deng, ‘has given them neither proper knowledge of, nor real insights into, what the current liberal order meant, how it came about, and in what way could it be overturned’ (Yue, 2018a, p. 16). China today is so tightly enmeshed in the international system that it lacks both the will and ability to challenge the USA through any sort of hard-balancing approach. Its lack of ‘potent soft-power sources’ also makes it no match for either the Third Reich or the USSR, which in every sense constituted competing alternatives in their respective eras (Nye, 2015, p. 68). Far from having achieved parity with the USA in terms of relational capabilities – posing competing and more accurate understanding of what it means to be powerful (Quinn & Kitchen, 2019) – China, as Kitchen and Cox (2019) contend, ‘will remain a rule-taker’ unless a new ‘world-making moment’ befalls that equips it with the requisite structural power to wrest international leadership from the USA.

That is not to deny that China’s foreign and security policies have stiffened over the past decade or more, particularly after its success in hosting the 2008 Olympic Games and the coming of the 2007–09 financial crisis. Its increasing assertiveness in the region and the wider world are in large part a consequence of Chinese policy makers’ grave misjudgment of the USA: especially the belief that the financial crisis marked the point of no return in an accelerating US decline. With the USA’s subsequent ‘rebalancing to Asia’, and despite continued nationalist rhetoric, China silently reinstated Deng Xiaoping’s ‘bide time to build up strength’ strategy – also known as the ‘24-character strategy’ – in the closing years of Hu Jintao’s tenure.36

After his accession to power in late 2012, Xi Jinping became fully aware of how corrupt and incompetent the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had become, whose ‘first and paramount mission is (and will continue to be) preserving the power of the Chinese Communist Party against China’s own people’ (Frum, 2021).37 Xi also took note of the fact that China was far more dependent on the USA than vice versa, that it still lacks effective alternatives to escaping from dependency and thus can ill-afford a complete decoupling, especially in technological terms. Xi fully recognized that an all-out trade war, much less a military conflict with the USA, were not viable options for China and must be avoided at all costs. He was entirely candid at his first meeting with Trump at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017: ‘There are a thousand reasons to make the China-U.S. relationship work, and no reason to break it’.38

Thus despite frequent saber-rattling and a cosmetic toughening of China’s foreign policy aimed primarily at domestic opinion,39 the Chinese Communist leadership has viewed continued bandwagoning on the liberal order as crucial to the country’s economic dynamism and thus to the regime’s own security ‘at the critical juncture of painful structural adjustment for fulfilling the desired economic transition’ (Yue, 2018a, p. 312).

#### China led order is impossible---social constraints

Allan 18 — Bentley B. Allan is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and an affiliate of the Environment, Energy, Sustainability, and Health Institute at Johns Hopkins University. Srdjan Vucetic is Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa. Theodore Hopf is an American academic and a leading figure in constructivism in international relations theory. Allan, B., Vucetic, S., & Hopf, T. (2018). The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects. International Organization, 72(4), 839-869. doi:10.1017/S0020818318000267 WMK

What are the prospects for the Western hegemonic order in the face of China’s rise? Broadly speaking, there are three possibilities. The order could remain stable under the leadership of either the US or a coalition of great powers. The order could dissolve without being replaced. Or, China could lead a hegemonic transition, either by joining and transforming the current order or by constructing an alternative order from the outside. To assess which of these is most likely, we return to the three theoretical expectations about the dynamics of hegemonic order we outlined earlier. We conclude that the first two possibilities are more likely than a Chinese-led transition, given the distribution of identity.

First, does the distribution of identity bolster Western hegemony? The evidence shows that while some aspects of Western democratic neoliberal hegemony are contested, the distribution of identity among the great powers provides strong support for Western hegemony. Masses and elites in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India clearly identify with democracy. While the masses in some of these countries reject neoliberalism, elites identify with liberal policies. This suggests that the hegemonic order is likely to remain stable even in the face of a relative decline in American power. Other states would likely be willing to support the order and either bolster American leadership or form a coalition akin to Snidal’s k-group that could maintain most existing rules without a hegemon.

Second, what does the distribution of identity imply for China’s ability to join and transform the existing order? Among the great powers, Chinese elites are alone in openly opposing the democratic element of Western hegemony. This poses an important obstacle to any Chinese global hegemonic project because Chinese elites would have to abandon a fundamental aspect of their own self-understanding to become full members of the current order. There is unlikely to be an American-Chinese hand-off similar to the shift from British to American hegemony because China is not likely to join the existing order as a junior partner. Thus, China is unlikely to lead a transition within the dominant norms of the existing order.

Third, what is the likelihood that China will be able to form an alternative counterhegemonic bloc that would challenge or displace the current order? Again, since all the other great powers save Russia identify as democracies, it is unlikely China can build an ideology that would simultaneously satisfy its domestic needs and appeal to others. So elites and masses in the other great powers would have to reject their democratic identities in favor of a Chinese alternative. This seems unlikely given the strong support for democracy in India and Brazil. To make a nondemocratic hegemony possible, China would have to delegitimate or displace the democratic elements that dominate identity discourses in the other great powers. While this is a possibility, the mass-level support for democracy means any effort to cultivate an alternative, nondemocratic distribution of identity is likely to take a long time. Moreover, China is portrayed negatively in other great-power discourses on this point. In Germany, Chinese authoritarian socialism is linked to a rejected Nazi and Soviet past.Footnote115 Some Indian texts worry that India’s democratic identity will bring it into conflict with a Chinese power hostile to democracy.Footnote116 Elsewhere, China is viewed ambivalently as an economic marvel or competitor, but is never represented positively as a leader or model.

China’s identity discourse contains little else that could be extrapolated into a compelling vision or ideology in support of an alternative international order. Because its national identity discourse is insular, it is hard to imagine how Chinese identity categories could be universalized so they would appeal to others. Given that the masses in all countries except for the UK have ambivalent or negative attitudes toward capitalism, markets, and neoliberalism, one possibility is that China could lead an anti-neoliberal, nationalist, counterhegemonic coalition. There is a latent alternative “historic bloc,” to borrow Gramsci’s terminology, in search of an ideology backed by sufficient global material power to make it hegemonic. But it is difficult to see how China would offer a compelling alternative to neoliberalism. Europeans and others seem ready for social democracy, but China is unlikely to offer that alternative.

### AT: Relations---TL

#### Chinese expansion causes relations breakdown

Haenle and Bresnick 22 — Paul Haenle holds the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Sam Bresnick is assistant editor and research assistant.Paul Haenle, Sam Bresnick, "Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 02-21-2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/21/why-u.s.-china-relations-are-locked-in-stalemate-pub-86478, accessed 7-10-2022, WMK

Former U.S. President Donald Trump ushered in a more confrontational era in U.S.-China relations, and Biden has largely maintained his predecessor’s approach to Beijing, albeit with a more equanimous tone and embrace of multilateralism. The U.S. government has for decades been concerned by China’s mercantilism, rapid military modernization, and illiberal approach to human rights, but it had held out hope that China might liberalize through increasingly robust contact with the rest of the world. That has not happened, and the United States and others have lost patience with China’s state capitalist system, militarization of the South China Sea, and increasingly authoritarian governance.

But Beijing is not backing down. Despite facing pronounced international pushback during the pandemic, Xi has become even more confident in China’s economic system, governance model, and approach to international affairs. “Time and momentum are on China’s side,” he argued last year at a high-level meeting, though many analysts accuse the party of overconfidence. At the same time, Chinese officials are increasingly looking askance at their U.S. counterparts. Many appear to believe that the United States, though still a formidable power, is in the early stages of an inevitable decline. Just as China resumes its rightful place atop the hierarchy of Asian nations, Beijing’s thinking goes, the United States’ unresolved racial justice issues, income inequality, and political polarization will catalyze an irreversible diminution of U.S. power in Asia and across the globe.

Complicating matters further, the U.S. and Chinese publics are increasingly distrustful of each other. A whopping 89 percent of American respondents to a recent survey from the Pew Research Center consider China a competitor or enemy, while around two-thirds of Chinese respondents view the United States unfavorably or very unfavorably. Such negative mutual perceptions would likely hamper each side’s ability to recalibrate its approach to the other.

### AT: Pandemics

#### Pandemics don’t cause extinction.

Halstead 19 John Halstead, doctorate in political philosophy. [Cause Area Report: Existential Risk, Founders Pledge, https://founderspledge.com/research/Cause%20Area%20Report%20-%20Existential%20Risk.pdf]//BPS

However, there are some reasons to think that naturally occurring pathogens are unlikely to cause human extinction. Firstly, Homo sapiens have been around for 200,000 years and the Homo genus for around six million years without being exterminated by an infectious disease, which is evidence that the base rate of extinction-risk natural pathogens is low.82 Indeed, past disease outbreaks have not come close to rendering humans extinct. Although bodies were piled high in the streets across Europe during the Black Death,83 human extinction was never a serious possibility, and some economists even argue that it was a boon for the European economy.84 Secondly, infectious disease has only contributed to the extinction of a small minority of animal species.85 The only confirmed case of a mammalian species extinction being caused by an infectious disease is a type of rat native only to Christmas Island. Having said that, the context may be importantly different for modern day humans, so it is unclear whether the risk is increasing or decreasing. On the one hand, due to globalisation, the world is more interconnected making it easier for pathogens to spread. On the other hand, interconnectedness could also increase immunity by increasing exposure to lower virulence strains between subpopulations.87 Moreover, advancements in medicine and sanitation limit the potential damage an outbreak might do.

### AT: Warming

#### Climate change doesn’t cause extinction.

Kerr et al. ’19 [Amber, Daniel Swain, Andrew King, Peter Kalmus, Richard Betts, and William Huiskamp; June 4; Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub; Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research; Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne; Physics PhD at the University of Colombia, climate scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab; Professor and Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in Working Group 1; Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; Climate Feedback, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence,” <https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/iflscience-story-on-speculative-report-provides-little-scientific-context-james-felton/>]

There is no scientific basis to suggest that climate breakdown will “annihilate intelligent life” (by which I assume the report authors mean human extinction) by 2050.

However, climate breakdown does pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it, and the potential for mass suffering on a scale perhaps never before encountered by humankind. This should be enough reason for action without any need for exaggeration or misrepresentation!

A “Hothouse Earth” scenario plays out that sees Earth’s temperatures doomed to rise by a further 1°C (1.8°F) even if we stopped emissions immediately.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

This word choice perhaps reveals a bias on the part of the author of the article. A temperature can’t be doomed. And while I certainly do not encourage false optimism, assuming that humanity is doomed is lazy and counterproductive.

Fifty-five percent of the global population are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions beyond that which humans can survive

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

This is clearly from Mora et al (2017) although the report does not include a citation of the paper as the source of that statement. The way it is written here (and in the report) is misleading because it gives the impression that everyone dies in those conditions. That is not actually how Mora et al define “deadly heat” – they merely looked for heatwaves when somebody died (not everybody) and then used that as the definition of a “deadly” heatwave.

North America suffers extreme weather events including wildfires, drought, and heatwaves. Monsoons in China fail, the great rivers of Asia virtually dry up, and rainfall in central America falls by half.

Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:

Projections of extreme events such as these are very difficult to make and vary greatly between different climate models.

Deadly heat conditions across West Africa persist for over 100 days a year

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

The deadly heat projections (this, and the one from the previous paragraph) come from Mora et al (2017)1.

It should be clarified that “deadly heat” here means heat and humidity beyond a two-dimension threshold where at least one person in the region subject to that heat and humidity dies (i.e., not everyone instantly dies). That said, in my opinion, the projections in Mora et al are conservative and the methods of Mora et al are sound. I did not check the claims in this report against Mora et al but I have no reason to think they are in error.

1- Mora et al (2017) Global risk of deadly heat, Nature Climate Change

The knock-on consequences affect national security, as the scale of the challenges involved, such as pandemic disease outbreaks, are overwhelming. Armed conflicts over resources may become a reality, and have the potential to escalate into nuclear war. In the worst case scenario, a scale of destruction the authors say is beyond their capacity to model, there is a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’.

Willem Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research:

This is a highly questionable conclusion. The reference provided in the report is for the “Global Catastrophic Risks 2018” report from the “Global Challenges Foundation” and not peer-reviewed literature. (It is worth noting that this latter report also provides no peer-reviewed evidence to support this claim).

Furthermore, if it is apparently beyond our capability to model these impacts, how can they assign a ‘high likelihood’ to this outcome?

While it is true that warming of this magnitude would be catastrophic, making claims such as this without evidence serves only to undermine the trust the public will have in the science.

Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research:

It seems that the eye-catching headline-level claims in the report stem almost entirely from these knock-on effects, which the authors themselves admit are “beyond their capacity to model.” Thus, from a scientific perspective, the purported “high likelihood of civilization coming to an end by 2050” is essentially personal speculation on the part of the report’s authors, rather than a clear conclusion drawn from rigorous assessment of the available evidence.

### AT: Terrorism

#### No nuke terror.

Christopher J. Fettweis 19. Associate professor of political science at Tulane University. “Pessimism and Nostalgia in the Second Nuclear Age.” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13.1

Finally, despite the string of bleak and terrifying projections from a variety of experts, nuclear weapons have remained well beyond the capabilities of the modern apocalyptic terrorist. The great fear of the SNA literature, that scientific knowledge and technology would gradually become more accessible to nonstate actors, has remained only a dream. Nor does there appear to be a great reservoir of fissile material in the world’s various black markets waiting to be weaponized.58 Just because something has not yet occurred does not mean that it cannot or will not occur eventually. However, it is worth noting that the world has not experienced any close calls regarding nuclear terrorism. Forecasting future unique events is a necessarily dicey enterprise, but one way to improve accuracy is to examine events that have already or almost happened. Given the many complexities involved with nuclear weapons, especially for amateurs as any terrorists would almost certainly be, it is not unreasonable to expect a few failures, or near misses, to precede success. While it is possible that we might not know about all the plots disrupted by international law enforcement, keeping the lid on nuclear near misses would presumably be no small task. As of this writing, the public is aware of no serious attempts to construct, steal, or purchase nuclear weapons, much less smuggle and detonate one. “Leakage” does not seem to be a problem, yet.59 The uniformly pessimistic projections about the second nuclear era have not, at least thus far, been borne out by events. Post–Cold War trends have instead been generally moving in directions opposite to these expectations, with fewer nuclear weapons in the hands of the same number of countries and none pursuing more. Why, then, doesnuclear pessimism persist? What are the roots of the current fashionable unwillingness—or even inability—to detect positive patterns in nuclear security?

### AT: Noko

#### No Korea war.

Post ’21 [Daniel; 1/29/21; PhD Candidate in IR @ Brown University; “Deterring North Korea,” <https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/deterring-north-korea/>]

With these principles in mind, can deterrence continue to work vis-a-vis North Korea? In short, yes. Throughout the evolution of the U.S-North Korean deterrence relationship, vulnerability has played an important role in the nuclear strategies and policies of both sides. The vulnerability of U.S. allies and assets in the region to North Korea’s intermediate-range missile and artillery barrages has almost certainly been a check on a more aggressive U.S. strategy, whether geared toward nonproliferation or regime change. It is certainly plausible that in the absence of this vulnerability the chances of the U.S. preventively attacking North during the Trump administration would have been higher, especially considering the extremely hawkish views of his national security adviser in 2017. As a result of this vulnerability, the U.S. routinely demonstrates its dedication to security agreements with allies in word and deed. Strategic bomber flights and military exercises, for example, demonstrate to North Korea their own vulnerability to U.S. and allied power in the region. Conversely, although the Kim regime would like nothing more than to unify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean leadership (dubbed the “holy grail of North Korean statecraft” in a recent report), it has refrained from overt and aggressive military action in pursuit of this goal. There is no doubt that Kim, like his predecessors, is wary of such behavior in the face of U.S. and allied military capabilities. Today, North Korea remains vulnerable to U.S. nuclear attacks, while the United States and its regional partners remain vulnerable to nuclear attack or retaliation from North Korea. This mutual vulnerability necessitates caution on both sides.

Recent progress in North Korean missile technology have made portions of the U.S. mainland vulnerable, giving the U.S. further reason to avoid unnecessary provocation. In 2017, North Korea conducted several tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles, two of which demonstrated the capability to potentially reach the continental United States. More recently, North Korea has successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile and has showcased a new and larger submarine-launched ballistic missile at a recent parade. As a result, the United States continues to invest significantly in homeland missile defense, as well as to deploy missile defenses to defend allies and assets in the region. Missile defenses likely contribute to increased feelings of vulnerability among Kim’s regime, which may see the build-up as a prelude to a military offensive. Though imperfect, these attempts to reduce vulnerability enhance deterrence by potentially denying North Korea the expected military gains from a limited missile attack, even as fully effective missile defenses might contribute to strategic instability. Regardless of their effectiveness, Kim will have to factor in these defensive capabilities when assessing the success of engaging in conflict and will question the ability to achieve even limited goals through limited means. For example, in order to ensure the success of a missile attack, Kim would have to increase the size of the salvo in order to compensate for missiles likely to be shot down by U.S. and allied defenses. But knowing that a larger initial attack would be perceived as particularly aggressive and would likely invite a larger counter-attack, he might be deterred from pursuing whatever limited gains a smaller attack might have achieved. From Kim’s perspective, U.S. military capabilities are more than sufficient to make military success for North Korea in any conflict appear difficult and costly. Vulnerability to severe retaliation and punishment from U.S. strategic forces is also currently unavoidable for Kim. In fact, this very vulnerability has driven the North Korean nuclear program toward a capability to directly threaten the U.S., thereby demonstrating its own acknowledgement of vulnerability. In sum, both sides are vulnerable to each other. Most importantly for U.S. decision-makers, there is no likely development in the near to medium term that might remove this sense of vulnerability from Kim’s mind.

There is also great uncertainty in the nuclear capabilities and red lines of each side, in particular concerns about what might cause Kim to feel existentially threatened, and concerns over what might trigger the United States to exercise nuclear defense on behalf of its allies in the region. Kim consistently expresses concerns about regime survival and fear of a U.S. attack, and recent U.S. regime change operations in other states only strengthen this fear. While the United States should be careful not to inadvertently increase this threat level to a point where Kim believes he must start a major war, the threat of nuclear retaliation should be maintained. Such a scenario is far from implausible (nuclear scholar Jeffrey Lewis sketches out a hypothetical nuclear war between North Korea and the United States in a recent novel). Missile defenses also add an important element of uncertainty to the relationship. Uncertainty about the effectiveness of these systems should induce caution on both sides because neither can be completely sure about how effective the systems will be (though these systems may also strengthen resolve on the part of the U.S. if deemed very effective, as Robert Powell suggests). Although the United States has been clear in its statements regarding North Korean nuclear use, for example stating in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that “there is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive,” uncertainty remains about which actions beneath the nuclear threshold might trigger a larger response. This uncertainty will undoubtedly induce caution in even lower-level conflict behavior. The U.S. explicitly includes some level of ambiguity and uncertainty in its declaratory statements, such as when describing possible conditions for nuclear use, saying, “Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.” This type of statement leaves plenty of room for adversaries to question what might trigger a response and makes any aggression against the U.S. or its allies a risky proposition.

Last, both Kim and leaders in the United States and its allies appear to remain rational actors despite recent bombastic behavior and inflammatory rhetoric (which may be plausibly attributed to clumsy signaling attempts). Kim may be a cold and brutal oppressor, but his behavior should be seen as quite rational if you make the very supportable assumption that, like most political leaders, his primary goal is keeping his regime alive and keeping himself in power. As others have noted, “Kim is a tyrant, but I don’t think he is suicidal.” Kim continues to build and enhance his nuclear weapons capability in reaction to real and proximate threats to his very survival. The United States frequently conducts exercises with South Korea and Japan, and North Korea frequently decries these exercises as hostile and reckless. Kim sees these exercises as practice events for an eventual attack on North Korea. The United States has also stationed missile defense capabilities in South Korea and Japan, as well as on ships in the region. Kim’s continued pursuit of enhanced nuclear capabilities in response is as rational as it is for the U.S. to want to mitigate its own vulnerability. Frequent military deployments to the region, and overflights of U.S. strategic (nuclear capable) bombers also serve to enhance the perception of threat on behalf of Kim. These security dilemma dynamics have certainly contributed to Kim’s rational pursuit of an enhanced nuclear weapons capability. On top of these very visible military measures, recent dramatic increases in hostile rhetoric from former President Donald Trump, such as his “fire and fury” remarks, have only served to solidify Kim’s perceived need for a nuclear deterrent to potential U.S.-backed regime change. Of course, deterrence requires clear communication and credibility, which includes demonstrating capability. Kim is well aware that if he were to engage in any sort of large scale aggressive military behavior against his neighbors, this could spell the end of his regime. He also has no reason to doubt the U.S. capability and opportunity to respond to threats from North Korea. Assuming, as I do above, that Kim desires to remain the leader of his country and to preserve his regime, he has little incentive to test the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Whether his eccentric and brutal behavior leads to some other inadvertent escalation is a different question. As far as U.S. leaders are concerned, assuming Kim is rational enough to know what he wants and to recognize how he can lose it seems to be a safe bet.

### AT: Space War

#### No space war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS.

Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals.

Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted.

The Reality

The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space.

That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern.

More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do.

However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space.

These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

### AT: Bioterror

#### No bioterror impact---it assumes every warrant.

Glenn Cross 21, PhD, Former Deputy National Intelligence Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction, "Biological Weapons in The ‘Shadow War’," War on the Rocks, 11/09/2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/biological-weapons-in-the-shadow-war/.

The threat of terrorists using biological agents exists but is very limited. The fear of nonstate actors using biological agents rose with Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 failed efforts to spread botulinum and anthrax in Japan. Fears of bioterror reached its most recent crescendo with the 2001 anthrax letter mailings, coming as they did within weeks after the 9/11 attacks. The threat of further bioterror attacks, however, never materialized.

Despite the fact that terrorist biological weapons attacks have not materialized since the Amerithrax scare, some continue to argue that the supposed ease and lower cost of biological weapons development, production, and use along with the societal disruption of COVID-19 has incentivized bad actors to adopt biological weapons. These concerns have been echoed by others who assume that misuse is inevitable and following the COVID-19 example will result in mass casualties and crippling political, societal, and economic repercussions.

However, the bioterror threat seems to have diminished — not grown — since the 2001 Amerithrax letter mailings. The core al-Qaeda biological weapons efforts were first envisioned in the late 1990s and began in earnest shortly afterward. Yet the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 effectively disrupted al-Qaeda’s biological weapons work which largely centered on anthrax. Left without a suitable safe haven, al-Qaeda was never able to reconstitute its biological weapons efforts. The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, however, may result in a reemergence of al-Qaeda and its biological weapons ambitions. Time will tell whether the Taliban now will grant safe haven to al-Qaeda that could be used for biological weapons work. What is undoubted is that the Taliban and al-Qaeda have a shared history and have continued to work closely together. Without a presence in Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence will have a more difficult time detecting any resurgent al-Qaeda biological weapons efforts.

The threat of a biological weapons effort by the Islamic State in Iraq never materialized, although the group did manage to produce and use chemical weapons agents until that program was effectively disrupted. Other terrorist groups’ interest in biological weapons has been rudimentary with a focus predominately on toxins such as ricin and botulinum. U.S. domestic extremists, self-radicalized individuals, and lone actors also have gravitated toward ricin, but no known casualties have resulted from the decades-long interest in ricin.

Some analysts, however, argue that the life science revolution and global proliferation of related scientific and technical capabilities has opened a Pandora’s Box of biothreats. The argument goes that the rapid revolution in genetic engineering — including synthetic biology — the DIY bio movement, and the advent of technologies like CRISPR (acronym for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats”) makes their misuse likely. However, as noted in the 2018 National Academies of Science report, Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, the large-scale production and delivery of biological weapons agents is inherently difficult, with biological weapons use favoring small-scale, highly targeted attacks.

### AT: AI

#### No emerging tech impact.

Pinker et al. ’20 [Steven; PhD, Professor of Psychology @ Harvard; Stuart Russell, Professor of Computer Science @ UC Berkeley; Lucas Perry; “Steven Pinker and Stuart Russell on the Foundations, Benefits, and Possible Existential Threat of AI”; June 29th, 2020; https://futureoflife.org/2020/06/15/steven-pinker-and-stuart-russell-on-the-foundations-benefits-and-possible-existential-risk-of-ai/]

Lucas Perry: Now that’s quite a beautiful picture of the future. There’s a lot of existential hope there. The other side to existential hope is existential risk. Now this is an interesting subject, which Steve and you, Stuart, I believe have disagreements about. So pivoting into this area, and Steve, you can go first here, do you believe that human beings, should we not go extinct in the meantime, will we build artificial superintelligence? And does that pose an existential risk to humanity?

Steven Pinker: Yeah, I’m on record as being skeptical of that scenario and dubious about the value of putting a lot of effort into worrying about it now. The concept of superintelligence is itself obscure. In a lot of the discussions you could replace the word “superintelligence” with “magic” or “miracle” and the sentence would read the same. You read about an AI system that could duplicate brains in silicon, or solve problems like war in the Middle East, or cure cancer.  It’s just imagining the possibility of a solution and assuming that the ability to bring it about will exist, without laying out what that intelligence would consist of, or what would count as a solution to the problem.

So I find the concept of superintelligence itself a dubious extrapolation of an unextrapolable continuum, like human-to-animal, or not-so-bright human-to-smart-human. I don’t think there is a power called “intelligence” such that we can compare a squirrel or an octopus to a human and say, “Well, imagine even more of that.”

I’m also skeptical about the existential risk scenarios. They tend to come in two varieties. One is based on the notion of a will to power: that as soon as you get an intelligent system, it will inevitably want to dominate and exploit. Often the analogy is that we humans have exploited and often extinguished animals because we’re smarter than them, so as soon as there is an artificial system that’s smarter than us, it’ll do to us what we did to the dodos. Or that technologically advanced civilizations, like European colonists and conquistadors subjugated and sometimes wiped out indigenous peoples, so that’s what an AI system might do to us. That’s one variety of this scenario.

I think that scenario confuses intelligence with dominance, based on the fact that in one species, Homo sapiens, they happen to come bundled together, because we came about through natural selection, a competitive process driven by relative success at capturing scarce resources and competing for mates, ultimately with the goal of relative reproductive success. But there’s no reason that a system that is designed to pursue a goal would have as its goal, domination. This goes back to our earlier discussion that the ability to achieve a goal is distinct from what the goal is.

It just so happens that in products of natural selection, the goal was winning in reproductive competition. For an artifact we design, there’s just no reason that would be true. This is sometimes called the orthogonality thesis in discussions of existential risk, although that’s just a fancy-schmancy way of referring to Hume’s distinction between our goals and our intelligence.

Now I know that there is an argument that says, “Wouldn’t any intelligence system have to maximize its own survivability, because if it’s given the goal of X, well, you can’t achieve X if you don’t exist, therefore, as a subgoal to achieving X, you’ve got to maximize your own survival at all costs.” I think that’s fallacious. It’s certainly not true that all complex systems have to work toward their own perpetuation. My iPhone doesn’t take any steps to resist my dropping it into a toilet, or letting it run out of power.

You could imagine if it could be programmed like a child to whine, and to cry, and to refuse to do what it’s told to do as its power level went down. We wouldn’t buy one. And we know in the natural world, there are plenty of living systems that sacrifice their own existence for other goals. When a bee stings you, its barbed stinger is dislodged when the bee escapes, killing the bee, but because the bee is programmed to maximize the survivability of the colony, not itself, it willingly sacrifices itself. So it is not true that by definition an intelligent system has to maximize its own power or survivability.

But the more common existential threat scenario is not a will to power but collateral damage. That if an AI system is given a single goal, what if it relentlessly pursues it without consideration of side effects, including harm to us? There are famous examples that I originally thought were spoofs, but were intended seriously, like giving an AI system the goal of making as many paperclips as possible, and so it converts all available matter into paperclips, including our own bodies (putting aside the fact that we don’t need more efficient paperclip manufacturing than what we already have, and that human bodies are a pretty crummy source of iron for paperclips).

Barely more plausible is the idea that we might give an AI system the goal of curing cancer, and so it will  conscript us as involuntary guinea pigs and induce tumors in all of us, or that we might give it the goal of regulating the level of water behind a dam and it might flood a town because it was never given the goal of not drowning a village.

The problem with these scenarios is that they’re self-refuting. They assume that an “intelligent” artifact would be designed to implement a single goal, which is not true of even the stupid artifacts that we live with. When we design a car, we don’t just give the goal of going from A to B as fast as possible; we also install brakes and a steering wheel and a muffler and a catalytic converter. A lot of these scenarios seem to presuppose both idiocy on the part of the designers

, who would give a system control over the infrastructure of the entire planet without testing it first to see how it worked, and an idiocy on the part of the allegedly intelligent system, which would pursue a single goal regardless of all the other effects. This does not exist in any human artifact, let alone one that claims to be intelligent. Giving an AI system one vaguely worded, sketchy goal, and empowering it with control over the entire infrastructure of the planet without testing it first seems to me just so self-evidently moronic that I don’t worry that engineers have to be warned against it.

I’ve quoted Stuart himself, who in an interview made the point well when he said, “No one talks about building bridges that don’t fall down. They just call it building bridges.” Likewise, AI that avoids idiocies like that is just AI, it’s not AI with extra safeguards. That’s what intelligence consists of.

#### No runaway AI

Edward Moore Geist 15, MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, Former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the RAND Corporation, Doctorate in History from the University of North Carolina, “Is Artificial Intelligence Really An Existential Threat to Humanity?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 8-9, https://thebulletin.org/2015/08/is-artificial-intelligence-really-an-existential-threat-to-humanity/

Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies is an astonishing book with an alarming thesis: Intelligent machines are “quite possibly the most important and most daunting challenge humanity has ever faced.” In it, Oxford University philosopher Nick Bostrom, who has built his reputation on the study of “existential risk,” argues forcefully that artificial intelligence might be the most apocalyptic technology of all. With intellectual powers beyond human comprehension, he prognosticates, self-improving artificial intelligences could effortlessly enslave or destroy Homo sapiens if they so wished. While he expresses skepticism that such machines can be controlled, Bostrom claims that if we program the right “human-friendly” values into them, they will continue to uphold these virtues, no matter how powerful the machines become.

These views have found an eager audience. In August 2014, PayPal cofounder and electric car magnate Elon Musk tweeted “Worth reading Superintelligence by Bostrom. We need to be super careful with AI. Potentially more dangerous than nukes.” Bill Gates declared, “I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.” More ominously, legendary astrophysicist Stephen Hawking concurred: “I think the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.” Proving his concern went beyond mere rhetoric, Musk donated $10 million to the Future of Life Institute “to support research aimed at keeping AI beneficial for humanity.”

Superintelligence is propounding a solution that will not work to a problem that probably does not exist, but Bostrom and Musk are right that now is the time to take the ethical and policy implications of artificial intelligence seriously. The extraordinary claim that machines can become so intelligent as to gain demonic powers requires extraordinary evidence, particularly since artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have struggled to create machines that show much evidence of intelligence at all. While these investigators’ ultimate goals have varied since the emergence of the discipline in the mid-1950s, the fundamental aim of AI has always been to create machines that demonstrate intelligent behavior, whether to better understand human cognition or to solve practical problems. Some AI researchers even tried to create the self-improving reasoning machines Bostrom fears. Through decades of bitter experience, however, they learned not only that creating intelligence is more difficult than they initially expected, but also that it grows increasingly harder the smarter one tries to become. Bostrom’s concept of “superintelligence,” which he defines as “any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest,” builds upon similar discredited assumptions about the nature of thought that the pioneers of AI held decades ago. A summary of Bostrom’s arguments, contextualized in the history of artificial intelligence, demonstrates how this is so.

In the 1950s, the founders of the field of artificial intelligence assumed that the discovery of a few fundamental insights would make machines smarter than people within a few decades. By the 1980s, however, they discovered fundamental limitations that show that there will always be diminishing returns to additional processing power and data. Although these technical hurdles pose no barrier to the creation of human-level AI, they will likely forestall the sudden emergence of an unstoppable “superintelligence.”

The risks of self-improving intelligent machines are grossly exaggerated and ought not serve as a distraction from the existential risks we already face, especially given that the limited AI technology we already have is poised to make threats like those posed by nuclear weapons even more pressing than they currently are. Disturbingly, little or no technical progress beyond that demonstrated by self-driving cars is necessary for artificial intelligence to have potentially devastating, cascading economic, strategic, and political effects. While policymakers ought not lose sleep over the technically implausible menace of “superintelligence,” they have every reason to be worried about emerging AI applications such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s submarine-hunting drones, which threaten to upend longstanding geostrategic assumptions in the near future. Unfortunately, Superintelligence offers little insight into how to confront these pressing challenges.

### AT: Peacekeepers

#### Peacekeeping fails even with Chinese support

Autesserre 19 — Séverine Autesserre is a French-American author and researcher. She writes about war and peace, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and African politics. Autesserre, Severine. "The Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN Can't End Wars." Foreign Affairs, vol. 98, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 2019, pp. 101+. Gale Academic OneFile, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A566263292/AONE?u=umuser&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=ce3384aa. Accessed 8 July 2022. WMK

Both the peacekeeping leadership in New York and the rank and file in the field tend to blame all these woes on the Security Council, which provides neither adequate resources nor clear mandates. To ensure success, they say, peacekeepers need more money, more logistical support, and more people, along with more realistic instructions. And, they add, the Security Council needs to force countries that contribute troops to stop interfering with the operations on the ground and instead tell their officers to respect the UN chain of command. But peacekeepers can't hold the Security Council responsible for all their shortcomings. Because they are the product of compromise, mandates are always vague, and they always need to be interpreted. Besides, even when powerful states and troop-contributing countries devote ample resources to a UN mission, the resulting efforts often fail.

The problem is bigger than mandates and resources. Above all, it has to do with two strategic choices the UN frequently makes: first, to work with national elites to stop violence from the top down and, second, to push for quick elections as a way to consolidate the peace. The standard UN approach to ending wars is to host large, costly conferences in order to strike agreements between governments and rebel leaders and then organize a national vote and declare victory. Both tendencies are based on faulty assumptions.

The weakness of the top-down approach is that warfare is often the result of not just national or international competition but local competition, too. In many conflict zones, the fight is over such issues as land, water, livestock, and low-level traditional and administrative power. In South Sudan, for example, it is not only tensions between President Salva Kiir and the former vice president and now rebel leader Riek Machar that fuel the current fighting; it is also clan rivalries and countless spats between herders and farmers.

When it comes to the UN's fixation on elections, the problem is that pushing for a vote before a country is ready may do more harm than good. In Angola in 1992, a premature vote triggered a resumption of fighting between the ruling party and the main rebel group (resulting in more deaths in two years than there were in the 17-year war that the UN had supposedly ended).

Both of these errors are on full display today in Congo, the site of both the world's deadliest conflict since World War II and the largest peacekeeping mission in the world. The UN attributes strife there to national and international factors: a weak central government, tensions between Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his opponents, and disputes with neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. It views elections, which Kabila has delayed for years, as a sort of cure-all. In fact, much of the violence in Congo is local in origin. Disputes often center on who will control neighboring land, the exploitation of local mining sites, or the traditional or administrative power over a village or a district. These tensions often result in localized fighting in one village or territory but frequently escalate into generalized conflict across a whole province and even at times spill over into neighboring countries.

Compounding these mistakes is the UN's overriding disdain for all things local. Because subject-area experience is valued more than country expertise, management positions almost always go to foreigners, who usually have no in-depth knowledge of their host societies, cultures, or institutions. Often, staff lack the language skills to communicate with local people--or even, at times, with one another. In the mission in Cyprus, for example, few peacekeepers speak Greek or Turkish; the same is true for Arabic or Nuer in South Sudan, Albanian or Serbo-Croatian in Kosovo, and French or Haitian Creole in Haiti.

Peacekeepers' everyday behavior only adds to the problem. Both the UN's military personnel and its civilian personnel live in fortified compounds and gather information mainly from elites. Sometimes, the result is that they thoughtlessly apply universal templates. For example, on seeing the success of so-called disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in Burundi and Sierra Leone, the UN attempted similar initiatives in Haiti and South Sudan, where conditions were different; the efforts failed. At other times, dangerous groupthink takes hold. In Congo, for instance, between the last two rounds of elections, from 2006 to 2011, most peacekeepers held a simplistic view of the primary cause of the violence (the illegal exploitation of mineral resources), the main consequence (sexual abuse of women and girls), and the best solution (a stronger state). By empowering the Congolese government and its army, the strategy that emerged from this view actually led to an uptick in human rights violations, including sexual abuse.

The preponderance of foreign staff and foreign ideas also generates resentment among local partners. In country after country, residents complain that peacekeepers are arrogant and demeaning, live in lavish accommodations, drive fancy suvs, and spend far too much time relaxing and far too little actually doing their jobs. They regularly disparage peacekeepers as neocolonial; local media portray them as parasites at best and thugs at worst. Fair or unfair, these views often cause local people to refuse to cooperate with UN initiatives, even when they support the underlying goals.

#### Authoritarian spread collapses the UN

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A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the United Nations , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become fragmented and less effective.

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#### Their ev is inconclusive

Can and Chan 22 — Ciwan M. Can, Anson Chan. Preventive or Revisionist Challenge During Power Transition? The Case of China–USA Strategic Competition. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs. 2022;9(1):7-25. doi:10.1177/23477970221076646 WMK

Before we move on to next section, we do find it necessary to clarify that the following article in no way seeks to provide a final argument on the ongoing scholarly debate on China–USA relations. We further acknowledge that we here provide a crude and abstract analysis as this has been necessary for the purpose of our argument and due to limitation on space. That said, we hope this article will be a fruitful and humble contribution to the academic discussions relating to revisionist versus preventive hegemonic confrontations during power transition processes in general, and China–USA relations in particular.